Oh well, it seems that military leadership in the Infantry all boils down to bringing order out of chaos. It's almost as though because in combat they're all improvised solutions that are all unique, there are no larger lessons or solutions to be derived. Damn, all those Vu-Graph slides in '77-'78 in Infantry Hall were for nothing.
I thought that was true of military leadership in all branches...
In reverse order, probably true on the Vu-graphs as is true for most of the foolishness that comes out of Bunker 4.Originally Posted by Pete
Not just the Infantry. Armor and Cavalry have exactly the same sorts and sets of problems -- as do Attack and Scout aircraft crews and the Engineers on occasion. The other combat and combat support arms can have the same sort of problems every now and then but those are rather rare and they seldom train for such efforts. Thus they tend to be more orderly and less chaotic. They tend to seek and use checklists, metrics and can actually apply larger lessons effectively and can also generally apply derived or patterned solutions
Maneuver combat OTOH is indeed a series of really unique situations and essentially undiffrentiated chaos requiring rapid assessments and intuitive responses and thinking. The problems of leadership and command in combat are many for all branches -- but those problems are far less structured and much more diverse for the maneuver arms and they are ferociously exacerbated for those guys BECAUSE we foolishly try to encapsulate 'doctrine' in larger lessons and solutions derived from other situations that were just enough different to be problematic...
At about the time you were cruising the Snack Bar in Muskogee County, Georgia that is the meeting place of the Army, had you instead gone to Leavenworth the Tactics Department there would have informed you first thing something along this line: "What we are going to teach you will work in gently rolling open terrain on a mild June day against a peer competitor with approximately equal strength and equipment provided you have all your authorized personnel and equipment and they are trained and it is all operational. If any of those factors differ, you will have to adapt."
That means that if it is raining pitchforks, you've got a problem. If the opponent is a mess of Go-rillas instead of a generally like unit, you've got problems. If you are short 20% of your folks and have only a 70% OR, it's snowing and you have to fit those guerrillas AND a like sized and equipped opponent, you got bi-i-g-g-g problems. Like I said, it's simple...
Pick up your cheeseburger and 'Follow Me'
We are the Building Four Infantry
My thoughts aren't completely clear on this subject, so the point I've been trying to make is probably obscure. When we fought the First World War the old FM 22-5 way of doing things was how we deployed for combat -- column for traveling, line for fighting, with many permutations in between-- platoons in column, etc.
Our doctrine during WW II is said to have been oversimplified so it could be taught in a hurry -- one element puts down a base of fire, the other finds a flank. Decades later, in a speech at Fort Benning Gen. DePuy said the main thing his company during WW II did was to transport his forward observer from one hill to another.
I've heard a lot about SOPs and battle drills. Given that 70 years ago what later became FM 22-5 was relegated to parades and change-of-command ceremonies, isn't it time to come up with a similar manual for infantry combat? It's as though the old way to fight -- how to move around and fight -- was rescinded and replaced with oversimplified talking points. We need a new way of doing it by the numbers. A new manual could be like DePuy's basic tactical formations in the old FM 100-5, but much more detailed.
Please forgive me -- I'm merely a broken-down old cannon-cocker.
Last edited by Pete; 12-10-2010 at 01:17 AM. Reason: Change to FM 100-5.
I fail to see the point of formations.
Self-discipline, confidence and wit of its NCOs and officers are decisive for survival and mission success.
It's about the attitude, not about formations and recipes.
We had way too many stupid fashions and specialised 'solutions' since the mid-90's and need to have a close look at OPFOR HE-frag effects again.
The "AK+RPG" opposition led to tailored responses that would be suicidal even against a 1944 army.
Fuchs, it has to do with how likely contact with the enemy is. The more probable it is the more important it becomes to have one's weapons able to fire at the enemy. When a traveling element makes contact it often has to change formation for fire and maneuver. There is also an advantage to being able to form without the need for detailed instructions about how to do it.
Up 500.
You're right -- and the key to ability to do that is to train units in varying situations against varying opponents. You need a book to tell you the basics -- and we have one -- but you need to practice doing it and you need to be able to do it in triple canopy rainforest, in a cottonwood thicket at Fort Sill or the bare hills of Camp Pendleton, in the river bottom of the Chattahoochee, in downtown Baghdad, in the bare desert of Fort Irwin or in the mountains of the Hindu Hush. Ability to do it in an open field at mainpost at Benning isn't adequate.
