Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
Some of this discussion is departing reality and is taking on a curmudegonly "Back in the day ..." aspect devoid of reality,

It is impossible to operate in a country the size of California without using vehicles with the limited troop densities we have. Allied troops are not as inept at C-IED as JMA suggests, there are a raft of TTPs and Techniques that more often than not prevent IED deaths. While IEDs are responsible for 90 some percent of casualties, the actual numbers are quite low given the number of daily patrols and movements going on.
The one thing for certain is that Iraq and Afghanistan will be remembered for IEDs. That such a high percentage of casualties were inflicted through IEDs and that it took so long to make any impression on IED casualties or to alter tactics to reduce the exposure of troops to IEDs will not reflect well on the forces involved. This is such a pity.

Platoon Leaders and company commanders are not blindly walking into IED hotspots writ large as you suggest. There are always a few bone-headed leaders. Media doesn't report houses that don't burn down, or patrols not hit by IEDs.
Michael Waltz's article appeals for junior commanders to be "freed" to use their initiative to alter the tactical methods of deployment to ensure they can serve their whole AO. There appears to be too much top down control in his experience.

This isn't to say we can't or shouldn't improve, but really. You suggest I walk my troops from, say, Spin Boldak to Kandahar on patrol? Who is divorced from reality here?
Here's a novel thought... fly. Insert here... uplift there. As Waltz suggests, use initiative.

Come on. The criticism to be made here isn't of the tactical TTPs, but of the strategy employed. If you haven't noticed, for all the hubub about Keating and Wanat, over the past year a number of patrol bases were attacked by large numbers in an attempt to repeat those episodes, and in every case the enemy was routed. So our tactical game has improved markedly. There are many, many other examples of successful C-IED and such out there. We adapt, they adapt. As it always has been.
It doesn't mean things are getting better overall. It doesn't mean we're going to win. But the grandstanding going on here is getting silly and divorced from reality and fueled by nostalgia and dreams.[/QUOTE]

Waltz's contention is:
This is a very unconventional war being waged in the most difficult terrain possible, and we are responding very conventionally. Instead of allowing such ingenuity and its associated risk, the coalition's default response has been to add more armor and widgets to ever larger vehicles that are the very antithesis of basic counterinsurgency operations.
Is he correct?