The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[M.L.]

Incidentally, I don't disagree with the "Policy-Strategy-Tactics" triad per se. It is a useful idea; its just not the same thing as Ends-Ways-Means.

Tell me why. If it's a useful idea, why not use it.

This concept illustrates the necessary connection between actions on the battlefield and policy objectives. Essentially, it is a richer statement of Clausewitz's axiom that "war is a continuation of policy by other means." In other words, war is an inherently political act. Therefore, everything which happens in war must serve political ends, right down to and including tactics.

By contrast, ends, ways, and means, is not a framework for connecting low level actions (tactics) to terminal goals (policy). Rather, it is an analytical framework within policy, strategy, etc... which aids in the conceptualization, planning, and execution of related actions.

In his book Modern Strategy Gray gives us his seventeen dimensions of strategy, which he groups into three categories. These align (roughly) with ends, ways, and means.

The first group is "People and Politics", which are the ends (goals).
The second is "Preparation for War", which are the means (resources).
Finally, the third is "War Proper", which are the ways (methods).

With respect to operational warfare and its relationship to strategy, Gray says the following in a 2009 monograph, SCHOOLS FOR STRATEGY: TEACHING STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY CONFLICT

A strategist is understood to be a professional military person charged either, or both, with: (1) guiding and shaping subordinate military operations by major units in campaigns for the purpose of securing military
advantage (success or victory); and (2) guiding and shaping the course of military events for the purpose of achieving the polity’s political goals.

In short, the subject of primary interest here is education for generals coping down the chain of command with the use of major military formations, and for generals striving to deliver upwards for the satisfaction of policy the military advantage achieved by the operational level of warfare. I am aware of the historical fact that in different times, places, and circumstances, the relations among politics, strategy, and tactics can assume widely different forms. Nonetheless, the two core behaviors just identified as our prime foci, truly are ubiquitous in kind. All belligerents have to strive for purposeful coherence in the activities by the elements that contribute to their military instrument; and all belligerents, similarly, must seek to employ that instrument in such ways that their political ambitions are advanced.

OK, so at which level of Command does "Operational Warfare" begin? What does it mean? Why is it not called "Divisional or Corps Tactics?"

As I posted previously, this can vary depending on the context. In the US system, the operational level is really the domain of the Corps. Only a Corps is manned to execute the inherently joint functions of a truly operational headquarters. However, there is no hard and fast rule. As Gray states above, the relationships are dynamic.

In response to the second question above, planning Corps operations (and to some extent, Division) are not like planning, say, a company operation, only on a larger scale. To call something "Corps Tactics" would be to suggest as much, and therefore be misleading.

Then I found and read Hamely. So then went back and re-read all the classics and found they made no mention of it, at all!

The word "strategy" appears exactly once in The History of the Peloponnesian War. Yet, this is one of the most influential books on strategy ever written, and is required reading in most strategic studies programs. Similarly, the absence of the words "operational warfare" from history doesn't really tell us that much. As I have said before, it is better to focus on ideas rather than words.

I could choose to believe in an "Operational level" but I want evidence. Doctrine is not religion.

I'm not sure exactly what you want as evidence. Do you mean evidence aside from the overwhelming majority of military thinkers? You reject that as "99% of thinkers are wrong." Or perhaps historical case studies? You reject that as misinterpretation. Or do you want doctrine? You reject that as "not religion."

If operational warfare is the link between strategy and tactics, the perhaps the best evidence is your own words:

A campaign/operation merely ensures that tactics take place in the time and place relevant to the strategy.

I've rarely seen a better definition of operational warfare...