Suppressive Fire

[Ken White]

I haven't read about anything like marching fire in Civil War accounts...

Not with muzzle loaders, of course not. The broader point though is that the power of the even poorly dug in defense and the relative rapidity of reloading with the Minie Ball plus the few repeaters made frontal assaults bloody as all get out.

...Patton in War As I Knew It is emphatic about having all weapons firing at the objective during an assault.

That's the issue isn't it -- assaults. They are a particularly poor way to do business and the Armed forces of the US use the and have used the 'techniques' entirely too often. Patton was almost as fond of them as Grant...

T.J.Jackson, John Buford, Walter Kreuger and James Gavin had more sense.

Had he lived longer I'm pretty sure Patton was enough of a master of his craft to have seen when suppressive fire reaches the point of diminishing returns.

I wouldn't bet on that. He was a master at manipulating people. I'll give him that. Consider the fact that a good many Majors today have more combat experience than Patton had.

This leads us back to the old FM 22-5 tactics drill tactics of the Civil War and First World War that nobody has ever been able to answer -- how do junior officers and NCOs re-establish fire control after the initial bursts of suppressive fire? What next after that? Find a flank? Call in artillery?

It hasn't been answered to your satisfaction you mean? Colud that be because it, as you state it, is a big open ended question lacking in any context and specificity and -- wait for it -- METT-TC applies. Always.

Our marginally trained troops may seem to need such NCO / Officer control and do in some units. Realistically in combat they have to know what to do at first contact and most figure it out after a couple of contacts. After that first rattle, they must know to look for and keep an eye on their leaders to watch for hand and arm signals -- the advent of individual troopies having radios will not totally change that aspect. Any good unit will develop that capability internally and since all leaders are different, most will do it in different ways. As for flank, call for fire, etc. -- all very much situation dependent.

The real constant is proper training and response to fire while keeping an eye on the leaders for cues. For the leaders, it should all be about what they need to have done to keep people alive and get on with the job. That can entail anything from a rapid departure from the area; to just going to ground; to trying to flank left or right (left or right are bad ju-ju, leaders should always use Compass directions, N,E,S,W, NW, etc. to preclude confusion which is generally around when under fire); to establish a base of fire; to a suicidal frontal assault supported by three DS and two GS Arty units -- and everything in between. It's really simple...

[Old Eagle]

Suppressive fire doesn't.

[Pete]

Oh well, it seems that military leadership in the Infantry all boils down to bringing order out of chaos. It's almost as though because in combat they're all improvised solutions that are all unique, there are no larger lessons or solutions to be derived. Damn, all those Vu-Graph slides in '77-'78 in Infantry Hall were for nothing.

[Ken White]

Oh well, it seems that military leadership in the Infantry all boils down to bringing order out of chaos. It's almost as though because in combat they're all improvised solutions that are all unique, there are no larger lessons or solutions to be derived. Damn, all those Vu-Graph slides in '77-'78 in Infantry Hall were for nothing.

In reverse order, probably true on the Vu-graphs as is true for most of the foolishness that comes out of Bunker 4.

Not just the Infantry. Armor and Cavalry have exactly the same sorts and sets of problems -- as do Attack and Scout aircraft crews and the Engineers on occasion. The other combat and combat support arms can have the same sort of problems every now and then but those are rather rare and they seldom train for such efforts. Thus they tend to be more orderly and less chaotic. They tend to seek and use checklists, metrics and can actually apply larger lessons effectively and can also generally apply derived or patterned solutions

Maneuver combat OTOH is indeed a series of really unique situations and essentially undiffrentiated chaos requiring rapid assessments and intuitive responses and thinking. The problems of leadership and command in combat are many for all branches -- but those problems are far less structured and much more diverse for the maneuver arms and they are ferociously exacerbated for those guys BECAUSE we foolishly try to encapsulate 'doctrine' in larger lessons and solutions derived from other situations that were just enough different to be problematic...

At about the time you were cruising the Snack Bar in Muskogee County, Georgia that is the meeting place of the Army, had you instead gone to Leavenworth the Tactics Department there would have informed you first thing something along this line: "What we are going to teach you will work in gently rolling open terrain on a mild June day against a peer competitor with approximately equal strength and equipment provided you have all your authorized personnel and equipment and they are trained and it is all operational. If any of those factors differ, you will have to adapt."

