My take when the Quetta Shura got rolled up a few months back was that it was a none to subtle reminder from the Government of Pakistan (I refuse to abdicate them from responsibility for the ISI and the military; just as I refuse to abdicate the Government of Lebanon for the actions of LH. To do so only creates and enforces further sanctuaries from the rule of law that states rely upon to sustain effective power and control) to the Taliban as to who they work for and that there is no quitting.
By the U.S. reaching out to the Taliban we disempower the coercive hold that Karzai has on us (essentially that we need him and the Northern Alliance in power in Afghanistan in order to secure ourselves from AQ) and also free the Pashtuns from the coercive power of Pakistan (similar, that they need Pakistan sanctuary and support to wage their insurgency against what they perceive as illegitimate government in Afghanistan).
We face an impossible mission in AFPAK only because we have defined the mission in impossible terms. By redefining the mission we can make this a much more viable operation and potentially make it more likely to produce the security we seek as well.
This thread is about indicators. There are 14 indicators of Late-Stage Insurgent success and 14 indicators of effective COIN in the CIA "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency" that was apparently produced sometime in the 1980s.
http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf
This is actually a pretty good outline on insurgency that I probably originally was made aware of here on the SWJ. I was reviewing it this week, and these 28 factors and indicators should cause thinking people to ask hard questions about our current course in Afghanistan. I will list them here, but be sure to look at them in regards to GIROA, not the Coalition. Afterall, this is an Afghan insurgency and an Afghan COIN. The Coalition intervention and support to that effort is a very different animal driven by very different interests and objectives. I think we tend to forget that.
I mean, people discuss the "COIN Strategy in Afghanistan." I think about this everyday, and yet I don't have the faintest idea what the GIROA COIN strategy is. I would ponder this as I would sit in large command and staff meetings in RC-South as we prepared for and executed the Marjah (central Helmand) operation and prepared for the Kandahar operations, with heavy emphasis on Afghan partnering. After 5 months a single Afghan LNO was brought into the room. Never did we say "here is the Afghan strategy, now lets figure out how we best support them;" always it was "here is the ISAF strategy, now lets figure out how we get our Afghan partners to help us execute the plan we've put together to support it." There is a difference, and it is a telling one.
So, from our friends at the CIA:
14 Indicators of Insurgent Success:
Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government:
- Withdrawal of support by specific , critical segments of the population.
- Growing popular perception of regime illegitimacy.
- Popular perception of insurgents as leading nationalists.
- Insurgent co-optation, incorporation, or elimination of other major opposition groups to government.
Progressive withdrawal of international support for the government:
- Withdrawal of foreign support by specific, critical allies.
- Increasing international support for the insurgents.
Progressive loss of government control over the population and territory:
- Significant expansion of territory under insurgent control.
- Escalation of guerrilla / terrorist violence.
- Increasing inability of government to protect supporters / officials from attack.
- National economy increasingly weakened by insurgent activity.
Progressive loss of government coercive power:
- Military plots or coups against the government.
- Armed guerrilla forces multiplying in size.
- Lack of sufficient government troops for counterinsurgency.
- Government seriously negotiating sharing of power with rebels.
And 14 Military and Nonmilitary factors of effective COIN (again, think GIROA first; then reconsider for the Coalition as a whole separately, but the GIORA assessment is the critical one):
Military Factors
Leadership. The degree of professionalism that characterizes a country’s military forces.
Tactics and Strategy. The ability of counterinsurgent forces to employ the various unconventional strategies and tactics required for combating insurgents in the field – tactics that deemphasize the concentration of forces and firepower and emphasize constant patrolling by many small, lightly armed units supported by larger backup forces.
Military Intelligence. The ability of the military intelligence apparatus to collect, analyze, and exploit quality intelligence of guerrilla personnel, modus operandi and locations, not just on insurgent order of battle.
Troop behavior and discipline. The quality of the relationship between soldiers deployed in the field and the surrounding populations.
Air and naval operations. The quality of air and naval support to the government’s counterinsurgency forces – for example, fire support, reconnaissance, supply transport, medevac.
Civil-Military relations. The ability of civilian authorities to influence military operations, especially with regard to proper consideration for political objectives.
Popular Militia. A government’s ability to establish and maintain a popular militia to assist regular forces in maintaining security.
Nonmilitary Factors:
Political operations. The ability of the police to maintain law and order and implement population – and resources – control programs.
Civilian intelligence. The ability of the civilian and police intelligence organizations to collect, coordinate, evaluate, and exploit intelligence on the insurgents and their political /military activities.
Psychological operations. The quality of a government’s psychological warfare effort, its information and media activities, and its ability to promote its cause domestically and internationally.
Unified management of counterinsurgency. The government’s ability to establish an organizational infrastructure capable of coordinating a coherent counterinsurgency campaign.
Political framework. The overall political form and appeal of the government and the validity of its claim that it is the legitimate expression of the people’s aspirations and of the country’s traditions and ethos.
Improvement of rural conditions and administration. The ability of the government to implement the programs and reforms necessary to gain popular acquiescence in and support for the government’s efforts against the insurgents.
Legal reform. The ability of the government to implement and administer special laws and regulations specifically designed to counter and suppress the insurgency.
Even with a simple "Red-Amber-Green" assessment, there is a whole lot of Red on the chart.
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