Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
Wilf may have a problem with operational art. I do not, it exists and is useful.
Well I don't have a problem with "Operational Art," if its the art of planning operations. Not just useful. It's essential.

Here are my "problems."

a.) There is simply no need to interject a concept between Strategy and Tactics. It isn't need. Most military men never needed it. Why do it? (it may exist as an "idea", but there are many "ideas" that lack utility)

b.) The idea of "levels of war," is not useful, especially when expressed in terms of Strategic, Operational and Tactical. For example, you can't have Strategic, Operational and Tactical "Mobility" in ways you can usefully define.

c.) The claim that Napoleon "invented" the operational level is without evidence or any form of proof. What Napoleon did was conceptually no different from what Marlborough did in 1704, and Napoleon studied Marlborough! Based on the idea that the operational level of war is "battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces," then this exactly defines how Hannibal and Ghengis Kahn fought. If the Operational level existed for the last 200 years, then it always existed!
If anyone can furnish any actual historical evidence to the contrary, I will happily study it in detail.

d.) The whole concept of "Operational Level" is, IMO, steeped in a lack of clarity. The definitions used in JPub 1-02 are not rigourous. Warfare is done by Command, so Corps, Division, Formation, etc. Commands make plans and issue orders. That is simple, effective and proven to work. What proven advantage does the "Operational level" deliver.

In conclusion, I see the "Operational level" as something like Manoeuvre Warfare, and EBO. Something that at best adds nothing, bar sophistry, and at worst is highly counter-productive.