That means that if it is raining pitchforks, you've got a problem. If the opponent is a mess of Go-rillas instead of a generally like unit, you've got problems. If you are short 20% of your folks and have only a 70% OR, it's snowing and you have to fit those guerrillas AND a like sized and equipped opponent, you got bi-i-g-g-g problems. Like I said, it's simple...

[Pete]

... the Snack Bar in Muskogee County, Georgia that is the meeting place of the Army ...

Pick up your cheeseburger and 'Follow Me'
We are the Building Four Infantry

[Pete]

My thoughts aren't completely clear on this subject, so the point I've been trying to make is probably obscure. When we fought the First World War the old FM 22-5 way of doing things was how we deployed for combat -- column for traveling, line for fighting, with many permutations in between-- platoons in column, etc.

Our doctrine during WW II is said to have been oversimplified so it could be taught in a hurry -- one element puts down a base of fire, the other finds a flank. Decades later, in a speech at Fort Benning Gen. DePuy said the main thing his company during WW II did was to transport his forward observer from one hill to another.

I've heard a lot about SOPs and battle drills. Given that 70 years ago what later became FM 22-5 was relegated to parades and change-of-command ceremonies, isn't it time to come up with a similar manual for infantry combat? It's as though the old way to fight -- how to move around and fight -- was rescinded and replaced with oversimplified talking points. We need a new way of doing it by the numbers. A new manual could be like DePuy's basic tactical formations in the old FM 100-5, but much more detailed.

Please forgive me -- I'm merely a broken-down old cannon-cocker.

[Fuchs]

I fail to see the point of formations.

Self-discipline, confidence and wit of its NCOs and officers are decisive for survival and mission success.


It's about the attitude, not about formations and recipes.
We had way too many stupid fashions and specialised 'solutions' since the mid-90's and need to have a close look at OPFOR HE-frag effects again.
The "AK+RPG" opposition led to tailored responses that would be suicidal even against a 1944 army.

[Pete]

Fuchs, it has to do with how likely contact with the enemy is. The more probable it is the more important it becomes to have one's weapons able to fire at the enemy. When a traveling element makes contact it often has to change formation for fire and maneuver. There is also an advantage to being able to form without the need for detailed instructions about how to do it.

[JMA]

I fail to see the point of formations.

Self-discipline, confidence and wit of its NCOs and officers are decisive for survival and mission success.


It's about the attitude, not about formations and recipes.
We had way too many stupid fashions and specialised 'solutions' since the mid-90's and need to have a close look at OPFOR HE-frag effects again.
The "AK+RPG" opposition led to tailored responses that would be suicidal even against a 1944 army.

OK, this is what I was taught and agree with:

Sound patrol formations are necessary in order that:
1. Control is exercised.
2. Movement is facilitated.
3. The patrol is ready for immediate action.

OK, so how do soldiers move from one place to another... in a blob?

[Ken White]

When we fought the First World War the old FM 22-5 way of doing things was how we deployed for combat ... Our doctrine during WW II is said to have been oversimplified so it could be taught in a hurry -- one element puts down a base of fire, the other finds a flank...

Yes and that started being questioned after Kasserine Pass and after the Bulge really fell by the wayside and had been totally discredited (at that time, not by the Bulge specifically). We in essence fought WW II with WW I tactical precepts until the tail end, by then we had so much mass employed that tactical nicety wasn't required.. Good thing because we did not know how to do that...

I'm not at all sure we can do it today -- I know there are units and people than can and do operate with excellent tactical acumen but I'm not at all sure the broader US Army does or can. Or even wants to, the tendency to rely on mass an firepower is strong -- because its easy. Unfortunatel, all the hard earned lessons of WW II were discarded and a return to 'real peacetime soldiering' took place. Our training and personnel system today are both flawed -- badly -- and both are relics of WW I and WW II -- just as tha dumbe 22-5 is. No parade ever won a war, no good haurcut ever killed a bad guy and unless someone has strangled one with it, neither has a stupid Reflective Safety Belt (NSN 8465-01-163-8835).

