I think the the opposite is true, as the plates in fact cause greater fatigue, and fatigue tends to weaken morale for the most part.The morale effect of NIJ level IV plates
There are times when I think that when Captain Samuel Nichols put out the word for recruits for the new U.S. Marine Corps in 1775 in Philadelphia it went something like this -- the first recruit went to Tun Tavern and sat down on a bench to wait for his interview. After 20 minutes or so another guy came in and sat down next to him on the bench. That's when the first guy turned to the new guy and said, "Man, let me tell you what it was like in the Old Corps."Originally Posted by Ken White
I think the the opposite is true, as the plates in fact cause greater fatigue, and fatigue tends to weaken morale for the most part.The morale effect of NIJ level IV plates
Hmm, morale or mood?
It's probably a hopeless case anyway, for we cannot measure the effect.
Credit where credit is due
Pete, we have to give credit to Umar Al-Mokhtār and the Old Corps.
CheersTun Tavern, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November 11th 1775
Captains Nicholas and Mullens, having been tasked by the 2nd Continental Congress to form two battalions of Marines, set up the Corps' first recruiting station in the tavern.
The first likely prospect was, in typical recruiter's fashion, promised a "life of high adventure in service to Country and Corps". And, as an extra bonus: If enlisted now he would receive a free tankard of ale...
The recruit gladly accepted the challenge and, receiving his free tankard of ale, was told to wait at the corner table for orders.
The first Marine sat quietly at the table sipping the ale when he was joined by another young man, who had two tankards of ale.
The first Marine looked at the lad and asked where he had gotten the two tankards of ale?
The lad replied that he had just joined this new outfit called the Continental Marines, and as an enlistment bonus was given two tankards of ale.
The first Marine took a long hard look at the second Marine and said: "Damn boot, it was nothing like that in the old Corps!"
Mike
No, that's an old story and I heard an earlier version of it from Major Dick Culver, USMC, Ret. He was a small-arms guy who after Vietrnam ran the USMC Sniper School before he retired. Dick is/was one of those eccentric Marine Corps characters who never really stopped being an enlisted man. For some of his Sea Stories click here.
Last edited by Pete; 12-30-2010 at 01:15 AM. Reason: Add Culver's Sea Stories.
What ?
A mustang Marine Major who is somewhat eccentric - unheard of !
Since the link is titled "Welcome to Culver's Shooting Page", it actually seems relevant, and even material, to this thread.
Cheers
Mike
High-Tech Fire Control
Don't despair, high-tech may offer solutions for how to maintain control over small arms fire in the U.S. military. Imagine if you will a future infantry rifle with a chip inside that transmits ammunition consumption data to a database operated by the Defense Supply Agency. Whenever a rifle is switched to automatic fire the computer would capture how much ammo is fired off. On a monthly basis the cost of ammo fired in the automatic mode could then be deducted from the budget of the U.S. Army Infantry School and Fort Benning. I'll admit that some people thought I had some strange ideas when I was in the Army, but I think this one might work.
Last edited by Pete; 01-02-2011 at 02:17 AM. Reason: Fix typo.
The article is a couple of months old, but it appears that the US Army M4s are being upgraded to M4A1s with full auto and a heavier barrel (among other improvements). Interesting to note that they're enabling full-auto again. I wonder why.
Not a purely German thing:
The Valour of Simple Men
Captain Thomas Kettle, Royal Dublin Fusiliers 8 Sept 1916
We are moving up tonight into the battle of the Somme. The bombardment, destruction and bloodshed are beyond all imagination, nor did I ever think the valour of simple men could be quite as beautiful as that of my Dublin Fusiliers. I have had two chances of leaving them - one on sick leave and the other on a staff job. I have chosen to stay with my comrades. I am calm and happy but desperately anxious to live.
- John Catton ed Letters from the Front (1973).You have a copy of the infamous one? It should be published IMHO.A (in)famous booklet of the 80's, meant to motivate junior leadership to do its job and to transport WW2 lessons learned to the late 20th went so far as to give the example of soldiers with wounds and illnesses avoiding being sent to hospital in favour of sticking with their company (as they expected to fare best among their closest comrades).
Btw, the booklet became infamous and PC-incompatible because of is many WW2 anecdotes, was rewritten (some anecdotes less) and re-titled around 2000 and came again under PC fire. I wasn't able to spot a single offensive anecdote, but I know for sure that the PC outcry (apparently deliberately) didn't even mention the least PC content of the booklet!
