Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

[Dayuhan]

I believe much of the GWOT violence aimed at the US is due to perceptions of populaces in primarily Muslim countries where such insurgent movements are active or growing is that the blame for much of their current grievances with their governments lies with the US.

AQ has very little to do with populaces or nationalist insurgency. It is not a populace based movement and has only very tenuous connection to nationalist insurgency. It's good to remember that AQ's initial prominence and much of its residual legitimacy emerged from a struggle against the Soviet Union, not the US, and that it has only achieved meaningful popular support for struggles against direct foreign intervention. To declare a linear causative relationship among US policy, nationalist insurgency, and AQ terrorism is to assume what has yet to be demonstrated, and to excessively simplify a very complex causative environment.

For the US to go from insurgent spot fire to insurgent spot fire and assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies primarily serves to make these GWOT-feeding perceptions WORSE.

Are we doing this? If so, where? Certainly not in Iraq or Afghansitan... we didn't go to those places to assist governments threatened by insurgency, we went there to replace governments we dislike, and the insurgencies we now face grew from that process. We didn't go there because of insurgency, the insurgency is there because we went there.

Where exactly do we "assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies"? Is there any government out there that we support that would talk to its own people and address issues if we ceased to support it? I can't think of any, offhand. In most cases a withdrawal of US support and associated conditionalities would simply generate more vigorous suppression.

I think you're vastly overestimating our assistance, and the degree to which we enable anything.

Bringing this back to my two points: The conventional wisdom (of governments, btw) is that insurgency is "caused" by insurgents, ideology, or some external actor drives our current approaches. I simply suggest considering, just for a moment, what if that planning assumption is wrong, and in fact that causation is something that comes from governmental domestic policy for nationalist insurgencies; and for the US/GWOT, from governmental foreign policies?

Largely true, but of questionable relevance to GWOT, which is not fundamentally a fight against insurgents. Our COIN fights in Iraq and Afghanistan are collateral burdens, products of fundamentally flawed (IMO) GWOT policy decisions, not an integral part of the supposed GWOT.

Part of our problem in imposing COIN models, whether FM 3-24 or the Jones model, on GWOT is that it's not essentially a COIN fight: it's not a fight against insurgents. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan there is no insurgency that requires US intervention in more than a limited FID role, and Iraq and Afghanistan are less the traditional insurgencies that these models are designed to confront (intervention to support an allied government threatened by insurgency) than a natural and inevitable part of the regime change process. The issue is not entirely governance,it's also about foreign intervention.

We may be looking less at a case of flawed models than at a case of models being applied to situations they were not designed to cover.

Next time you sit down to do planning for an OEF-P way ahead, have one group do a COA that:

1. Adopts the planning assumption that insurgency causation comes primarily from the government of the Philippines and their domestic policies toward the south; and that the risk of those groups supporting acts of terrorism against the US and our interests derives its causation from US foreign policy in general, but more specifically toward Muslim governments/populaces globally, and to the governments/populaces of SEA.

Certainly causation in this case comes from the Philippine government; I think that's universally recognized. Despite our long-term relationship with the Philippine government, though, these groups have not generally acted against US interests, and have acted against US citizens only in opportunistic situations that are less terrorism than criminality. To the limited extent to which anti-US rhetoric is embraced, it's little more than a nod to groups who occasionally send a little money. It's very difficult to draw any causative line between US policy and terrorist or insurgent activity in the Philippines. Both insurgent groups and their popular base in the Philippines generally approve of us; they see us as a moderating influence on their enemies.

US planners in the Philippines actually did go through a process much like that which you describe. Unfortunately it was very badly done, and considered very few of the factors and influences involved. The outcome was American support for an ill considered "peace process" that was doomed from the start and managed to make things a good deal worse.

One problem with the approach you suggest is that "diplomatic approaches in Manila" are not going to produce any meaningful change. No matter how diplomatic we are (generally not very) we can't make policy for the Philippine government, nor can we persuade or compel the Philippine government to follow our policy recommendations. It's another country, and our influence is not that great.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,

US planners in the Philippines actually did go through a process much like that which you describe. Unfortunately it was very badly done, and considered very few of the factors and influences involved. The outcome was American support for an ill considered "peace process" that was doomed from the start and managed to make things a good deal worse.

One problem with the approach you suggest is that "diplomatic approaches in Manila" are not going to produce any meaningful change. No matter how diplomatic we are (generally not very) we can't make policy for the Philippine government, nor can we persuade or compel the Philippine government to follow our policy recommendations. It's another country, and our influence is not that great.

