Now, we scratch the surface of the constitution.

I remember a conference (w/Dorronsoro on the panel) where the discussion turned to how we intervened and put this amateur national "democracy" constitution/structure in place. We have been chasing this problem--full blown since at least 2007/8 when it became clear that it wasn't working.

Unlike anthropologists, I spent a lot of time in Iraq studying the national and sub-national governance structures in Iraq since pre-Ottoman days. Studying the maps, structures and events over the last 100 years creates clear patterns of regional operational and control systems that, after a great deal of nail biting on my part, seems to be re-establishing itself in Iraq---despite our efforts, and those of the many expats, refugees and minorities we worked so hard to help create something different.

Every day that sub-national news simmers out of Iraq, it fits the blocks I expected it would. Example: Mosul as a City/State with reach down below Ninewa, and strong connections through to Turkey. Tikrit, (and Salah ad Din, without its "first family," now returning back to a bit part, while Sammara either stands as a special city with it's own relationship to Baghdad.

Had someone ever studied the sub-national structure ahead of time, it would have been obvious that one of our first constitutional objectives should have been to roll back the Saddam provincial restructuring initiatives in order to reconstruct the DNA of the long-standing city/region power structures that were always the building blocks of Iraq (even under Saddam, there were places he did not control or f---with, contrary to myth).

I have not spent time in Afghanistan, but have learned enough from others to know that the DNA/building blocks of that arguable "country" (more like a minimalist confederation brought to open family feud during the 1970's-2010) are not a part of our forced and ineffective bag of tactical objectives.

It is not just about Pakistan. The core problems are the basic structure, and finding structures that are sustainable, with or without Pashtun involvement. If the real solution lies in a Quetta/Kandahar/Baluchistan structure (as may ultimately be the case), then a temporary solution that does not provide a format for that possibility is as bad as all other half-assed solutions.

Crack this issue open for Afghanistan's sub-populations and neighbors, and the right answers will start to emerge. Ask the White House of Pentagon, and they will tell you their solutions for expedient inside the Beltway realities, but they are not likely, over the next two years, to survive US domestic realities, or to hold any real value on the ground.

I suspect that the default Petreaus solution (arm everybody and let them shoot at each other) may provide us with an exit (which might be the right answer for US), and a pause for the parties, but, like Iraq, will have little enduring structural value.