Quote Originally Posted by M.L. View Post
Michael's tactical successes did not give rise to strategic success because the two were not linked.
That is simply not true. King George actually warned his staff that if German success continued, "we may have lost the war."
Luckily the whole offensive was very badly planned in terms of exploitation, and had almost no reserves to replace very high casualties - which is why it failed. Had tactical success, such as that seen in the first 36 hours continued, they would have knocked the UK out of the war.
This is because strategy and tactics are not inherently linked by their nature, as Mr. Owen suggests.
As I suggest? Sorry 800 years of written military thought say they are linked as do 5,000 years of recorded Military History. Your case is based on a 1980s invention of Corps Operations.
They are linked. If not then Strategy is not linked to tactics and tactics does not bear on Policy. If that's the case then the whole conceptual edifice that puts "Operations" between Strategy and tactics falls apart.
In this case, had Ludendorff pressed for the French communications hub of Amiens as his operational objective, and been able to reinforce success toward the objective with men and materials (although there were practical problems with the latter), he might have succeeded in splitting the French/British line and pushing the Brits into the sea.
"Operational Objective"? So basically you mean "objective". Nothing you state there makes the case for an "operational level of war.

This is after the fact justification of the worst sort. The British went on to fight solidly for the "100 days" with nothing even remotely resembling the "Operational Level." You cannot say "oh they had it, but they didn't call it that." In the minds of British Generals and Staffs, there was NO operational level. ...and it worked just fine! The UK did not adopt the Operational Level until well into the 1990's. We even won the Falklands without it!