It could happen.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
It could happen.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
I have spent a while searching the threads, but I cannot find a link to the 1943 War Department publication detailing how the German squad fought. I have the .pdf, but need a link to an online archive.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Many thanks.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I'm sorry I didn't know about it -- there's a LOT of well stated wisdom in that booklet. Many things I had to learn the hard way -- and yet, it was out six years before I followed the Recruiter home...
Base on what I see and hear today from both theaters, Benning should make this required reading...
I'm about to print the part about leadership and hang it up at work...
Wow, you're slipping Wilf...you never saw that publication before, or the link to the archive?
I read it long ago and don't remember unusual stuff in it. What's so special about it?
and more combat and reality focused than most of it's western contemporaneous documents -- and vastly superior to most of today's.
While I don't particularly agree with the then Squad organization, the combat actions and degree of detail are impressive -- no wonder the WW II German force was such a tough opponent.
As an aside, your earlier comment on the German troops 'talking it up' in combat also applies to others. Good units know when to talk it up and when to be silent -- and what to say when talking where. Dare I say METT-TC yet again...
It's also inaccurate.
Let's look at Fig.8. It makes no sense whatsoever.
MG1 in prepared position, riflemen in the open? Nonsense.
MG1 without MG2? Nonsense.
Riflemen separated like that from MG? I have never, ever seen, read or heard anything like that. It makes no sense anyway, other than extending the hand grenade range.
Figure 10:
Again nonsense; the defensive positions are depicted on the front slope!
Different barrage areas for different types of support weapons are also highly questionable (and I've never seen anything that confirms the assertion).
the practice of pre-planned barrage positions has afaik never been weapons-type specific. The infantry mortars were preferably used against point targets because of the limited supply of ammunition.
A main line of resistance without forward observation and listening posts was totally contrary to doctrine. Very few tactics that weren't and didn't become doctrine were universally applied.
Figure 13.: Again forward slope defence...
...
Wartime publications about opfor tactics were often outrageously inaccurate. I've seen this in many, many publications. Authors were either mislead or described what individual units had done in the assumption that it was representative.
Those are the factor you cite -- seeing a limited sample and assuming it's universal ( a lot of that still going on... ); translation flaws; and the inability of generally civilian artists to properly capture the military nuances. Those and the inability or unwillingness of supposed military (but often very inexperienced) reviewers to get all three types of flaws (and more) corrected.
Such publications should be reviewed by a board of competent and experienced, not 'specially selected and long serving' -- very different things, those -- NCOs but that would mean that a lone Captain or Major, even the odd LTC or COL, was not 'competent.'
Even if he or she had no combat experience...
The errors you mention and others not withstanding IMO it is still a more useful publication than most.
Ain't no possessive or possessed 'it'...
I suspect that a lot of First World War experience influenced the content of that Wehrmacht infantry squad manual, particularly the emphasis upon riflemen in the squad supporting the machine gun, instead of the other way around.
During that war change happened so fast that the lengthy review and approval process for official publications couldn't keep pace with new innovations on the battlefield. Because of that the British army artillery began publishing unofficial bulletins on changes in artillery practices, and the "Field Artillery Notes" put out by Fort Sill is the continuation of a practice begun by us in emulation of the British during that war.
The old Sturmtruppen appelation adopted by Hitler and the Nazis in the 1930s was a reference to the specialized assault battalions formed by the German army during WW I. Back then they were considered to be cutting-edge and their influence on German line infantry units then was similar to how some practices of Airborne units in the U.S. Army migrated over to straight-leg outfits post-1945.
The gist of it seems to be that the German squad leader led from the front and usually concentrated on getting his LMG into action. That type of leadership and employment is more like something we expect to see at fire team level today instead of squad level. That's close to Paul Melody's recommendations for squads too.
Changing the subject a little: I thought there was a light infantry article that had some operational history on the Chindits and Galahad somewhere on the cgsc.edu link but I can't find it. The search function didn't work for me. Anyone have a link to the article I'm talking about?
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
I don't want to belabor the point, but part of the reason for stalemate on Western Front during the First World War wasn't because tactics were outdated and stayed mired in the past, but because of dramatic advances in the siting and employment of machine guns and artillery fire planning and techniques during a relatively short period of time.
Fuchs, you need to review the illustration after reading the following text:
As to the positions of the riflemen... everywhere (except in Afghanistan apparently) soldiers do not walk/sit/lie in the open. So see that merely as an illustration relating to distances as marked on the diagram.When a light machine gun fires through a gap in the line, it should be located behind the center of the gap, and the distance from the gun to the gap should be less than the width of the gap (fig. 8). Overhead fire with the rifle and light machine gun is undertaken only when the weapons are located on high ground immediately above the troops over which the firing is directed.
Again... when in doubt read the text... and never say never about forward slope defensive positions.Figure 10:
Again nonsense; the defensive positions are depicted on the front slope!
Different barrage areas for different types of support weapons are also highly questionable (and I've never seen anything that confirms the assertion).
the practice of pre-planned barrage positions has afaik never been weapons-type specific. The infantry mortars were preferably used against point targets because of the limited supply of ammunition.
A main line of resistance without forward observation and listening posts was totally contrary to doctrine. Very few tactics that weren't and didn't become doctrine were universally applied.
Figure 13.: Again forward slope defence...
Wartime publications about opfor tactics were often outrageously inaccurate. I've seen this in many, many publications. Authors were either mislead or described what individual units had done in the assumption that it was representative.
The context is defensive fire plans and interlocking arcs of fire machine guns (and anti-tank weapons) which have been sited in depth.
Don't knit-pick the illustrations or you will get a reputation like some others around here
Bookmarks