Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[Bob's World]

I confess, I cringe every time I hear someone say the term "ungoverned spaces" and the word "sanctuary" in the same sentence. Needless to say I cringe a great deal, and typically in the presence of some high-ranking government official or subject matter expert on Insurgency who is busily explaining the concept or their approach to resolving some sanctuary or another.

I think it is important to understand that there are both physical and functional components to sanctuary, and that the most powerful components are found in legal/cultural obstacles and in the willingness of a populace to not assist the state in enforcing the rule of law.

Attached here is a simple (I am no artist) diagram to attempt to help make a few critical points regarding sanctuary in the AFPAK region for the Taliban and AQ.

Perhaps the first point that needs to be made is as obvious as it is overlooked: These two organizations have very different missions; one comes from this populace and the other is a guest within this populace; and therefore have very different requirements for sanctuary, and very different aspects to the sanctuaries they currently enjoy.

AQ Sanctuary in AFPAK is the easiest to resolve, as it comes solely from the hospitality of the Taliban/pro-Taliban Pashtun populace. When the Taliban decide to evict AQ, they must go and find their sanctuary elsewhere (which they will undoubtedly do, as their mission is no way reduced by being evicted from the AFPAK region). They will still retain the sanctuary of their outlaw and non-state status, and they will still have influence with poorly governed populaces around the globe. Some of those populaces are self-governed, as in Somalia, the Maghreb, and Yemen. Some are just small pockets and individuals within largely well-governed populaces, such as in Europe and North America.

So: For AQ, we can evict them from AFPAK if we work through the Taliban, but even if successful in that effort they will simply operate from other sanctuaries so long as the conditions that support their existence continue to influence populaces, organizations and/or individuals to be willing to break the law in support of them.

Taliban sanctuary is different as their mission is different and as they come from this populace. They too enjoy the sanctuary of being outside the law and of being a non-state actor; but their sanctuary comes from a much broader slice of the populace of these two states. They are on the "friends and family" plan, and are woven inextricably into the fabric of this bi-state society. The border issue is actually the easiest one to resolve, as it is a simple matter of a bi-lateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan narrowly tailored to this single issue. The outlaw status and their ties to the populace are facts that can be dealt with as well. I would caution, however, that merely removing this one legal obstacle and acting more aggressively to “defeat” the Taliban will most likely strengthen other key aspects of their sanctuary.

Outlaw status is resolved by simply bringing them inside the law. Grant a pardon (with clear conditions, such as the eviction of AQ with the turning over of certain key AQ members bringing very clear benefits as well). Once inside the law, the Taliban are constrained by the law, at least as much as anyone is constrained by the law (right, Mr. Karzai?? Wink Wink) in this culture.
The sanctuary provided by the populace is also one that can be addressed, but by bringing the Taliban inside the law the biggest hurdle is cleared. This then allows a massive reduction of coalition presence, which brings down the next largest hurdle. The final hurdle is getting GIROA to make substantive changes that provide equal rights and opportunities to the Pashtun populace that are provided to the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek populaces of the Northern Alliance.

Of note, none of these are military missions. This is all head of state/diplomatic in nature. So long as the lead rests with the military, the military will not address these issues, as they are not in the military’s lane. The military will do what militaries do. It will seek to “Clear-hold-build” where they can; or deny through ISR and fires where they cannot. That is no way to deny sanctuary. That is the way to build and strengthen sanctuary. This is a mission that the military must pass back to the Department of State and the President for action.