Decades later, in a speech at Fort Benning Gen. DePuy said the main thing his company during WW II did was to transport his forward observer from one hill to another.

Rather than slam De Puy for ineptitude and say that was his fault if he was the Commander, since I wasn't there and do not know if that's correct, I can and will say that comment applied to him and his Company in one small area in one large Theater in an even larger global war. Having talked to and served under a number of people who commanded Companies in that war, my sensing is that most would not agree with him. I know those from the Pacific Theater would grin, mirthlessly, at the absolutely dangerous naivete of the comment.

That principle almost certainly did not apply to most Companies in that War -- yet, it got embedded in the mind of a young Captain and years later, he tried as a General to structure an Army based on his brief experience in one geographic area, in one command in one war.

I do not think that was wise. Recent history proves it was far from helpful.

Thus my point earlier: ""...those problems are far less structured and much more diverse for the maneuver arms and they are ferociously exacerbated for those guys BECAUSE we foolishly try to encapsulate 'doctrine' in larger lessons and solutions derived from other situations that were just enough different to be problematic..."" (emphasis added /kw).

I've heard a lot about SOPs and battle drills.

That's a function of the Army in which you served. It trained to Tasks, Conditions and Standards and had a large quantity of less than stellar soldiers and few experienced NCOs to train those folks because way too many of the good and experienced got killed in Viet Nam. Those SOPs and Battle Drills were seen as a cheap and easy way for marginally competent trainers to train marginally competent individuals. Those days, fortunately, are gone --but too many are still trying to 'train' much smarter and more capable people the same way.

Drills are necessary but not the simplistic type that we picked up in the 80s. What's needed are complex, multi scenario drills that force the inclusion of multiple tasks and no pre-determined outcome.

"No pre determined out come" is what happens in combat...

Given that 70 years ago what later became FM 22-5 was relegated to parades and change-of-command ceremonies, isn't it time to come up with a similar manual for infantry combat?

There's one out there. (LINK). It's only three years old and it's not too bad. Go to Chapter 3, Tactical Movement. It's fair. It's greatest problem as would be true with any doctrinal pub or technique is that it must be very generic in tone. For example, look at Figure 3-15. It suggests a 20m interval between Teams. That's okay for many places and times -- that "rolling open terrain on a mild June day" but it will not work in the jungle where less than five meters is necessary -- it is poor for place like much of Afghanistan where 60 to 100m would be better. METT-TC HAS to be considered by the guy fighting but the Book cannot do that, too many variables.

That's where the Task, condition and Standard of BTMS fails -- the conditions vary widely. Task: Clear a building. Conditions: Fragile mud hut in Viet Nam? Hardened, tough mud hut in Afghanistan? Frame house in Central America? Reinforced Concrete Police Staion in Iraq? Ten Story Apartment? The Tower of Dubai?...

You, as they said at Leavenworth in the old days, have to adapt.

The problem with manuals is they embed thoughts and images in minds and then when folks get in a scrap in places and ways the manual did not depict (or often could not predict...), they simply don't know what to do. Training -- repetitive conduct of combat like activities in different settings and against differing opponents is the answer, manuals are not. Tha training should be harder, more diifcult and more complex than is most combat, then combat will be easy. right now because the training is marginal, combat is more difficult than it should be.

It's as though the old way to fight -- how to move around and fight -- was rescinded and replaced with oversimplified talking points.

I disagree. Strongly. That old way to fight got people killed and we've gotten a bit smarter, we should not regress, we should improve even more. 'METT-TC' and 'depends on the situation' are not talking points, they are very real concerns. An even greater concern is too rigid adherence to doctrine...

We need a new way of doing it by the numbers. A new manual could be like DePuy's basic tactical formations in the old FM 100-5, but much more detailed.

Scary thought. You cannot fight by the numbers. Period.

That "by the numbers rationale" is predicated on the dumb enlisted swine model. It may be needed for mobilization but it is absolutely wrong for a supposed professional force.

Not to mention that100-5 was a very flawed document...

Please forgive me -- I'm merely a broken-down old cannon-cocker.

No forgiveness required. As Brother Dave Gardner used to say, "Dear Hearts, you can't tell someone if they haven't never..."

Sadly, even some who have and should know better still produce flawed items. Witness DePuy who did a lot of good, really. He also did some harm...

As Fuchs said:

""Self-discipline, confidence and wit of its NCOs and officers are decisive for survival and mission success.""

[jcustis]

The problem with manuals is they embed thoughts and images in minds and then when folks get in a scrap in places and ways the manual did not depict (or often could not predict...), they simply don't know what to do. Training -- repetitive conduct of combat like activities in different settings and against differing opponents is the answer, manuals are not. Tha training should be harder, more diifcult and more complex than is most combat, then combat will be easy. right now because the training is marginal, combat is more difficult than it should be.

And we rarely train as hard as we should at night.

Just when someone should be getting a foot broken off in their you-know-what, we tend to ratchet things down, or at least pay lip service to reverse cycle ops.

Want to impress me that you can do something? Do it to standard in the dark.

Good post Ken!

[Compost]

Two articles by CWO3 Eby were published in the Marine Corps Gazette during 2004. The articles - summarizing trials for effective employment of platoon crew-served and individual weapons in CQB - are not currently retrieveable via the Gazette index. Versions available elsewhere on the web either lack tables or have poorly formatted tables. Attached (hopefully) is a fair copy formatted in Word.

Interesting to note that current USMC planning for its Infantry Automatic Rifle is apparently focussed on using the IAR as a replacement (rather than as a complement) for the LMG/M-249 with suppression to be provided by the M-240 and other heavy crew-served weapons.

[RC]

When it comes to suppressive fire two things are need, accuracy and volume. Just because an infantryman is dumbing rounds in the general area, it is not enough to ensure suppressive ability. As mentioned, seasoned fighters will not duck simply at the sound of fire, but look to see where the rounds are landing. If the shots are accurate, than the enemy knows he is fighting a trained, seasoned, and disciplined fighter. The second function is volume. The standard load carried is for doctrine patrol - where one fight is expected, max. After contact is made, the patrol is ended and all return to the patrol base. The reality is that on deliberate attacks, where more ammo is required, the 1SG will have more ammo, (or at least the platoon sergeant). I hope this helps clarifies the issue

-Robert Cumbo, SGT US ARMY INFANTRY

[Pete]

He [Patton] was a master at manipulating people. I'll give him that. Consider the fact that a good many Majors today have more combat experience than Patton had.

Patton was a cavalryman at heart, which during WW II meant he'd get there "the fastest with the mostest" during breakthrough and exploitation operations in places where the enemy wasn't. He did that in Sicily during his advance up the western part of the island, during the breakout from Normandy across France, and also after the Bulge when the Wehrmacht was on the verge of defeat.

However, during the Lorraine Campaign in September-December 1944 he made little progress in the area of Metz and Nancy in the heavily fortified part of France that had been German from 1870 to 1918. The Germans were masters of tactics and their reconstituted army had its fields of fire and artillery fire planning all worked out during that campaign. That was also when the Allied armies had outrun their logistic support from the Normandy beachead and fuel and ammunition had been diverted for the Market Garden operation in the Netherlands. Patton and Third Army also had to contend with heavy rains which flooded the rivers and led to the writing of the famous "Weather Prayer" later published during the Bulge as a Christmas card to his troops.

During the First World War Patton saw only one week of combat in command of troops before he was wounded, although he had been in-theater since Pershing had arrived in 1917, which is to say he'd spent a lot of time in combat zones but not very much in close combat. One might be able to add a few more days of combat to his resume from his Pancho Villa-chasing days in Mexico, but that fighting was more like Wild West gunfights against bandits rather than hard-core combat.

The point I was making about movement drills is that they should be trained often enough that they become second-nature -- perhaps saying "by the numbers" was a poor choice of words, but guys tend to remember things that have been taught that way. The idea is to be able to assume one of perhaps four or five formations instantly without the need for lengthy discussions about what needs to be done on the radio. It goes without saying that METT-TC will modify any and all template solutions the schoolhouse might devise. In schools we might also teach that fully automatic fire is to be discouraged except for certain Hail Mary situations.

I think Patton was one hell of a combat leader, and I'm unwilling to downgrade his accomplishments in order to compensate for the near-divinity some admirers have accorded him. I'm glad he was on our side.

[jcustis]

I'm beginning to form the opinion, based on a good bit o first hand observation, and followed by spending a whole day watching youtube videos of US, Brit, Canadian, and Dane forces in Afghanistan, that there are two constants we can see.

The first is that maneuver under fire is easier to the rear, especially if it is along a covered and concealed route.

The second is that a massive amount of "suppressive" fire, applied at the enemy as you are about to conduct an assault or otherwise maneuver forward, provides a moral effect more than anything else. It may keep the enemy's head down, but that is not what provides the impact...it is the notion in the head of the man moving forward, that the enemy has his head down in the first place. As it gives him comfort the enemy is going to have less effect on him, he pushes forward.

[Fuchs]

It may keep the enemy's head down, but that is not what provides the impact...it is the notion in the head of the man moving forward, that the enemy has his head down in the first place. As it gives him comfort the enemy is going to have less effect on him, he pushes forward.

That's an interesting thought.

Now add two ingredients: The morale effect of NIJ level IV plates and the incompetence of the opponent (inability to exploit the potential of modern infantry arms to inflict devastating casualties even when most troops are suppressed).


A really capable opponent could inflict so much damage even with a fraction of his forces and against hard body armour-equipped opposition that I decided to seek refuge in dreams of near-perfect self-discipline, camouflage, concealment (incl. obscuration) and deception years ago.

Armour battles and armour insights of the Cold War period might lead the way: It was understood back in the 70's (before Chobham armour gave some confidence in passive protection) that tanks that are being seen will be shot at. Tanks that get shot at will be hit. Tanks that get hit will be destroyed.
The armour community understood this, but also kinda threw this overboard asap in order to be able to keep at least some offensive tactics.
These offensive tactics rested heavily on a combination of casualty tolerance and combined arms efforts.

[Ken White]

The point I was making about movement drills is that they should be trained often enough that they become second-nature ... The idea is to be able to assume one of perhaps four or five formations instantly without the need for lengthy discussions about what needs to be done on the radio. It goes without saying that METT-TC will modify any and all template solutions the schoolhouse might devise.

Bad units have little to no idea what you're talking about...

That has to be a unit thing because many different approaches to the issue are available and used; the 'one size fits all' school model doesn't work well.

In schools we might also teach that fully automatic fire is to be discouraged except for certain Hail Mary situations.

Can't speak to today; we used to do that but poorly trained -- and not really well selected -- junior leaders allowed it anyway and their bosses had other, weightier things on their minds so the proscription was ignored. Apparently still is...

Again, that's a unit thing. Too much time usually elapses between institutional training and combat application.

[jcustis]

The morale effect of NIJ level IV plates

I think the the opposite is true, as the plates in fact cause greater fatigue, and fatigue tends to weaken morale for the most part.

[Fuchs]

Hmm, morale or mood?

It's probably a hopeless case anyway, for we cannot measure the effect.

[jmm99]

Pete, we have to give credit to Umar Al-Mokhtār and the Old Corps.

Tun Tavern, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November 11th 1775

Captains Nicholas and Mullens, having been tasked by the 2nd Continental Congress to form two battalions of Marines, set up the Corps' first recruiting station in the tavern.

The first likely prospect was, in typical recruiter's fashion, promised a "life of high adventure in service to Country and Corps". And, as an extra bonus: If enlisted now he would receive a free tankard of ale...

The recruit gladly accepted the challenge and, receiving his free tankard of ale, was told to wait at the corner table for orders.

The first Marine sat quietly at the table sipping the ale when he was joined by another young man, who had two tankards of ale.

The first Marine looked at the lad and asked where he had gotten the two tankards of ale?

The lad replied that he had just joined this new outfit called the Continental Marines, and as an enlistment bonus was given two tankards of ale.

The first Marine took a long hard look at the second Marine and said: "Damn boot, it was nothing like that in the old Corps!"

Cheers

Mike