Our interagency and military planning is frequently done poorly, and our nation and especially our troops have to live with the results of this poor planning all too often. Sometimes the poor results are due to arrogance and ineffective personalties leading the planning effort, but just as often I think the root of the problem is the planning process itself and the associated expectations.

I think we plan poorly because (at least in the military) we're focused on the process instead of correctly defining the problem. We almost casually give our planners a mission to plan, which often means we told them the problem to solve, and probably without putting much intellectual rigor in it. Then the planners take the mission given to them and with religious zeal adhere to the MDMP steps believing they'll come up with the right answer. Usually the over worked majors will quickly identify some bogus centers of gravity again without intellectual rigor, because the expectations are you'll have to give a brief on your plan development according to the timeline. So now we have most likely have the wrong mission and wrong centers of gravity. Obviously if we define the problem incorrectly, our plan won't be helpful, and most likely it will just make the situation worse.

IMO one of the changes we need to address in FM 3-24 is the importance of slowing the train down during planning. We need to invest the time required to research the situation and truly talk (and more importantly listen) to the experts who understand the dynamics in that nation. Once we identify the right problems to solve (or help the HN solve), then maybe we can use something along the lines of MDMP that is modified for interagency purposes. Perhaps in the end we know how to plan, but we don't how to identify the right problem to address? Regardless, I still think the process is too restrictive and consequently stifles the development of creative solutions.

Insurgencies are relatively slow processes, we have the time to really think this through before we commit to a course of action. After we commit we need to constantly reassess to monitor when the character of the conflict changes and adjust our plan accordingly. Seems we have trend of starting to get things right after 7 or 8 years of involvement in these types of conflicts. Maybe we can do better?

[Dayuhan]

Our interagency and military planning is frequently done poorly, and our nation and especially our troops have to live with the results of this poor planning all too often. Sometimes the poor results are due to arrogance and ineffective personalties leading the planning effort, but just as often I think the root of the problem is the planning process itself and the associated expectations.

True, but I think a great deal of the trouble is at the policy level. Screw up there and it's very difficult to fix things at the strategic or tactical levels.

[Bob's World]

I recommend that John M. Collins' (Colonel, US Army, Retired) on "Military Strategy - Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives" be included as a reference in the next version of this manual.

John's text is clear, complete, and logical. A great desk reference for anyone who deals with military or policy issues much. His section on "Specialized Military Strategies" that drills into a wide range of subtopics material to this discussion is of particular note.

[slapout9]

I think we plan poorly because (at least in the military) we're focused on the process instead of correctly defining the problem. We almost casually give our planners a mission to plan, which often means we told them the problem to solve, and probably without putting much intellectual rigor in it. Then the planners take the mission given to them and with religious zeal adhere to the MDMP steps believing they'll come up with the right answer. Usually the over worked majors will quickly identify some bogus centers of gravity again without intellectual rigor, because the expectations are you'll have to give a brief on your plan development according to the timeline. So now we have most likely have the wrong mission and wrong centers of gravity. Obviously if we define the problem incorrectly, our plan won't be helpful, and most likely it will just make the situation worse.

IMO one of the changes we need to address in FM 3-24 is the importance of slowing the train down during planning. We need to invest the time required to research the situation and truly talk (and more importantly listen) to the experts who understand the dynamics in that nation. Once we identify the right problems to solve (or help the HN solve), then maybe we can use something along the lines of MDMP that is modified for interagency purposes. Perhaps in the end we know how to plan, but we don't how to identify the right problem to address? Regardless, I still think the process is too restrictive and consequently stifles the development of creative solutions.

As the ultimate Field manual and Mapping freak I would say you hit it on the head. And if I was the Field Manual Czar for a day I would create a field manual that had 50 pages of the best known analysis techniques and 50 BLANK pages for the solution. On another thread we were talking about the Galula manual which has Insurgency analysis methods that are as valid today as they were back then........but he has only one solution, not a good ideal against a dedicated and creative enemy.

[slapout9]

Ideal, why dosen't the Army have a contest and put up some cash to see who could write the best new update for the manual.

[Fuchs]

Ideal, why dosen't the Army have a contest and put up some cash to see who could write the best new update for the manual.

Because this kind of tender exists primarily (almost exclusively) for hardware ... for unknown reasons.

[Ron Humphrey]

Because this kind of tender exists primarily (almost exclusively) for hardware ... for unknown reasons.

pretty sure the reasons are widely known, and apparently accepted; at least to some extent.