Now if the US had not intervened in WW2 I would probably have been able to read that.
At least it is in the public domain now and there may be a chance it will be translated sometime.
The book Communist Guerrilla Warfare by Dixon/Heilbron (1955) dealing with how the Germans dealt with Soviet guerrilla activity after the invasion of 1941 was useful reading in the 70s before COIN became an "industry". It is worth study even though some of the methods used against the guerrillas were considered war crimes at the time.
But having seen right here on SWJ someone advocate that the French efforts in Algeria are not worthy of study as the French used torture widely I assume the PC sensitive youth of today will be unable study what the terrible Germans did to the poor Soviets. It is their loss surely.
Sources like this - especially 50's and 60's sources - often praise certain qualities of the Soviet troops, especially their quick & deep digging, application of camouflage, ability in night combat, ability in night infiltration attacks and tenacity under adverse weather conditions even if ill-supplied.
This goes as far as criticizing a certain laziness of the own German troops in regard to these activities as well as to routine close reconnaissance & security efforts.
This is exactly why it is important to read what the Germans have to say themselves. They would have evolved their doctrine and tactics based on the abilities of their own soldiers.
The last great war involved the Germans who proved to be a formidable opponent to all comers. There is a significant danger that in recent wars against weak and near totally incompetent adversaries the kids who fought in the Gulf, Iraq and now Afghanistan will allow sloppy soldiering to pass unchecked as they would not have been punished for their errors (as they would have by the Germans).
But then each generation demands to reinvent the wheel. Each generation's 20-30 year olds have all the answers and are usually too clever by half and it is only when they come across a proper enemy that they catch a wake up call.
A Grim Price in Blood
Possibly, like most of our infantry, they (the battle school directing staff) suffered from the consequences of the pre-war shortage of creatively intelligent regimental officers. Too few of them were professionally dedicated to the extent that they could visualise how battles would be fought and identify the problems that might arise when planning them. They seemed to lack the capacity to think relentlessly through these things until solutions were found. Much of their time had been spent policing the British Empire. Also, unlike the Germans, we British instinctively avoid displays of keenness. The enthusiast, particularly if he is innovative, is an embarrassment. Thus the battlefield became our teacher and, inevitably, it exacted a grim price in blood and time.
Sydney Jary MC 18 Platoon (1987).
Indeed the booklet shows in many anecdotes a hefty dose of harsh critic of the performance of German soldiers, which I personally think is an excellent thing. The fact that this errors were committed by your "own" people and army should help to take the lessons to the heart and to have a hard look at your unit. This kind of brutal critic is often missing, both in training and the various literature. As a German officer put it after WWI: "(Just) Personal experience comes usually at a too high price and too late".
Of course there are are also some examples were German soldiers and units performed very well. Wilf would be happy with all the CvC quotes and the anecdotes concerning the importance of the crew-served weapons (MGs). Ken might like the importance placed at target detection, observation and recce.
...
The "overall" qualities of the Soviet soldier as described by Fuchs were often painted by German propaganda as a consequence of the "primitive nature" (quick digging, excellent camo, great endurance, infiltration) and "fanatic indoctrination" (desperate resistance, etc) of the "Bolshevik".
Generally it can be said that the greater amount of warm bodies made it easier for the Soviets to have effective scouting, sniping, patrolling and observation. ( The devastating effect of the Soviet artillery is not only due to mass of material, as one might get the impression, but also beside other factors, due to the great effort in scouting and the capture of German "tongues".)
This line of reasoning appeared late in the war when leaders complained that they hadn't enough infantry left for scouting, patrols, security and such.
The post-war reply was that you need to place even more emphasis on recce and security if you're weak.
Actually my maternal grandfather would have agreed wiht you, and had, as a very experienced NCO/officer a little, personal anecdote to offer to many a raw recruit concerning the importance of local security.
In 39' he was part of a German mountain division attacking P. from the south. After many a hard day fighting and marching, mostly as part of the recce elements, his platoon reached at nightfall a small p. village. After a quick search they dispersed themselves among some of the houses and sheds and posted relative few guardposts and only one patrol, having had no enemy contact this day and needing sleep very badly. He and three comrades hit the hay of a small shed on the outskirts. To avoid the snoring of his comrades, he choose to sleep in the most distant angle, in a little depression behind the main stack. He covered himself with the hay and slept, as usually very silently.
