William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

[Polarbear1605]

1-The more abstract a concept the more situations it can be applied to, but you also get the risk of it being applied incorrectly, which is how many people view Boyd IMO.

Ah Ha! IMO Boyd had to keep it abstract in order to adapt to an ever changing situation. Then you wrote down that magic word "RISK"...we are making comments on what we are doing wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan...risk is always there with or without Boyd and with or without a good strategic leadership...risks are not the issues ....but the assumptions to minimizie the risks are.

2-When I think of the moral level as it relates to the US I think of a formal "Declaration of War" there is a lot of moral authority in doing that and we screwed that up IMO. Whe we first went into A'stan that was explained to the forces we supported and it seemed to work well, truth and honor required that we retalite, but then we fell off the snowmobile and started doing make the world safe for freedom and democracy....really bad move IMO.

Depends on which war your talking about...afghanistan when we went in we could morally, pretty much do what we wanted. Have you read "Jaw Breaker"...The CIA did a tremendous job conducting that war...very rigorious...they were not constrained by doctrine because there was none...risks were extremely high...it is not until the military takes over the operation that see it stale mate. BTW the military takes over when the risks became low.

[slapout9]

Ah Ha! IMO Boyd had to keep it abstract in order to adapt to an ever changing situation. Then you wrote down that magic word "RISK"...we are making comments on what we are doing wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan...risk is always there with or without Boyd and with or without a good strategic leadership...risks are not the issues ....but the assumptions to minimizie the risks are.

Yes, Boyd did have to keep it abstract. But the risk I am talking about is the risk of being misunderstood, not any specific risk relative to a specific situation.

[Polarbear1605]

Yes, Boyd did have to keep it abstract. But the risk I am talking about is the risk of being misunderstood, not any specific risk relative to a specific situation.

Oops! Sorry about running down that rabbit trail. I did misunderstand your intent.

[slapout9]

Depends on which war your talking about...afghanistan when we went in we could morally, pretty much do what we wanted. Have you read "Jaw Breaker"...The CIA did a tremendous job conducting that war...very rigorious...they were not constrained by doctrine because there was none...risks were extremely high...it is not until the military takes over the operation that see it stale mate. BTW the military takes over when the risks became low.

Exactly, moral certainty provides operational clarity! Yes, I read Jawbreaker several times. I am a big fan of that operation, them boys put the Alabama Whoop Ass on em!! Although I would argue that this was essentially Airpower theory(The Air Control Theory) from the 1950's. Now take a look at Iraq and how moral certainty degraded and then look what happened

I also read the Montgomery Meigs article last night.

[Polarbear1605]

Exactly, moral certainty provides operational clarity! Yes, I read Jawbreaker several times. I am a big fan of that operation, them boys put the Alabama Whoop Ass on em!! Although I would argue that this was essentially Airpower theory(The Air Control Theory) from the 1950's. Now take a look at Iraq and how moral certainty degraded and then look what happened

I also read the Montgomery Meigs article last night.

Hmmm...your going to have to expand on The Air Control Theory comment a bit... your lossing me there.
You also need to expand the "how moral certainty degraded" phase...???? I think Iraq demonstrates a failure of strategic thinking by not only the national comand authority but also the military stategic leadership....???

[slapout9]

Hmmm...your going to have to expand on The Air Control Theory comment a bit... your lossing me there.
You also need to expand the "how moral certainty degraded" phase...???? I think Iraq demonstrates a failure of strategic thinking by not only the national comand authority but also the military stategic leadership....???

Bear,

1-Using small ground teams in conjunction with airpower goes all the way back to WW1 in Iraq (Mesopotamia) started by the UK and updated by the US Air force.

2-The original Moral Imperative to attack Iraq was possession of WMD, when that turned out to be false and we probably new that from the start. That undermined our legitimacy both at home and in the region. We lost at the Moral level of warfare IMO.

PS: Operation Jawbreaker was on TV yesterday! Somebody needs to give these guys some medals! They should also.......well I could go on but I want.

[Backwards Observer]

One notes with bewilderment the stubborn recalcitrance of uncivilised tribes in recent history to automatically cede the moral high ground to those who would slaughter their kinfolk and reduce their dwellings to smouldering rubble from the air. Puzzling.

Guilio Douhet's Theory of Air Power

... ...

Having achieved command of the air, pilots would then destroy the enemy's will to resist by conducting aerial bombing on his cities, industrial centres and civilian population. It was thought that civilians were not prepared for the effects of war and the bombing of population centres would create panic among the people.

... ...

In the 1920s Britain bombed Kurds and Arabs in Iraq when they rebelled against Britain's attempts to control them.

... ...

Winston Churchill, the colonial secretary at the time, believed that gas could be used effectively against the Kurds and Iraqis (as well as against other peoples in the Empire): 'I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poison gas against uncivilised tribes.'

... ...

Wing-Commander Sir Arthur Harris, later Bomber Harris, head of wartime Bomber Command, was happy to emphasise that 'The Arab and Kurd now know what real bombing means in casualties and damage. Within forty-five minutes a full-size village can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured.' It was an easy matter to bomb and machine-gun the tribespeople, because they had no means of defence or retaliation. Iraq and Kurdistan were also used as testing grounds for new weapons; devices specifically developed by the Air Ministry for use against tribal villages.

excerpts from "Bomber Theory" - http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/AVbombertheory.htm

[slapout9]

One notes with bewilderment the stubborn recalcitrance of uncivilised tribes in recent history to automatically cede the moral high ground to those who would slaughter their kinfolk and reduce their dwellings to smouldering rubble from the air. Puzzling.

