Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
Ms Flournoy often talks of how we must quit being so idealistic and must become more pragmatic. Well, here's a bit of pragmatism for us to consider: We currently side with two parties who cannot help us accomplish our mission to gang up on the one party who can. I suggest we stop doing that, sit down with the Taliban and figure out what it takes to deal with AQ, and then make it happen. I suspect our friendly rogues will not like it much, but that they will play ball. Particularly Pakistan.
Do the Taliban want to sit down with us? Why should they be interested in our mission? They have a mission of their own: get back the power they lost. All they have to do to accomplish it is to outlast us, and if they follow our discussions at home they know they can do that.

The Pakistani Army and ISI would not want us dealing with the Taliban. AQ will not want us dealing with the Taliban. The Deobandi religious core of the Taliban will not want us dealing with the Taliban. Maybe some politically-inclined pragmatists might feel otherwise, but will they have enough influence on the organization to bring about a deal? Or will an effort to make a deal just end up with anyone pragmatic enough to deal getting rolled up and buried?

We have to accept that any deal made will be seen, by both Karzai and the Taliban, as a step toward full control. They might make a deal if they think it will provide them opportunity in the long run, but both will break the deal as soon as they have an opportunity to get what they want. I doubt very much that this is about representation. It's about power, and when the dust settles somebody's going to be in and somebody's going to be out. Whoever ends up out is going to have a bad time of it.

Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
Afghanistan less so, as the populace that makes up the Northern Alliance dreads any opening of the door of a return to potential Pashtun rule for good reason. We will need to protect them, and the number one tool for providing such protections is a proper constitution that is in turn protected by a military that places its loyalty to that constitution first, and their commander in chief second at best.
It is not in our power to create an army that places its loyalty to a Constitution first. We can train and equip soldiers, but we cannot transform their loyalties. It would be nice if we could, but we can't. It would be lovely if we could set up a nice system with representation for all, checks and balances, legal protection for minorities, and a chicken in every pot, but we can't. So how realistically do we propose to protect our erstwhile allies if the other guys take over? A Constitution won't do anything if the people in power choose not to follow it. We have to deal with what is and what we can realistically accomplish, and modern constitutional democracy is not in either category.

The only real virtue I see in a forced compromise, if we can create one at all (highly debatable), is that it might give us a graceful exit point: "ok, you've made peace, we're outta here". Of course as soon as we were gone the compromise would end and the parties involved would proceed to chew each other up, but that would not be our problem, unless the Taliban won. Odds on that might not be so favorable, to us at least.

By the U.S. reaching out to the Taliban we disempower the coercive hold that Karzai has on us (essentially that we need him and the Northern Alliance in power in Afghanistan in order to secure ourselves from AQ) and also free the Pashtuns from the coercive power of Pakistan (similar, that they need Pakistan sanctuary and support to wage their insurgency against what they perceive as illegitimate government in Afghanistan).
The US reaching out to the Taliban will not in itself accomplish any of these goals. This only works if the Taliban reach back. If we reach out publicly and get rebuffed we accomplish nothing at all.

I have nothing against sending quiet overtures where they seem appropriate, and pursuing any that seem to have potential. I don't see how making a grand overture to the Taliban is likely to get us anywhere. Why would they want to play along with us?

You speak sometimes as if the only obstacle to a viable power-sharing deal is us, and if we only reach out all things will fall into place. Why would this be the case? Do you really think the guys on the other side of the fence are that amenable to making a lasting deal?