Now whether their good ones or not is up for debate------

Constantly

[JMA]

On another thread we were talking about the Galula manual which has Insurgency analysis methods that are as valid today as they were back then........but he has only one solution, not a good ideal against a dedicated and creative enemy.

That has been my point.

No one person can provide a solution (or set of solutions) to cater for all eventualities. Use Galula to help hone analysis skills and if having studied as many sources to assist with such an analysis one can't come up with a custom solution then it should be left to those more able.

The level of this process should start at Command and Staff Course level and extend beyond. All those below should act under instructions and do the job their level demands/requires. It starts to get ridiculous when junior officers and NCOs start second guessing the COIN strategy for a particular campaign.

If faced with a dedicated and creative enemy you beat him by outdoing him in both aspects... or if you can't, better you just pack up and go home.

[Bob's World]

AQ has very little to do with populaces or nationalist insurgency. It is not a populace based movement and has only very tenuous connection to nationalist insurgency.

This oft stated position is simply not the case. AQ has no populace, true. AQ also has no power without its ability to leverage the populaces of others. AQ takes sanctuary in it's non-state status and employs an Islamist ideology to leverage and incite both individuals and organizations experiencing conditions of insurgency to support actions that advance the AQ cause, while advancing their own causes at the same time. Without the existance of significant conditions of insurgency in the many distinct states that AQ leverages their influence, this movement would be little more effective than that of Tim McVeigh and his little group of buddies.

It's good to remember that AQ's initial prominence and much of its residual legitimacy emerged from a struggle against the Soviet Union, not the US, and that it has only achieved meaningful popular support for struggles against direct foreign intervention.

Also not the case. Certainly the Saudis have always encouraged the dissident members of their populace to take their issues elsewhere, and taking them to the AFPAK region during the Soviet invasion was a popular cause and destination. It is good to remember that the Cold War was still in full effect at this time, and that if the Soviets could invade Afghanistan, they could certainly expand into Iran and down into the Arabian Pen. as well. At that point in time the presence of the US in the Middle East was welcome to the degree that it was far superior to the alternative.

AQ really got going in the first Gulf War. The KSA rejected Bin Laden's offer to protect them and brought in a very overt Western, US-led presence for that mission. A significant presence remained following the defeat of Saddam's push south; and not insignificant in this is that the Soviet threat no longer existed. Tolerence for Western presence that deterred the Soviets waned just as quickly (if not more so) in the Middle East than it did in Europe. We vastly downsized our presence in Europe in response to this pressure, but actually increased it in the Middle East. This shifted the bullseye of AQ squarely onto the US; and also made the US the easy scapegoat for poor governance in the region.

To declare a linear causative relationship among US policy, nationalist insurgency, and AQ terrorism is to assume what has yet to be demonstrated, and to excessively simplify a very complex causative environment.

US policy is to GWOT as Domestic Policy is to insurgency. Just as each state shapes the degree of the conditions of insurgency within their populace through the domestic policies they adopt and enact; so too does the US shape the degree of the conditions of international terrorism directed against us through the foreign policies we adopt and enact. Some dynamics are indeed simple, though the facts of how they materialize are always going to be diverse and complex.

[Bob's World]

Are we doing this? If so, where? Certainly not in Iraq or Afghansitan... we didn't go to those places to assist governments threatened by insurgency, we went there to replace governments we dislike, and the insurgencies we now face grew from that process. We didn't go there because of insurgency, the insurgency is there because we went there.

Actually Afghanistan had a very active insurgency in the Northern Alliance vs. the Taliban. We picked side and helped them to prevail to suit our goals against AQ. But every insurgent always becomes immediately a counter insurgent upon "winning." Does the US have a hand in facilitating the current insurgency of the Taliban against the Northern Alliance? Absolutely. There was little insurgency by the Taliban until we enabled the current Karzai regime to emerge. Once it became clear what type of government we had enabled the Taliban insurgency quickly grew in strength to oppose it and our support to it.

As to Iraq, much like the Balkans under Tito, Iraq under Saddam was a powderkeg of suppressed insurgency. We took the lid off and lit the fuse when we took Saddam out, and then naively were surprised when the whole thing blew up.

Where exactly do we "assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies"? Is there any government out there that we support that would talk to its own people and address issues if we ceased to support it? I can't think of any, offhand. In most cases a withdrawal of US support and associated conditionalities would simply generate more vigorous suppression.

I think you're vastly overestimating our assistance, and the degree to which we enable anything."

Most of these states call their insurgents "terrorists" and if you think the US is not a big supporter of counter-terrorism programs across our allied governments in the Middle East you are not paying attention. We know these are some of the most despotic regimes on the planet, and yet we support them as by and large they have been willing to work with us in the pursuit of our national interests in the region over the years. This is a model that worked well during the Cold War while that Soviet threat hung over the region, and in an age where information technology was such that these governments could control their people through force and the control of information.

Times have changed, and the U.S. must change our policies in the region to match the times, and also to bring them more in line with our founding principles as a nation.

As to the U.S. having the right or the influence to get these governments to address their domestic policies? Excellent point. We certainly have no right, and our influence is shrinking daily. This brings us back to the example of man with the failing heart. If that man was your business partner, you also would have no right to make him change his lifestyle. But you definitely have an interest in him making those changes. He too has an interest in making those changes that he may not fully appreciate. Sometimes your partner needs some tough love to recognize the need for such change. Currently we are enabling destructive behavior. We need to change ourselves, and we need to then apply such tough love with our partners.

Largely true, but of questionable relevance to GWOT, which is not fundamentally a fight against insurgents. Our COIN fights in Iraq and Afghanistan are collateral burdens, products of fundamentally flawed (IMO) GWOT policy decisions, not an integral part of the supposed GWOT.

Part of our problem in imposing COIN models, whether FM 3-24 or the Jones model, on GWOT is that it's not essentially a COIN fight: it's not a fight against insurgents. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan there is no insurgency that requires US intervention in more than a limited FID role, and Iraq and Afghanistan are less the traditional insurgencies that these models are designed to confront (intervention to support an allied government threatened by insurgency) than a natural and inevitable part of the regime change process. The issue is not entirely governance,it's also about foreign intervention.

We may be looking less at a case of flawed models than at a case of models being applied to situations they were not designed to cover.



Certainly causation in this case comes from the Philippine government; I think that's universally recognized. Despite our long-term relationship with the Philippine government, though, these groups have not generally acted against US interests, and have acted against US citizens only in opportunistic situations that are less terrorism than criminality. To the limited extent to which anti-US rhetoric is embraced, it's little more than a nod to groups who occasionally send a little money. It's very difficult to draw any causative line between US policy and terrorist or insurgent activity in the Philippines. Both insurgent groups and their popular base in the Philippines generally approve of us; they see us as a moderating influence on their enemies.

US planners in the Philippines actually did go through a process much like that which you describe. Unfortunately it was very badly done, and considered very few of the factors and influences involved. The outcome was American support for an ill considered "peace process" that was doomed from the start and managed to make things a good deal worse.

One problem with the approach you suggest is that "diplomatic approaches in Manila" are not going to produce any meaningful change. No matter how diplomatic we are (generally not very) we can't make policy for the Philippine government, nor can we persuade or compel the Philippine government to follow our policy recommendations. It's another country, and our influence is not that great.

I will not argue against the fact that we have over-engaged, over-reacted in our GWOT response. We did not understand the problem then, and we still do not today. In a recent interview with President Bush he made the comment to the effect that "on 9/11 we were ruthlessly attacked when we had never done anything to anybody." Americans need to look in the mirror a bit more carefully. Ike once said the best thing about Containment was that we in effect contained ourselves. Since the fall of the Soviets we've been feeling a lot less contained, and the list of sovereign countries we have bombed, invaded, or economically attacked through sanctions is growing larger and larger, while the rationale for doing so is becoming smaller and smaller. But this goes to the causal effect of foreign policy on international terrorism. Its complicated true, but we are not blameless and we must evolve. Harder-Faster will not win this contest.

(As to the Philippines, every GCC was looking for some place to get into the fight. PACOM picked the Philippines as the Government agreed to allow them in under strict constraints and the auspicies of the training exercise "BALIKATAN". If not for 9/11 we would not be there in the manner we are today. I believe that the Government of the Philippines and their security forces have evolved in very positive ways through our intervention, but you are right, this was and remains largely a family squabble between a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government. I fear that our presence enables the government to avoid making really hard decisions on substantive changes of domestic policies that could reduce the conditions of insurgency in a more enduring manner.)

[Dayuhan]

This oft stated position is simply not the case. AQ has no populace, true. AQ also has no power without its ability to leverage the populaces of others. AQ takes sanctuary in it's non-state status and employs an Islamist ideology to leverage and incite both individuals and organizations experiencing conditions of insurgency to support actions that advance the AQ cause, while advancing their own causes at the same time. Without the existance of significant conditions of insurgency in the many distinct states that AQ leverages their influence, this movement would be little more effective than that of Tim McVeigh and his little group of buddies.

