Quote Originally Posted by Sargent View Post
JMA --

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions. Where bad comparisons are knowingly used, the objective is usually to prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time. It seems to me that the point you want to make, especially with the closing comment, is that it is bad policy, either generally or in the specific case of Iraq or Afghanistan, and that the US should not participate in COIN operations. There may in fact be good arguments for this, but to argue that COIN can only be best pursued with a doctrine of brutality is not one of them. The mass slaughter of civilians is not war. Brutal though the experience of war may be, brutality, on its own, is not war.
My closing comment was to question whether in the light of history the US/Brits and others believe that what was/is being achieved was/is worth the cost. Time will tell and my gut tells me that history will judge the cost of the victory as too high.

In the case of foreign intervention (by a western power) against an insurgency one needs to accept that 1) there are grounds for a rebellion/uprising/insurgency, 2) that peaceful means to have these issues addressed would have already been exhausted. If sheer brutality was to be used to crash the aspirations of the people it would have already been done (like in Zimbabwe, Tibet and Sri Lanka for example).

Peace under such circumstances would require a political accommodation which would undermine the stated aims and objectives of the insurgents.

You are probably correct in that the US should not get involved to any great extent in counter insurgency wars... unless they start to accept there is a difference between conventional warfare (Dessert Storm) and what is needed in Afghanistan.

Can the US achieve this? Sure. It will just require a paradigm shift in the mental approach to warfare.

snip
There are many examples out there but not many recent ones where counterinsurgency wars were won without having had to give away the farm.

There is not a particularly good record for successful foreign intervention because the temper of modern conventional warfare is not built for the needs of such wars. But rather than lacking in necessary brutality, I would submit that this model lacks the proper restraint, the willingness to sacrifice not for territorial or geographical advantage, but simply for the protection and betterment of local populations. It's particularly difficult for Americans because ours is a culture of doing, not sitting and waiting for something to happen. We are impatient. It has helped us in many things -- the exploration and settlement of the territory (at the cost of a terribly brutal campaign against the native tribes), the development of industry and mass transportation -- but it does not serve foreign counterinsurgency. Maybe that's a small price to pay -- or it is perhaps a weakness that enemies will note and play upon. So, it would be better if the US can figure out a means to effective COIN practices.
Yes, I agree that the US will not allow itself the freedom to crush an insurgency but rather just assist the beleaguered country to reach some sort of peace through (eventual) negotiation. The US must know that there is no possibility of any great victory only a negotiated peace where their friendly regime will probably have to give the farm away to achieve that.

As for Kilcullen, I've seen the man speak. He seems intelligent. While I'm sure he believes that he has arrived at a good model, I can hardly believe he wants his ideas raised to the level of a religion to be quoted as dogma. Slapout got there before me with his point that doctrine ought to be a starting point, a thing to get personnel thinking, but it is not a prescription. Specifically as concerns the "mirror" point, to be nothing more than a photocopy of the insurgent would be folly, as the need is to be better. My impression is that good COIN practice requires that you address the issues of concern that the insurgent has raised and which resonate with the populace.
Kilcullen certainly has value. The more I read his stuff the more little gems I find buried in there. Read him read Galula, read McCuen, read the whole lot and fill your database with possibilities.

It is the government which needs to address the grievances which lie behind the insurgency. US/Brit/NATO intervention can merely assist to provide stability while this process runs its course. It might take a while for the regime to accept that the grievances need to be seriously/genuinely addressed.

The problem for military doctrine and COIN is that, unlike conventional war, where you fight and defeat first, and then do the recovery piece second, in an insurgent war you must do both simultaneously. So, every piece of military activity must accord with the social, political, and economic policies that are simultaneously being pursued. This is mightily difficult.

Jill
That difficulty lies at the top and at probably division and brigade level. By the time it gets down the line the troops have their RoE and their SOPs and the like and are free of the really sensitive "joint" planning and strategy headaches.

At platoon level it gets quite simple. "There are some insurgents in them thar hills, go find them and kill them, and make sure you don't kill any civvies or break their stuff in the process."