Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
Bob, I think you're right at one level (A), but it isn't so easy at another (B).
(A) The Iranian nuclear program started under the Shah, and the West was fine with it. When Khomeini came to power, the nuclear program was stopped.
In 1980, Iran was attacked by Iraq, half a million people died, and CW were used against the Iranians and Kurds with hardly a peep from the West—on the contrary, the West armed Saddam, escorted Iraqi and Kuwait oil exports, and even shot down an Iranian civilian airliner (due to carelessness, I know--but that doesn't matter much in Iranian eyes). That is the Iranian strategic perception.
At this point, the Iranians—quite sensibly, given their strategic situation—thought a deterrent might be useful, and restarted their nuclear program. I'm not saying that this is a good thing, but it I am saying that there are wholly understandable Iranian reasons for doing so.
On this level, therefore, I agree that there is value in a dialog on Iranian strategic interests that could be quite useful in assuaging their concerns and convincing them to abandon any quest for a weapon, except...
(B) ...it is not at all clear that the Iranians want such a dialog under the current President and Supreme Leader, or in the current political climate. You'll find former senior Iranian officials in Tehran who will, reluctantly and off the record, suggest that while dialog would have been possible between Khatemi and Obama (had they been in office at the same time), it just won't fly under Ahmadinejad any more than it flew at the US end under Bush. In the eyes of many of the current regime, the US is part of the Axis of Evil.
I think the US is right to offer dialog as an option. No matter how well that is done, however, I have little confidence (sadly) that it will get us anywhere anytime soon given present realities.
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