What is bewildering is people who refuse to realize the CIA didn't do that. The Air strikes were coordinated with the local guerrilla forces to hit the Taliban.

[slapout9]

Here is a quote form the Montgomery C. Meigs article "Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare" on how Political Will really collapses.

The tumultuous politics of the 1930s left the French body politic torn between the forces of the right and left. The connivance of the 200 richest families, none willing to look past its psychological fatigue and warped self-interest to appreciate the good of the state, devastated political will

I had to read it twice because I thought he was talking about modern day America.

[Backwards Observer]

What is bewildering is people who refuse to realize the CIA didn't do that.

I understand completely. The excerpted quotes in my post do not mention CIA, for whom I have a healthy respect, but your point is taken.

[Polarbear1605]

Bear,

1-Using small ground teams in conjunction with airpower goes all the way back to WW1 in Iraq (Mesopotamia) started by the UK and updated by the US Air force.

2-The original Moral Imperative to attack Iraq was possession of WMD, when that turned out to be false and we probably new that from the start. That undermined our legitimacy both at home and in the region. We lost at the Moral level of warfare IMO.

1 – If you are talking this Air Control Theory …and I think you are: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/gagnon.pdf
I do not see the connection between the initial Afghanistan (CIA) invasion and Air Control Theory. There was no control idea in the forehead of the CIA … they were conducting war with the intent of destroying (killing) the enemy and they did that very well (and better than the US military can do it). They got inside the AQ/Taliban OODA loop by organizing the opposition tribes into a single and coordinated unity of effort. When we entered Afghanistan, the AQ/Taliban was basically fighting a second generation war (trench lines, bunkers, caves, etc.). Manning the opposition with SF teams basically allows them to move from 2GW to a very successful mobile 3GW force. (4GW is another debate).

2 – I do not think a lack of WMD lost the moral level of warfare in Iraq. There is plenty of moral justification to take out Hussein … he was a mass murderer who worshiped Stalin (Kurd chemical attacks, environmental swamp Arabs genocide, put down of the Shiite rebellion after Desert Storm). I think that our own US opposition party is what lost the moral high ground with the US military naively, without thought, reinforcing those notions (Murtha and Haditha; Abu Ghraib was a self inflicted wound…the press story and pics were from the Army investigation).

[slapout9]

1 – If you are talking this Air Control Theory …and I think you are: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/gagnon.pdf
I do not see the connection between the initial Afghanistan (CIA) invasion and Air Control Theory. There was no control idea in the forehead of the CIA … they were conducting war with the intent of destroying (killing) the enemy and they did that very well (and better than the US military can do it). They got inside the AQ/Taliban OODA loop by organizing the opposition tribes into a single and coordinated unity of effort. When we entered Afghanistan, the AQ/Taliban was basically fighting a second generation war (trench lines, bunkers, caves, etc.). Manning the opposition with SF teams basically allows them to move from 2GW to a very successful mobile 3GW force. (4GW is another debate).

2 – I do not think a lack of WMD lost the moral level of warfare in Iraq. There is plenty of moral justification to take out Hussein … he was a mass murderer who worshiped Stalin (Kurd chemical attacks, environmental swamp Arabs genocide, put down of the Shiite rebellion after Desert Storm). I think that our own US opposition party is what lost the moral high ground with the US military naively, without thought, reinforcing those notions (Murtha and Haditha; Abu Ghraib was a self inflicted wound…the press story and pics were from the Army investigation).

Bear,
1-That study is close enough, but I only wanted to point out that the British Air Control theory was the start point(connection to A'satn) to begin using airplanes to do something beside being flown around in the skies by guys wearing scarfs and only trying to shoot down other guys wearing scarfs and usually named the Red baron.

2-If you can find an original copy of USA(project control) that is something very different and closer to 4GW ( there is very little Air Power in it which is why it was called project control) read it if you get the chance.

3-A'stan by the CIA was maneuver warfare IMO because they were given a Mission!!! and they picked the Objectives (just like Colonel Wyly said) then applied the main effort against a gap.

4-Agree 100% about using locals to get inside the enemies OODA loop.

5-SoDamn Insane was indeed a very bad man, but so are a lot of other people that we deal with and we don't invade their countries. And we don't have the President going on National TV saying that we have proof that he has WMD, when we knew he didn't.(General Van Ripper has You tube video stating this) That is where we lost the moral level of war IMO. The instances you mentioned just poured fuel on the fire so to speak IMO.


Bear, here it is. Towrds then he talks about going fishing with General Zinni and says there are know WMD and we knew it.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qybox...eature=related

By the way this is #10 of a ten part series by Van Riper and it id very, very good....he understands SBW!!!!!(PC version =Systems Based Warfare)

[Polarbear1605]

Bear, here it is. Towrds then he talks about going fishing with General Zinni and says there are know WMD and we knew it.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qybox...eature=related

By the way this is #10 of a ten part series by Van Riper and it id very, very good....he understands SBW!!!!!(PC version =Systems Based Warfare)

Couple interesting guys your talking about there. General Zinni gave one of the most interesting examples of maneuver warfare at an officer's call when he was a regimental commander in Okinawa. The example was the 3rd Mar Div operations on Iwo Jima in WWII. Sent us all back to the books at the time.

General Van Riper was at the this year's Boyd conference and gave a good talk there. He is also one of the voices you hear asking questions at the beginning of the Boyd CDs you have.