JMA --

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions. Where bad comparisons are knowingly used, the objective is usually to prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time. It seems to me that the point you want to make, especially with the closing comment, is that it is bad policy, either generally or in the specific case of Iraq or Afghanistan, and that the US should not participate in COIN operations. There may in fact be good arguments for this, but to argue that COIN can only be best pursued with a doctrine of brutality is not one of them. The mass slaughter of civilians is not war. Brutal though the experience of war may be, brutality, on its own, is not war.

If it is your intention to speak credibly on the matter of counterinsurgency, then it behooves you to be well acquainted with the historical record for yourself. However, when I spoke of it in my message, I was thinking of the history of foreign interventions in the domestic politics of other countries during the period since the rise of nationalism, which I would generally date to the American Revolution. The British failed to understand the extent to which a shared identity had developed, and behaved in a fashion likely only to alienate the populace they were attempting to pacify. New Jersey is the perfect example, as its population was not strongly patriotic, and could easily have been turned against the cause. However, the actions of the army in that state in the winter of 76-7 did a tremendous amount to spoil that opportunity. Let's not even discuss Burgoyne's horribly mistaken Northern campaign, stupid appeal to the populace, and failure to recognize that the Revolutionary ideal was quite strong outside of New England. On the other hand, it is instructive how careful Washington was in any actions the army would take that might make civilians and local populations unhappy. In fact, he let the army suffer rather than impress necessary goods to the level authorized by Congress, and did so only when such impressments would serve the dual good of providing for his men and depriving the British, as in those conducted arounded Valley Forge in the Winter of 77-8. Finally, how the French participated in that war was exceedingly savvy -- they did not come in as the leading army, to defeat the British for the Americans. They participated as an ally, as the second force in support of the primary, the Continental Army. It was a truly brilliant example of how to intervene in the matter of regime change, not to be repeated until the Allies retook and rebuilt Western Europe almost two centuries later. From the Revolutionary War on, foreign armies would operate at a tremendous disadvantage on foreign soil unless they were very careful. Short term brutality might gain ephemeral advantage, but it was always the rare case that it could endure.

There is not a particularly good record for successful foreign intervention because the temper of modern conventional warfare is not built for the needs of such wars. But rather than lacking in necessary brutality, I would submit that this model lacks the proper restraint, the willingness to sacrifice not for territorial or geographical advantage, but simply for the protection and betterment of local populations. It's particularly difficult for Americans because ours is a culture of doing, not sitting and waiting for something to happen. We are impatient. It has helped us in many things -- the exploration and settlement of the territory (at the cost of a terribly brutal campaign against the native tribes), the development of industry and mass transportation -- but it does not serve foreign counterinsurgency. Maybe that's a small price to pay -- or it is perhaps a weakness that enemies will note and play upon. So, it would be better if the US can figure out a means to effective COIN practices.

As for Kilcullen, I've seen the man speak. He seems intelligent. While I'm sure he believes that he has arrived at a good model, I can hardly believe he wants his ideas raised to the level of a religion to be quoted as dogma. Slapout got there before me with his point that doctrine ought to be a starting point, a thing to get personnel thinking, but it is not a prescription. Specifically as concerns the "mirror" point, to be nothing more than a photocopy of the insurgent would be folly, as the need is to be better. My impression is that good COIN practice requires that you address the issues of concern that the insurgent has raised and which resonate with the populace.

The problem for military doctrine and COIN is that, unlike conventional war, where you fight and defeat first, and then do the recovery piece second, in an insurgent war you must do both simultaneously. So, every piece of military activity must accord with the social, political, and economic policies that are simultaneously being pursued. This is mightily difficult.

Jill