I think it's about time to agree that we disagree about the operational level.
Why Huh?
Policy, Strategy, Tactics. Roger so far?
They all have casual relationships with each other. Roger so far?
Campaign has no casual relationship. Destroying Rome (the Policy) means campaigning in Italy. That's a given. Destroying the Roman Army (the strategy) will have no effect if done Spain or Gaul. Conversely conquering Carthage, means Campaigning in Carthage.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I think it's about time to agree that we disagree about the operational level.
Actually, I don't think we disagree at all. Mr. Owen admits that campaigning (operations) links strategy to tactics.
Of course, he disagrees with himself in the same post.
I'll agree to the fact that I don't really understand what he thinks, and I don't think he understands what he thinks either.
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
Mr. Owen,
Why are you ignoring the fact that in your own Infinity Journal the very first part of the very first article of the very first issue discusses ends, ways, and means as I have been articulating it?
Are you going to post something here that says Eliot Cohen and T.X. Hammes are as naive as I am for buying into the ends/ways/means concept? I suppose they are also part of the 99% of us who doesn't get it? If that is the case, how did that article ever make it into your journal?
Just curious....
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
I learned the "operational level" of warfare via a simple explanation using logistics. It made the point very clear: At the strategic level, you have the goods being produced and shipped in their masses from the factories and the homeland to the theatre. At the tactical level (which can reach as high up as the "army" -- basically, the tactical level is the fighting force), you have units making use of these goods. How they exist at the strategic level is of no use to the tactical level, so the operational level is the point at which those large parcels of goods are taken apart and reassembled into new packages that make sense for utilization on the battlefield.
This logic can be applied in all military matters. The strategy which guides a war or military action is of no use to the operating units. It must be broken down into campaigns and operations and so forth, which can be put into action by those forces. So, for the Americans, the strategic level is DC, the operational level is the -COM (CENTCOM, PACCOM, etc.) and the tactical level are the guys in country.
I think the problem arises because "operational" has a variety of uses. Let's call it the "transitional" level of warfare. This sort of thinking may seem irrelevant for most, but without this separate level the US military, in all of this overlarge glory, does not work effectively.
What I find interesting about Owen's argument against the operational level of warfare is that England was the operational level of the Allied invasion of Western Europe. An essential strategy along with the means (masses of troops and goods) were funnelled into England over the course of years and prepared for deployment to and effective use upon the battlefield. This came in the form of developing the invasion and campaign plans, the training and organization of the troops and units, and the preparation of the supplies. It is simply unthinkable to conclude that something very different from either strategy or tactics did not occur during this process.
By the way, I highly recommend the Navy War College's JMO core course to give a good sense of the existence of this space in warfare. It kills the students, because it's very work intensive, but as a "tourist" I enjoyed it very much. of course, the students thought I was a bit looney for literally begging the powers that be to let me sit in - it was a quick and dirty way for me to accomplish some dissertation research -- besides, as a civilian it's a rarefied area you can't usually access, so to me it was all exciting. Anyway, I believe they put the syllabus online.
Jill
Well said. I'd also add that operational warfare is tough because:
1. It links strategy to tactics, and therefore has elements of both. There is a temptation to lump it into one bucket or the other.
2. It is dynamic. What level of command plans at the operational level can change depending on the operation.
3. It isn't always there. A single aircraft performing an air strike to kill Saddam Hussein is a tactical action with a strategic effect. There is no need for operational planning (though one might argue that such a strike is part of an operational campaign).
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
You asked a question and I answered it.
As to this:
you'll have to argue that out with COL Bartholomees at the War College.from Wilf
Sorry, this is garbage.Quote:
1) Strategists generally insist that their art includes not only the traditional military element of power but also other elements of power like politics and economics. Most would also accept a peacetime as well as a wartime role for strategy.
2) With increased inclusiveness the word strategy became available outside the military context and is now used in a variety of disciplines ranging from business to medicine and even sports.
One simply has to wonder how poor old CvC and Jomini (and Mahan, Halleck and Bigelow) managed to deal with strategy and tactics sans benefit of an operational level of war (operational warfare).
Please excuse - I have to get back to my hamsters (upcoming hamster races and hamster jousts post Boxing Day, you know) to get from them a quick rundown on operational art from a hamster's viewpoint.
Regards
Mike
This is clever indeed. What Mr. Owen is trying to do here is make his point by demeaning the opposition.
You see according to Mr. Owen, if you think there is an operational level of war, then it just isn't that you have a bad idea...no, its much worse: You are too stupid to "comprehend the basics."
