Concur on the potential and proven benefit of CAP-type concept (i.e., US Marines/Soldiers pairing with indigenous forces and moving in among the people) in the Al Qaim AO. I've talked to many Marines that served in 3/6, at the platoon level, and they have nothing but great things to say about why the strategy worked and has changed the landscape in what used to be known as the "Wild West" for good.
A very similar CAP to that executed in Vietnam worked very well in Haditha back in spring 2004 (see http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/articl...G4T7GMRL1.DTL). Problem came when CAP Marines were pulled for Fallujah I and then again for Fallujah II. This left the young and inexperienced police force alone to fight the insurgents. 19 Iraqi Police were subsequently hanged in Haditha's athletic stadium and then Al Qaeda in Iraq moved in. It's taken subsequent Marine units almost 3 years to re-build any level of trust back with the people in Haditha.
Also, Stars & Stripes has run multiple articles over the past months on how a CAP-type concept has significantly changed the situation in Ramadi (see http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?...&archive=true). While Ramadi's not the nicest place on earth today, many parts in the N and away from central South have seen drastic improvements due to clear-hold (move in among people)-build. Similar in so many ways to CAP in Vietnam.
I've made my Marines read "Bing" West's The Village for the past year or so in preparation for Iraq. Attached are the focus questions that I give them beforehand and the answers that I use when leading the discussion group.
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