It will fall into chaos as a result of renewed famine and poverty, resulting in military crackdowns.
There will be a military coup that displaces the current leadership, hopefully soon.
It will continue to remain a closed society, technologically dormant and otherwise insignificant.
The leadership will eventually make a misstep, forcing military action from the United States.
First off the risk from NK is much higher because of their nuclear capability. So there is the first mistake from the weakness of the past.
Given the survival of the NK regime under the current sanctions China remains their source of all sanctions busting imports and probably finance as well. The power is total, "do as we say or we close the border."
China holds the key.
... oh yes, and tell the kids in SK to stop doing silly things unless they are will to step up to the plate and not just threaten to take action next time.
Supposedly there were two waves. The first had shells landing all over the place, apparently including water. The second more or less landed on the base itself. The island also has bunkers which the military and civilians took cover in. That probably explains the widespread damage (also partly thanks to the fires started by the shelling) and low casualties.
I would also add that we should be careful not to assume that the Chinese always see these incidents in exactly the same way we do.
It isn't clear to me, for example, that Beijing is convinced that the ROKS Cheonan was necessarily sunk by a North Korean torpedo. Beijing may also agree with Pyongyang that ROK live-fire naval exercises just outside a disputed maritime boundary were provocative, and may even lend some credence to North Korean claims that the incident started when South Korean shells landed in Northern territory.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
Exactly how does firing on civilian targets actually in South Korean territory fit within Chinese parameters of acceptability.
May just be me, but if they believed as you say wouldn't it seem like this particular action puts them in a rather tough position to say that the North was being unduly accused on the Cheonan.
And lets not forget that its the North who decided to walk someone through to get a look at their new toys just a little bit ago. Somehow the narrative here doesn't seem to help much with the Chinese pushing back against accusations of undue provocations by Kim and company.
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
The demarcation line known informally as the '38th Parallel" or the De Militarized Zone doe not extend into the coastal waters on wither side of the Peninsula, both Notrt and South Korea -- for different reasons -- did not want that to occur at the time of the Truce.
The South did not want it because they effectively occupied many of the islands off both North Korean coasts; the North wanted them to fight over in the future...
The South has moved off many of those islands but still occupy those where the sinking of the Corvette and this artillery duel took place. The North contends they are NK territory, the South disagrees and the South does deliberately provoke things in that area -- and have done so since 1954.
The Chinese -- and the Koreans (both) do indeed look at this far differently than do we. The Chinese also look at differently than does North Korea.
Seems awful undefined for such a heavily fortified and possibly explosive area.
Actually quite surprising in that it seems rather less predictable then the Chinese would usually prefer considering both their proximity and in larger terms the effects circumstances there can have on those countries close by.
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
I doubt the Chinese thought it was helpful. Equally, however, North Korea does not accept the current post-war border demarcation (the Northern Limit Line), a complicated issue on which I'm not sure that China has a definitive position. The Chinese may well feel that South Korean live fire exercises in a disputed area (and the alleged shelling of North Korean waters, according to Pyongyang) were provocative, even if the subsequent North Korean response was disproportionate.
My point is that we should not assume that China's perception of the conflict is always the same as ours.
* * *
Since I started writing this, five students have knocked on my door, and Ken has written pretty much the same thing.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
From the Mail & Guardian:
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak accepted the resignation of his defence minister on Thursday, two days after an attack by North Korea and amid criticism that the South's response was too slow.
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/artic...sp?aid=2928852
There are other articles out there.
China? No one else has the leverage to do so.
Last edited by Maeda Toshiie; 11-26-2010 at 07:52 AM.
One of the interesting side effects of the recent incident is that China seems to have backed down on its opposition to a US carrier operating in the Yellow Sea. Previous announcements opposed any operation in the sea, now the reference is to areas within the 200 mile exclusive economic zone, which does not cover all of the Yellow Sea. I wonder if JMA will call this a "humiliating climb down".
Realistically, of course, it's less about China and the US than about China sending a message to North Korea. It would be a huge mistake to believe that China has full control over North Korea and that the North asks permission before taking any action: the North is and has long been quite willing to take their patrons by surprise. They are dependent, but they are well aware of the reasons China keeps them afloat and they are aware that the strategic imperative will still be there even if they throw Beijing a curveball now and then. I don't suppose the Chinese are very happy with the latest performance - hence the back-down on the US exercises that the North finds so offensive - but they still aren't going to allow the North to fold up. If that happened and the North was absorbed by the south, China would have an economically potent, militarily significant US ally on their border. They don't want that and the North Koreans know it, which gives the North leverage despite their dependence.
and the answer to your question is "of course not..."
Bold assumption that DPRK finds the exercises offensive. The case could be made that the DPRK welcomes these excuses for military action.
The theme lately seems to be "avoid reunification at all costs". Note the failure of the Kaesung Industrial Complex, and how the most recent events derailed a scheduled reunification talk. The appearance is that the North is pursuing status quo, albeit an earlier status quo with more generous food shipments from the South. But it makes a twisted kind of sense.
What advantage is there for regime members in reunification? Who will guarantee their status, quality of life, personal security, and financial incentives? More important, who will guarantee KJI's steady stream of comfort girls?
But who in this game would benefit from reunification?
The U.S. would most likely lose basing (greatly diminished basing as the very least) in the region, and our foothold in the region.
China would lose the buffer between democracy and the middle kingdom, and would run what is likely to be an unacceptable risk of disturbing the harmony of the ethnic Koreans in China.
Japan would see both military and economic threats in the long term from a unified Korea.
South Korea would bear the brunt of rehabilitating an environmentally, socially, and economically devastated region.
Russia is the only player who might be open to reunification, simply to reduce the U.S. presense in the Pacific Rim, but runs risk to their interests in the region from branches and sequels of reunification (various possibilities for war, shifting economic blocks, etc).
So the big question is "What does DPRK really get out of this?"
-Shifting fishing in the region, now that the fishing villages on those islands have been relocated, although this might benefit China more.
-Attention. ("I'm such a big player now! Look how upset I got the U.S.")
-Leverage in the next round of food begging/barginning ("Feed us or we'll do this again!")
-Maybe, and this is the long-shot, Tom Clancy scenario; U.S. attention drawn away from a DPRK ally like Iran or Syria...
Ok granted, should have said "publicly". I've no doubt that the north needs and relies upon responses to provocation. Like so many other governments, they need somebody to hate.
In some ways the most provocative and disconcerting response we could give to provocation would be to completely ignore it, but that's difficult to do... and would leave the temptation to escalate the provocation until response was gained.
I suspect that many regional players would be happy enough to see the status quo of a divided and eternally conflicted Korea continue, but of course the rather eccentric nature of the north makes that status quo a bit shaky.
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