Carl,

Who has standing to legally advocate for the Pashtun people today? They are split between two nations, neither of which is inclined to offer them legal, Representative participation in government.

This feeds directly to the causal factor I label as "Hope." A populace that perceives that it has access to legal, trusted, and certain means of influencing governance has "hope," and as such is far less likely to participate or look to the illegal forms of violent and non-violent politics that make up insurgency. A populace without such an outlet is much more likely to act out. There is no "hope" in Afghanistan for anyone not directly affiliated with the Northern Alliance or Mr. Karzai.

So this brings us to the question of "who represents the Pashtun people?" Who indeed.

Historically, prior to the Taliban and the current Karzai constitution, local, provincial and district Shuras were the basis of legitimate government, selected and serving locally; with patronage also being a local dynamic. From these local forums a Khan was selected who would then represent the Province (not sure off the top of my head exact selection process or level represented) to the Afghan government. These representatives were then recognized by the King as having official authority. Legitimacy from the people, Authority from the King. By all accounts, while not an incredibly effective government, it was widely regarded as "good governance", and there was stability.

Not many are willing to outlaw themselves to represent the people so excluded from official governance. Often those who are willing to outlaw themselves have their own selfish interests or the interests of some foreign power at the heart of their motivations. If you bleed in the water, it is likely that predators will appear before help does. Same-same with a populace excluded from good governance.

But my point is not that the Taliban are the representative of the Pashtun people (though be default, in many ways they are), but rather that they are the organization with influence, access, capability and capacity to evict AQ from the FATA. That is US mission in AFPAK. That is the U.S interest at stake in AFPAK. Historically we have worked with all manner of rogues to service our interests; many suggest that we work with rogues in dealing with the current official governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. If one must work with rogues, at least one can have the common sense to work with the rogues that can actually help one accomplish what they are attempting to do.

Ms Flournoy often talks of how we must quit being so idealistic and must become more pragmatic. Well, here's a bit of pragmatism for us to consider: We currently side with two parties who cannot help us accomplish our mission to gang up on the one party who can. I suggest we stop doing that, sit down with the Taliban and figure out what it takes to deal with AQ, and then make it happen. I suspect our friendly rogues will not like it much, but that they will play ball. Particularly Pakistan. Afghanistan less so, as the populace that makes up the Northern Alliance dreads any opening of the door of a return to potential Pashtun rule for good reason. We will need to protect them, and the number one tool for providing such protections is a proper constitution that is in turn protected by a military that places its loyalty to that constitution first, and their commander in chief second at best.