If you ask me, that is pretty bold for someone who not only contradicted himself in his own post, but also challenged anyone who saw ends/ways/means as goals/methods/resources to publish it in Infinity Journal, only to find out that the FIRST ARTICLE in the FIRST ISSUE of that journal contained EXACTLY THAT!
I don't usually use the little smiley icons, but
WTF, over?
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
Well, it's not his journal alone and the consistency of an advocate doesn't tell about the quality of his position anyway.
I feel that the arguments were traded and rejected by both sides, I don't expect either side to change the opinion any time soon.
Another good article on operational warfare, focusing on British doctrine.
da.mod.uk/defac/publications/jk.pdf
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
To demean the opposition would be a breach of good form. To argue against bad ideas is a requirement.
The point merely being, IF you understand the relationship between strategy and tactics, why put operations in there.You see according to Mr. Owen, if you think there is an operational level of war, then it just isn't that you have a bad idea...no, its much worse: You are too stupid to "comprehend the basics."
I reject the operational level of war, because I see no need for it. It adds nothing. I also think having "levels of war" is not useful.
That article was written by T.X.Hammes. Not me.If you ask me, that is pretty bold for someone who not only contradicted himself in his own post, but also challenged anyone who saw ends/ways/means as goals/methods/resources to publish it in Infinity Journal, only to find out that the FIRST ARTICLE in the FIRST ISSUE of that journal contained EXACTLY THAT!
T.X. know each other and we argue a lot. First time we met, I called him on 4GW. I think we've been pretty friendly ever since! I allow writers to write what they want, even when I think they are completely wrong. Get the debate out there. As long as they are talking about strategy, it's all good. I don't aim to suppress debate. I want debate, and I want evidence.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Fair enough. We'll throw Hammes and Cohen in the "99% that don't get it" bin.
Incidentally, I don't disagree with the "Policy-Strategy-Tactics" triad per se. It is a useful idea; its just not the same thing as Ends-Ways-Means.
I've tried to restrict myself to empirical evidence so far, but I thought I'd throw this bit in.
I'm curious to know if you have ever served on a military staff above brigade? You see, I have, and in combat no less. I've also commanded and served on staff in combat at the tactical level, and I have served on staff at the strategic level (though not in combat).
In my experience there are three levels of war. (I have an idea why you don't like the term "levels", and I agree that it is a poor word to describe a continuum that is not always clearly stratified). I believe there are three levels because there are different sets of skills required to plan at the operational level, and those skills are distinct from, though related to, both tactics and strategy. So, while you "see no need for" the operational level, I do, having done the work myself.
Of the three, operational warfare is the most difficult to understand. Although there is doctrine and it is taught in the US officer education system, one really has to get out there and do it in order to appreciate it fully.
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
99% maybe high, but no impossible
Tell me why. If it's a useful idea, why not use it.Incidentally, I don't disagree with the "Policy-Strategy-Tactics" triad per se. It is a useful idea; its just not the same thing as Ends-Ways-Means.
Never done any time in any HQ above Brigade, and I've only ever done it in training.I'm curious to know if you have ever served on a military staff above brigade? You see, I have, and in combat no less. I've also commanded and served on staff in combat at the tactical level, and I have served on staff at the strategic level (though not in combat).
OK, so at which level of Command does "Operational Warfare" begin? What does it mean? Why is it not called "Divisional or Corps Tactics?"Of the three, operational warfare is the most difficult to understand. Although there is doctrine and it is taught in the US officer education system, one really has to get out there and do it in order to appreciate it fully.
To repeat myself, I used to be an "Operational Art" and Manoeuvre Warfare "Groupy." Spent a lot of time reading Glantz and studying Soviet Doctrine. I waffled on about "Deep Battle" and "Simultaneity" etc etc.
Then I started to write about it and thus have to really understand what I sought to discuss and guess what..... It turns out to be utterly empty. All definitions of the "Operational Level" turn out to utterly evidence free. Thus I ceased to be a believer. I looked behind the curtain, and there was nothing.
Then I found and read Hamely. So then went back and re-read all the classics and found they made no mention of it, at all!
I could choose to believe in an "Operational level" but I want evidence. Doctrine is not religion. ....and I live in Israel, where many in the IDF worship the "Operational Level," and where no one can really explain it either. To me, it's like Manoeuvre Warfare (and actually part of it). It evaporates under rigour.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
It's not a natural law thing that's simply there beyond doubt.
It's a definition, and as such it's useful to help people to establish order in chaos. Tactics need to vary on every level - individual, squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, corps, army, theatre.
This multitude of levels is too difficult, thus it helps to group them.
The mall unit and unit tactics (even those which apply for formations as well) are called tactics.
The unique formation tactics are called operational art.