AQ has been singularly ineffective at leveraging insurgency. What AQ has managed to leverage effectively is widespread resentment in the Islamic world toward foreign military intervention in Muslim lands. This is a very different thing. AQ’s efforts to muster insurgency against Muslim leaders they dislike have fallen flat on their faces: they have never drawn anything near the popular support needed to generate insurgency. The narrative that works for them is “expel the infidel from the land of the faithful”… they’ve tried others, but generally without much success. That’s why they have to keep provoking the infidel to make sure they keep intervening: without an intervening infidel to challenge, they have nothing.

AQ really got going in the first Gulf War. The KSA rejected Bin Laden's offer to protect them and brought in a very overt Western, US-led presence for that mission. A significant presence remained following the defeat of Saddam's push south; and not insignificant in this is that the Soviet threat no longer existed.

AQ really got going against us during the first Gulf War. They actually enjoyed far broader and deeper support during the anti-Soviet jihad, but we didn’t so much notice, because they were on our side.

The US presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s was only half of what AQ exploited. The other half, at least as important, was the global oil glut, the extremely low oil price, and the consequent extremely poor economic environment in Saudi Arabia. That created the perception, inaccurate but widespread, thet US troops were somehow forcibly keeping the price of oil low and impoverishing them. That was, of course, something AQ could and did exploit.

We do not, of course, have to change current policies to address this perception, because the conditions that generated it no longer exist. The US troops are no longer there, the oil glut is ancient history, oil prices are sky high, the Saudi economy is booming. The 1990s are gone, we no longer have to concern ourselves with that environment because it's already gone.

We may not like the Saudi government, but they know their people better than we do, and they know that if they provide security, stability, and prosperity, the vast majority of their people will not oppose them. As long as times are good, there will be no functional insurgency. A bit of terrorism here and there, but nothing they can’t handle, and as long as the boat has a solid tail wind the bulk of the populace won’t object if they lock up those who rock it.

US policy is to GWOT as Domestic Policy is to insurgency. Just as each state shapes the degree of the conditions of insurgency within their populace through the domestic policies they adopt and enact; so too does the US shape the degree of the conditions of international terrorism directed against us through the foreign policies we adopt and enact.

I think you vastly overestimate the degree to which we shape anything. There are many other influences out there, and many effects for which we are not the sole cause… and for which we are not the cause at all.

Actually Afghanistan had a very active insurgency in the Northern Alliance vs. the Taliban. We picked side and helped them to prevail to suit our goals against AQ....There was little insurgency by the Taliban until we enabled the current Karzai regime to emerge. Once it became clear what type of government we had enabled the Taliban insurgency quickly grew in strength to oppose it and our support to it.

I didn’t say there wasn’t insurgency in Afghanistan, I said we didn’t go there because of insurgency, certainly not to defend an allied government from insurgency. Realistically, the Taliban would have opposed any government we installed.

As to Iraq, much like the Balkans under Tito, Iraq under Saddam was a powderkeg of suppressed insurgency. We took the lid off and lit the fuse when we took Saddam out, and then naively were surprised when the whole thing blew up.

Again, there may have been insurgency, but that’s not why we went there… and while we may have removed the lid, what ensued was less “insurgency” than the very predictable armed competition to fill the vacuum left by Saddam’s removal. We may have backed one faction and called it “Government” and the others “insurgent”, but those distinctions existed in our minds, not in Iraq.

Most of these states call their insurgents "terrorists" and if you think the US is not a big supporter of counter-terrorism programs across our allied governments in the Middle East you are not paying attention. We know these are some of the most despotic regimes on the planet, and yet we support them as by and large they have been willing to work with us in the pursuit of our national interests in the region over the years.

They would say that you are calling their terrorists “insurgents”, and redefining the term “insurgency” to suit your arguments. How many of these states actually depend on US assistance to suppress their dissidents? Certainly not the Saudis.

As to the U.S. having the right or the influence to get these governments to address their domestic policies? Excellent point. We certainly have no right, and our influence is shrinking daily... Currently we are enabling destructive behavior. We need to change ourselves, and we need to then apply such tough love with our partners.

Tough love? Surely you jest… we’re not talking about cranky teens here, these are sovereign states, not our wards or dependents. We didn’t create their policies, we don’t meaningfully enable their policies, and we don’t have sufficient influence to force or persuade them to change their policies. Your proposition assumes that we hold a position of influence and authority that we simply do not have.

Since the fall of the Soviets we've been feeling a lot less contained, and the list of sovereign countries we have bombed, invaded, or economically attacked through sanctions is growing larger and larger, while the rationale for doing so is becoming smaller and smaller.

Is this really true? Add up our intervention rates pre and post cold war; it may be surprising.

(As to the Philippines, every GCC was looking for some place to get into the fight. PACOM picked the Philippines as the Government agreed to allow them in under strict constraints and the auspicies of the training exercise "BALIKATAN". If not for 9/11 we would not be there in the manner we are today. I believe that the Government of the Philippines and their security forces have evolved in very positive ways through our intervention, but you are right, this was and remains largely a family squabble between a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government. I fear that our presence enables the government to avoid making really hard decisions on substantive changes of domestic policies that could reduce the conditions of insurgency in a more enduring manner.)

Questionable. The conflict in the southern Philippines is at root not a fight between “a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government”. It’s a fight between two distinct and fundamentally irreconcilable segments of the populace. The government has failed to act as referee, and has taken the side of the segment from which it is almost entirely drawn and to which it is effectively accountable. Can’t address that conflict until we face up to the reality that it is populace vs populace, not populace vs government. The proposed "solution" that we supported failed to address that reality, and crashed in flames before it left the runway. If we'd opened at least one eye we would still have had no solution, but we could have avoided association with a dysfunctional proposal.

I don’t think the Philippine government and security forces have evolved at all. They’ve learned to tell us what we want to hear and show us want to see (actually they learned this long ago), but the moment we’re out of sight they reset to default mode. If our presence was removed there would be no substantive change, just a return to the status quo ante.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

Clearly you just want to argue rather than discus some very complex issues. My points are attempts to stay within the context of FM3-24. Not every problem in the world is a COIN problem for the U.S., most are policy problems for the US, but are certainly related to COIN problems for our allies.

I think we agree in general that US interventions can create more problems than they resolve. Where I think we disagree is in the causation of such problems in general. A US intervention shifting the focus of a problem onto the US is far different than the US intervention being the causation of a problem.

Meanwhile back to FM 3-24. IMO a good update of this manual would adopt a much more holistic understanding to the causation of insurgency in general; and then refine its current positions in line with that understanding. The key to moving forward in this world is to step away from controlling policies and to embrace empowering ones. The success of empowering ones will be based on how well they empower populaces as well as they do governments.

We agree in spirit, I suspect, far more than we agree in words. I'm ok with that, as it provides positions for many others to consider in their own pursuit of these issues.

[Dayuhan]

I thought I was discussing complex issues. Contentiously perhaps, but they are contentious issues.

I suspect that you're right that we agree in spirit more than we agree in words... but I still think there are some items in your model that need to be critically addressed. Most particularly I suspect that you drastically overstate the degree to which the US "enables" other governments to oppress their populaces, and I suspect that you're hugely overstating the degree of influence the US can bring to bear in any proposed effort to persuade or compel other governments to modify their domestic policies to suit our preference.

Overestimating our own influence and capacity is a very dangerous base for strategy.

I also can't see how to reconcile your criticism of US intervention with your frequent advocacy of openly interventionist positions. Trying to impose ourselves, uninvited, as "champion of the populace" in a dispute between a foreign government and its populace seems to me a recipe for disaster; I can't imagine that failing to blow up in our faces. A perfect example is the suggestion, on another thread, that we intervene in a dispute between the Chinese government and the Turkistani Islamic Party:

My recommendation is that we out-compete AQ for influence with this populace. They need an advocate to help them in their very real issues with the Chinese government.

I really can't see that pointing to anywhere we want to be. What reason have we to impose ourselves, uninvited, in a dispute between the Chinese government and a segment of its populace? Certainly we are not in a position to be laying any "tough love" on the Chinese government... they are not exactly a client state.

At least pretending to get back on topic... the problem I see with trying to address "the causation of such problems in general" is that any specific case may not reflect a general pattern: different insurgencies are going to have different causative factors, especially since we seem intent on expanding the definition of "insurgency". One example might be the southern Philippines, where a general model might lead us to assume a conflict between populace and government and overlook the populace-populace conflict that lies at the core of the dispute.

I don't think it requires any great insight to see that practices developed for cases where we are intervening as a response to insurgency, to assist an allied government threatened by insurgents, may not be entirely applicable to a regime change environment, where insurgency emerges as a response to our intervention.