The book exists, it's adequate. Formations are known and taught -- they just are not trained or practiced adequately.
Ability to adapt a formation is present. What that does not cover goes back to your earlier question; suppressive fire? flank? artillery? The formation and what Joe needs to do are the easy part and really are not a problem -- what the Leaders do is the problem.
OK, this is what I was taught and agree with:
OK, so how do soldiers move from one place to another... in a blob?Sound patrol formations are necessary in order that:
1. Control is exercised.
2. Movement is facilitated.
3. The patrol is ready for immediate action.
Fuchs is totally correct. Formations are deadly, patterns are deadly.
Yes and that started being questioned after Kasserine Pass and after the Bulge really fell by the wayside and had been totally discredited (at that time, not by the Bulge specifically). We in essence fought WW II with WW I tactical precepts until the tail end, by then we had so much mass employed that tactical nicety wasn't required.. Good thing because we did not know how to do that...
I'm not at all sure we can do it today -- I know there are units and people than can and do operate with excellent tactical acumen but I'm not at all sure the broader US Army does or can. Or even wants to, the tendency to rely on mass an firepower is strong -- because its easy. Unfortunatel, all the hard earned lessons of WW II were discarded and a return to 'real peacetime soldiering' took place. Our training and personnel system today are both flawed -- badly -- and both are relics of WW I and WW II -- just as tha dumbe 22-5 is. No parade ever won a war, no good haurcut ever killed a bad guy and unless someone has strangled one with it, neither has a stupid Reflective Safety Belt (NSN 8465-01-163-8835).Rather than slam De Puy for ineptitude and say that was his fault if he was the Commander, since I wasn't there and do not know if that's correct, I can and will say that comment applied to him and his Company in one small area in one large Theater in an even larger global war. Having talked to and served under a number of people who commanded Companies in that war, my sensing is that most would not agree with him. I know those from the Pacific Theater would grin, mirthlessly, at the absolutely dangerous naivete of the comment.Decades later, in a speech at Fort Benning Gen. DePuy said the main thing his company during WW II did was to transport his forward observer from one hill to another.
That principle almost certainly did not apply to most Companies in that War -- yet, it got embedded in the mind of a young Captain and years later, he tried as a General to structure an Army based on his brief experience in one geographic area, in one command in one war.
I do not think that was wise. Recent history proves it was far from helpful.
Thus my point earlier: ""...those problems are far less structured and much more diverse for the maneuver arms and they are ferociously exacerbated for those guys BECAUSE we foolishly try to encapsulate 'doctrine' in larger lessons and solutions derived from other situations that were just enough different to be problematic..."" (emphasis added /kw).That's a function of the Army in which you served. It trained to Tasks, Conditions and Standards and had a large quantity of less than stellar soldiers and few experienced NCOs to train those folks because way too many of the good and experienced got killed in Viet Nam. Those SOPs and Battle Drills were seen as a cheap and easy way for marginally competent trainers to train marginally competent individuals. Those days, fortunately, are gone --but too many are still trying to 'train' much smarter and more capable people the same way.I've heard a lot about SOPs and battle drills.
Drills are necessary but not the simplistic type that we picked up in the 80s. What's needed are complex, multi scenario drills that force the inclusion of multiple tasks and no pre-determined outcome.
"No pre determined out come" is what happens in combat...There's one out there. (LINK). It's only three years old and it's not too bad. Go to Chapter 3, Tactical Movement. It's fair. It's greatest problem as would be true with any doctrinal pub or technique is that it must be very generic in tone. For example, look at Figure 3-15. It suggests a 20m interval between Teams. That's okay for many places and times -- that "rolling open terrain on a mild June day" but it will not work in the jungle where less than five meters is necessary -- it is poor for place like much of Afghanistan where 60 to 100m would be better. METT-TC HAS to be considered by the guy fighting but the Book cannot do that, too many variables.Given that 70 years ago what later became FM 22-5 was relegated to parades and change-of-command ceremonies, isn't it time to come up with a similar manual for infantry combat?
That's where the Task, condition and Standard of BTMS fails -- the conditions vary widely. Task: Clear a building. Conditions: Fragile mud hut in Viet Nam? Hardened, tough mud hut in Afghanistan? Frame house in Central America? Reinforced Concrete Police Staion in Iraq? Ten Story Apartment? The Tower of Dubai?...
You, as they said at Leavenworth in the old days, have to adapt.
The problem with manuals is they embed thoughts and images in minds and then when folks get in a scrap in places and ways the manual did not depict (or often could not predict...), they simply don't know what to do. Training -- repetitive conduct of combat like activities in different settings and against differing opponents is the answer, manuals are not. Tha training should be harder, more diifcult and more complex than is most combat, then combat will be easy. right now because the training is marginal, combat is more difficult than it should be.I disagree. Strongly. That old way to fight got people killed and we've gotten a bit smarter, we should not regress, we should improve even more. 'METT-TC' and 'depends on the situation' are not talking points, they are very real concerns. An even greater concern is too rigid adherence to doctrine...It's as though the old way to fight -- how to move around and fight -- was rescinded and replaced with oversimplified talking points.Scary thought. You cannot fight by the numbers. Period.We need a new way of doing it by the numbers. A new manual could be like DePuy's basic tactical formations in the old FM 100-5, but much more detailed.
That "by the numbers rationale" is predicated on the dumb enlisted swine model. It may be needed for mobilization but it is absolutely wrong for a supposed professional force.
Not to mention that100-5 was a very flawed document...No forgiveness required. As Brother Dave Gardner used to say, "Dear Hearts, you can't tell someone if they haven't never..."Please forgive me -- I'm merely a broken-down old cannon-cocker.
Sadly, even some who have and should know better still produce flawed items. Witness DePuy who did a lot of good, really. He also did some harm...
As Fuchs said:
""Self-discipline, confidence and wit of its NCOs and officers are decisive for survival and mission success.""
And we rarely train as hard as we should at night.The problem with manuals is they embed thoughts and images in minds and then when folks get in a scrap in places and ways the manual did not depict (or often could not predict...), they simply don't know what to do. Training -- repetitive conduct of combat like activities in different settings and against differing opponents is the answer, manuals are not. Tha training should be harder, more diifcult and more complex than is most combat, then combat will be easy. right now because the training is marginal, combat is more difficult than it should be.
Just when someone should be getting a foot broken off in their you-know-what, we tend to ratchet things down, or at least pay lip service to reverse cycle ops.
Want to impress me that you can do something? Do it to standard in the dark.
Good post Ken!
CWO3 Eby on suppressive fire and CQB.
Two articles by CWO3 Eby were published in the Marine Corps Gazette during 2004. The articles - summarizing trials for effective employment of platoon crew-served and individual weapons in CQB - are not currently retrieveable via the Gazette index. Versions available elsewhere on the web either lack tables or have poorly formatted tables. Attached (hopefully) is a fair copy formatted in Word.
Interesting to note that current USMC planning for its Infantry Automatic Rifle is apparently focussed on using the IAR as a replacement (rather than as a complement) for the LMG/M-249 with suppression to be provided by the M-240 and other heavy crew-served weapons.
CWO3 Eby on suppressive fire and CQB.
Two-part item in almost original format.
Bring the Pain
When it comes to suppressive fire two things are need, accuracy and volume. Just because an infantryman is dumbing rounds in the general area, it is not enough to ensure suppressive ability. As mentioned, seasoned fighters will not duck simply at the sound of fire, but look to see where the rounds are landing. If the shots are accurate, than the enemy knows he is fighting a trained, seasoned, and disciplined fighter. The second function is volume. The standard load carried is for doctrine patrol - where one fight is expected, max. After contact is made, the patrol is ended and all return to the patrol base. The reality is that on deliberate attacks, where more ammo is required, the 1SG will have more ammo, (or at least the platoon sergeant). I hope this helps clarifies the issue
-Robert Cumbo, SGT US ARMY INFANTRY
I'm not sure I understand this comment.
Could you expand on that? Do you mean that comment to apply to all combat generically, to a particular theater / war / operation, or to specific unit(s)?
The reason for my question is that while a patrol can be made specifically to gain contact based on intel and that contact becomes the mission of the patrol or unit, many if not most patrols are going to be purpose (reconnaissance, etc.) patrols where contact may or may not be made and if it is, that may not satisfy the purpose of the patrol and there may not be a return to a patrol base, rather there may be more movement and thus possibly additional contacts.
There is also the possibility that hypothetical contact patrol having made and successfully concluded their contact could while in process of returning to the patrol base have a meeting engagement or get ambushed and thus also have one or more additional contacts...
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