Theatre command and civilian input should be strategy (although even two army group HQs and a national general staff can delve into detail problems of an operational plan if it encompasses enough forces and if there's a fighting break as during the drôle de guerre).
Now there are three levels, and it becomes much easier to explain a platoon leader why his behaviour needs to change in order to meet higher plans. You tell him about the operational level and how its demands can even look pointless or contradictory at his tactical level.
You can on the other hand also easily communicate that tactical fights aren't enough. It's not enough to be better in many, many small fights. You need to look at the bigger picture of operations as well, where tactical successes can even be counter-intentional (when you want to deceive about your strength or allow an enemy to enter a trap, for example).
Wilf; remember how useful it looked to you a few years ago. That's a great part of the utility of the concept of an operational level. Thinking in three levels is easier than thinking in ten levels. You may think that you reached the point where you don't need this aide any more and are too irritated by the artificiality of the distinction, but that doesn't make it a poor idea.
Besides; would you really argue for no separation between buddy team tactics and whatever is was right below the "Germany first!" strategy?
Buddy team tactics in in-house fighting should be subsumed under "tactics" just like Operation Zitadelle? Really?
I don't think so, obviously.
Example?
a.) I thought it useful because I merely never questioned it. I just assumed it was. It was only when I started researching doctrine above the battle group level I began to find it answered none of the "So what" questions.Wilf; remember how useful it looked to you a few years ago. That's a great part of the utility of the concept of an operational level. Thinking in three levels is easier than thinking in ten levels. You may think that you reached the point where you don't need this aide any more and are too irritated by the artificiality of the distinction, but that doesn't make it a poor idea.
b.) Two levels is easier than than three. Again, I don't think this levels thing adds anything.
c.) I don't get irritated because I think I know more. I get irritated that there is an idea out there which no one seems to be able to explain to me in simple language and answer the questions I ask.
To whit,
OK.The unique formation tactics are called operational art.
Why?
What tactics are unique to the formation level?
What is it about "Operational Art" that is not merely the planning and conduct of "Operations" and at every level of command?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I continue to follow this; despite some "thread fencing" which tends to detract from things, it is still an interesting and useful thread - if anything it presents a dialectic of operational theory to help us to determine what is useful and what is not.
I don't think anyone disputes that there is an "operational" aspect in warfare - all sides have acknowledged that it:
a. exists
b. exists to provide some link from strategy to tactics.
Thus "operational warfare" is the aspect of warfare concerned with this mechanism and "operational art" is the application of it. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think all sides agree to this.
Where we seem to get off the rails is, at least as this thread goes, is that it isn't very well defined.
Fuchs labels it as a form of "high tactics". Brigade/Division and up.
M.L., however, provided the following (which was useful):
Points 2 and 3 seem to refute Fuchs' definition. Points 2 and 3 also point to an ambiguous nature of "operational warfare"; it fluctuates in who is applying it and it isn't always a factor in an operation. If I may, let me pose the following two questions for everyone as a way of focusing the discussion onto something to help us better define it and, perhaps, break some of the deadlock:
1. Is a commander of a field force always applying tactics? Is the CFLCC in the run-up to Desert Storm? How about VII Corps Commander? How about a company commander?
2. Is a commander of a field force always applying the operational art? Is the CFLCC in the run-up to Desert Storm? How about the VII Corps Commander? How about a company commander?
Your name is not William.
Feel free to prove that my statement is false.
It doesn't matter what others say or write, you need to prove it , really really prove it beyond doubt. Only my opinion on this counts, not anyone else's opinion.
Prove it to ME.
I'll explain; I just took it for granted that William was your name, but then I asked myself why? So what? There was no evidence (except that other appear to think that William is our name).
- - - - -
Wilf, the operational level as such was created because people agreed on it. You may go on a crusade and proclaim the hypothesis that the operational level doesn't exist, but you do not seem to grant us the chance to falsify your hypothesis. You're even moving goalposts - a few pages ago it looked as if we only needed to show the utility of the concept to justify it, now you're not content with that.
Besides, you're asking questions that were answered pages ago. And some of these questions aren't even useful.
The whole discussion comes to no end because you demand evidence for a clear black/white cut between military art & science.
There's no such clear cut, and it appears as if nobody but you seems to have a requirement for it.
To lead Operation Zitadelle is nothing like leading a fire team. There has to be a distinction somewhere in between, and the interested part of mankind appears to have agreed on calling the intermediate between strategy and tactics "operational art".
The exact separation is difficult because the meaning of designations such as brigade, division and corps varies over time and between countries. There are even differences between different conflicts that enable at times a division to play a role that had been played by an army group in an earlier conflict (division in Georgia 2008 ~ army group in France 1940).
You want clarity of separation where clarity is neither required nor appropriate.
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