0310. At its simplest, there are two core functions: to fix and to strike. The need to find and to be prepared to exploit is implicit in both. In the 5th Century BC, Sun Tsu coined the terms ‘ordinary force’ for the function of fixing the enemy or denying him the freedom to achieve his purpose; and the ‘extraordinary force’ for the function of manoeuvring into a position of decisive advantage from which he can be struck. Whilst finding and fixing contribute to shaping, striking and exploiting have the potential to be decisive. Fixing is by no means confined to defensive operations to protect the force. Defensive or offensive operations designed to fix the enemy may set the conditions for offensive action to strike him. Where circumstances permit, operations designed primarily to find, fix or strike the enemy should be exploited. Operational experi¬ence indicates that finding, fixing, striking and exploiting should be conducted concurrently, or at least achieve seamless transition from one to another. The campaign plan for Operation DESERT STORM chose to do both.
0311. The core functions have wide utility across the continuum of operations. In a COIN campaign non-military and paramilitary adversaries are found by information gathering by the intelligence services, covert and overt elements of armed forces, and other government agen¬cies. The uniformed military forces and the police, combined with diplomatic efforts and Informa¬tion Operations, fix the insurgents, acting as the ‘ordinary force’. Locally-raised forces can also help to find and fix opponents, and have been employed in numerous campaigns to good effect. Special Forces, military and police units and the legal system contribute to striking, acting as the ‘extraordinary force’. Exploitation in both combat and non-combat operations involves taking advantage of a developing situation in accordance with the superior commander’s intent. For ex¬ample, local tactical successes against insurgents may enable freedom of movement for military forces, civilian police, government officials and humanitarian workers. This process, if exploited, may assist in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population and allow economic and political development to take place.
Finding the Enemy
0312. Finding the enemy is a basic function which endures throughout an operation. It includes locating, identifying, tracking and assessing the enemy. Forces may be directed specifically to fight the battle for information, particularly in the opening stages of an operation. This will nor¬mally be a sound investment when the situation is confused and seemingly chaotic. Whatever its source, information is never wholly reliable. It may need checking or corroborating with other sources. Too much information is a form of friction that can impede decision-making.
Fixing the Enemy
0315. To fix is to deny the enemy his goals, to distract him and thus deprive him of his freedom of action. By doing so, the friendly force gains freedom of action. Combat is adver¬sarial and lethal; an enemy will avoid being struck and defeated unless his freedom of action is constrained. It is difficult to strike an enemy effectively if he is not fixed. Furthermore, an enemy who has no freedom of action cannot dictate the course of tactical events; he has lost the initia¬tive. Depriving an enemy of his freedom of action has both physical and mental aspects. Physi¬cally, his force can be blocked, or pinned against an obstacle. Mentally, he is fixed if he believes he has no freedom of action, if he feels himself compelled to do something, or if he believes he should persist with something which in practice will not bring success. Deception or distraction can play a major role. Often the easiest way to fix an enemy is to attack something that he has to protect: his forces, for example. Deception may fix him until the deception is exposed, which may be too late for him to regain the initiative.
0318.
Depriving the Enemy of his Freedom of Action. The enemy can also be fixed by a combination of methods which deny him information, deny him the ability to pass orders, and inhibit their execution. The enemy’s information sources and his command system are central to his ability to concentrate force. Both often depend on the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Dominating and exploiting it can help fix the enemy. An unsophisticated enemy or one who de¬centralizes command will be less vulnerable. Distracting and fixing the enemy is further achieved by embroiling him in subsidiary actions which divert him from his main purpose. He should also be denied physical mobility.
0319.
Tactical Methods. Fixing the enemy may require the use of firepower or close combat. Such operations can use a significant element of one’s own combat power. Thus the extent to which the enemy’s freedom of action should be constrained has to be judged carefully, to ensure that the resources devoted to fixing are no more than the minimum required. The air operations which preceded the Normandy invasion in June 1944 fixed the German mobile reserves by a combination of interdicting road and rail routes, direct air attacks, and other deception measures. These gave the impression of a direct threat in the Pas de Calais area. This example highlights the value of fixing the enemy by several different means, making it difficult to counter any one. In Northern Ireland, patrolling, vehicle checks, searches and observation have all contributed to fixing the terrorist by limiting his freedom of action.
Striking the Enemy
0320. To strike is to manoeuvre and then take direct action to achieve the purpose of the mis¬sion.
a.
Manoeuvre. To manoeuvre is to gain a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied. Manoeuvre means more than movement in combination with fire. It allows combat power to be focused for greatest ef¬fect, avoids strengths and exploits weakness. The concept of water flowing over surfaces and gaps is useful to understand the concept. Water runs off surfaces – enemy strengths – and pours through gaps – enemy weaknesses. Existing gaps are exploited where pos¬sible. Failing that, they are created. There is usually a time aspect: to exploit fleeting op¬portunities requires agility, anticipation, and decentralized decision-making. This places a premium on reconnaissance, and on forward command which pulls combat power towards enemy weaknesses rather than pushing it from the rear. Doing so opens up options for striking the enemy which, if exploited, present him with multiple threats to which he is un¬able to respond coherently.
b.
Direct Action. Direct action in combat means seizing objectives or destroying enemy forces. Firepower and movement are focused through simultaneity and tempo, to achieve shock and surprise and break the enemy’s will and cohesion. Such coordination makes the most of the complementary characteristics of tactical capabilities, concentrating force at the selected point to ensure a favourable outcome. There is also a time dimension to striking the enemy. It is generally preferable to apply concentrated violence to win quickly at minimum cost. However, constraints may dictate a more protracted approach without the prospect of a single decisive act. In these circumstances, operations should be sequenced and sus¬tained so that the effects on the enemy are cumulative. Nevertheless, whenever force is applied to strike it should be applied suddenly and in concentrations so as to achieve shock effect. Where the mission requires action other than the use of violent force, such as an arrest operation or preventing interference with the delivery of humanitarian assistance, similar while avoiding the adverse effects of shocking the general population.
Exploitation
0321. As a core function, exploitation is the seizure of opportunity in order to achieve a higher commander’s objective, or fulfil some part of his intent, directly. Opportunistic exploitation re¬quires action beyond the given mission. It may therefore replace the task stated in orders.2 For example, a commander ordered to neutralize an enemy force covering the approaches to his commander’s objective may find an approach which is not covered and simply move directly to the objective. Opportunities can occur at any time whilst finding, fixing or striking. A commander should constantly search for such opportunities and, when they occur, pursue them ruthlessly. Exploitation should be expected from subordinates. They should not have to be told to exploit, and only told how far they may do so if absolutely necessary, using the term ‘limit of exploitation’. General von Moltke the Elder’s prescription for success at the operational level was
“reconnaissance, victory and exploitation”, which might be described today as the aggressive handling of reconnaissance, tactical success and exploitation.
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