Almost as though by serendipity the other day SWJ Blog had an entry about Major General Fox Connor, the chief of operations of the AEF during the First World War. The quotation above is from an AUSA Land Power monogaph on General Connor by Major Ed Cox, who recently published a full-length biography of Connor.Perching on the western edge of the Missouri River, Fort Leavenworth had been the home of the Infantry and Cavalry School since 1881. The initial purpose of the school was to train lieutenants for duties in units larger than companies. By 1893, the school’s curriculum had expanded to a two-year program taught by seven academic departments within what was now called the General Service and Staff College. The Department of Military Art taught classes in international law and military history, and the faculty used map problems to teach strategy and grand tactics at the corps, division and brigade levels. [italics added]
My reason for posting is that in its context "grand tactics" in the above excerpt might be construed as being a sort of operational level of warfare. I'm ambivalent about this debate -- I really don't give a damn whether the U.S. Army has two or three levels of warfare, provided of course that the job gets done.
The 2001 version of Field Manual 3-0 had a really incoherent explanation of what the operational level was. I got the distinct impression when I read it that Fort Leavenworth tried to include all of the comments it had received on DA Form 2028 from the staff review of the draft manual -- hence what may have once been a useful definition of the operational level in the draft was rambling and all over the map in the published version. (If Fort Leavenworth won't defend its own version why should any of us care?) I haven't seen the current version of the manual and don't know how it defines the operational level or how useful that description is.
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