As he woke up after the morning call he came forward to wake up his comrades, which made no audible effort to get up. As he saw the first one he nearly broke down - his throat was slit open, just like the ones of his other two good comrades.
As that WWI German officer said:"Personal experience comes often at a too high price and too late. "
Needless to say that he later always insisted on good recce, observation and security discipline, which payed off for his new comrades and soldiers. It certainly is a good graphic warning for young recruits, and I really like the way this booklet integrates similar ones with lessons learned and well structured, easily understood, training advice.
Last edited by Firn; 01-08-2011 at 08:01 PM.
Lets introduce this MILITARY LEADERSHIP, AS THE GERMANS SEE IT which fell into Allied hands.
This is a must read as is much (on the historical tactics) from the lonesentry.com site.Several months ago the commanding officer of the Third Panzer Grenadier Division assembled extracts from two German Army manuals, one dealing with military leadership and the other pertaining to the training of officers, and ordered that they be distributed as a single booklet to the officers of his command. In a foreword the commanding officer said, "This booklet should always accompany my officers. It should become an indispensable possession. I expect them to take it out again and again, and study it until its contents have become a guide for their lives and actions. It should force them to test themselves, over and over, to see whether they are adequately prepared to meet the high—and often merciless—demands which will be made upon them.
and
What constitutes hard training? (This seems to have changed over the years)A unit which has been formed only superficially, and which has not been welded together by hard training and education, may easily fail at critical moments or under the impact of unexpected events. Therefore, from the outset of a unit's training, extreme importance must be attached to promoting and preserving strong community ties, as well as to discipline.
Then a footnote which resonated with my Rhodesian experience.
Exactly and that is why we were able to take on 10,000 trained and undertraining insurgents with 184 men, a handful of antiquated jets and 10 Allouette gunships on Op Dingo in November 1977. Killed thousands, wounded more.Superior combat efficiency can outweigh numerical superiority. The higher the combat efficiency of units, the greater the possibility of conducting forceful and mobile operations. Superior leadership and combat efficiency of a unit are the most reliable guarantees of victory.
And you get there by training hard. That's what the SAS did, that's what we did... and our insurgents were poor.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 01-09-2011 at 04:24 PM.
Here is a scan of the first two pages of the applicable instruction (translated). Might help.Originally Posted by Fuchs
Sources like this - especially 50's and 60's sources - often praise certain qualities of the Soviet troops, especially their quick & deep digging, application of camouflage, ability in night combat, ability in night infiltration attacks and tenacity under adverse weather conditions even if ill-supplied.
This goes as far as criticizing a certain laziness of the own German troops in regard to these activities as well as to routine close reconnaissance & security efforts.
Larger image here.
(I wonder why the forum tells me that your post is two minutes old when I remember it from yesterday?)
Administrator Note: -- no funny business, we had some IT issues and the post was recreated with an off timestamp. / Note.About the German military leadership style (and this made no huge difference between leadership by NCOs and COs); the most famous source is the 1933 Truppenführung manual (HDv 300/1), pp.9-36, including a typical German emphasis on the proper location of a leader - when forward and when with the staff?).
Last edited by SWCAdmin; 01-10-2011 at 02:24 AM.
JMA&others:
The German army collected quite a few reports from small unit actions for training and evaluation purpose. Some years after it, the US army selected the most interesting ones they could find and published them among other works to understand better the nature of this bloody conflict and, for then obvious reasons, the Soviet army. It makes for a very interesting read with quite thick chapters, for example one on anti-partisan actions. It also gives the Soviet soldiers a lot of credit in many areas.
You can download it here
Check also the related documents, there are quite some works about anti-partisan warfare. Total resistance is a Swiss manual for the "Small War" which might have been waged against the (Soviet) invader, and deals thus with the anti-partisan warfare in WWII and shortly after. (It should be available online in English).
P.S: "Infantry in combat" is an American classic concerning WWI, as well as the German "Development of Tactics in the World War". Both are also available online.
The latter book is a bit heavy going and shows the German performances perhaps in too bright a light, but gives a good overview from a German point of view. It certainly was ahead of its times when it mentioned among the disadvantages of the radio, that it could lead to leading from the staff room at the cost of the speed and freedom of action of the front commander.
Last edited by Firn; 01-12-2011 at 07:43 PM.
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks