Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Out here we call those things crabs...
Indeed and depends. In "Development of Tactics", which I posted some times ago it is clearly stated that in the last phase of WWI the squad/sections in the outposts and front-line of the "Vorfeld" supported the MGs and not the other way around. This "field in front" which screened the main defense zone, often on and behind the reverse slope, from ground observation, recce and thus firepower had of course also to be strong enough to fend off small assaults and combat patrols. Being exposed to the full weight of enemy firepower meant that it had to perform with as few men as possible. This could only be achieved by a high share of loud and silent automatic weapons, switching between positions and good, heavy indirect fire support.
In other situation, for example during limited (night) assaults it was the MG which would support the riflemen (pistol-men, bombers).
Of course combat, gained experienced and things lost and METT-T would lead both in WWI and WWII to many very different types of sections. For example that manual of the WWII ski-troops shows the demand for a larger section with a strong demand for telescopic sights, automatic weapons and rifle grenades (especially if no mortar could be taken) and careful marksmanship training. On the other hand mechanized infantry was partial to the heavy firepower of the MG, especially in defense, which numbers often increased in relation to the riflemen due to heavy infantry combat losses. Assault groups should have according to official training material a high amount of different hand grenades, demo charges (bundled, on staffs, etc) rifle- and pistol grenades and machine pistols (or assault rifles). Artillery, infantry cannons, mortars and MGs shouldered (should shoulder) almost all fire support, the MG(s) of the assault group were mostly there to provide defense against counterattacks. One could go on and on. Generally the challenge as a leader was to get as much as one needed and to get most out of what one had in men and material.
According to this:
The US Army appears to be adopting the Mk 48 as their fireteam automatic weapon in Afghanistan. The quote is brief, however, and I haven't been find much more info on it.http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/0...-2011-010111w/
The MK48 will serve as the fire team automatic weapon. It is 32 percent lighter than the 27-pound M240B, but lacks its effective range.
The article also states this:
So now the fireteam gunners (automatic riflemen?) will get to carry the same weight in ammo (in terms of calibre, not necessarily quantity) as the platoon gunners, with nearly similar weapon weight.The Army is working to reduce ammo weight — and with good reason. The average M240B gunner carries six pounds of ammo, while the A-gunner carries 30 pounds. The shell represents half that weight. Engineers are looking to construct a stainless steel cartridge case that will reduce ammo weight by nearly 20 percent.
With this move the US army will move in a direction directly opposing that of the USMC. Interesting.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
The article also goes on to say:
If this pans out, and the technology is applied to 7.62, then it would weigh close to what 5.56 currently weighs, wouldn't it?The Army’s Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center also is fielding a 5.56mm telescoped ammunition that uses a thin plastic casing instead of the traditional brass shell. This would reduce the weight by 42 percent.
Sustained Infantry use of small arms induces more stresses than does the use of the same weapon by SOF elements. That's true in several respects. Add the fact that decreased weigh in most weapons has historically led to reliability issues...
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
With regards to reliability... the bolt of the Mk 48 has to be replaced after 15,000 rounds, and the receiver after 50,000. So if nothing else, it's more maintenance-heavy than the M240.
Yup. I’d say it is likely that the durability of the Mk48 will be similar to that of the 5.56 variants we know.
What gets me about this move is the fact that (with the light 240) the army platoon will have two different 7.62 guns with weights that are not all that much different (too lazy to look into exact weights now).
So the large USMC platoon will end up with no organic 7.62 guns while the smaller army platoon will end up with 8 x 7.62 guns. I doubt that either of these two extremes is going to prove satisfactory.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
I assume you mean something like the 6.5 grendel or 6.8 SPC? While that would increase the terminal effect (6.8), or both terminal and external ballistics (6.5) of IWs, it would also decrease the "punch" so-to-speak, of GPMGs and LMGs (if the Mk 48 sticks). I feel as if the strength of the GPMG/LMG is more important than the strength of the IW as far as modern war is concerned. Also, the 6.5 proponents who say the 6.5 grendel has superior external ballistics than .308 are comparing open tip/high-bc ammo with a pretty standard ball for .308.
Even when looking for a mid-way point, I don't think the designs shown with the 6.5 and 6.8 are the way to go. They're (relatively) inefficient at increasing energy. A better investment would be developing sabot ammunition for small-arms. A 7.62x39 round generates about 2000 Joules of energy, and has a poor trajectory compared to 5.56. A 7.62x51 with a 5.56 bullet wrapped in a sabot will generate 2400 - 3000 Joules, have a far superior trajectory, far better armor penetration, and it will weigh roughly the same as M43 7.62x39. Essentially what I am advocating is that you should increase powder weight when you want to save weight, not bullet weight.
Last edited by Blah; 01-21-2011 at 11:47 PM.
The USMC platoon has never had 7.62mm MGs, AFAIK- they went from BARs to M14 ARs to M16 ARs to M249s and now are going to IARs.
The US Army platoon has, AFAIK, always had 7.62mm MGs, at least since the introduction of the M60, which replaced M1919 Brownings (IIRC).
Different strokes for different folks, I guess, although their not all that different in final execution. Both companies (USMC and USA) have 9 rifle squads and 3 MG/weapons squads- the differnence is in the weapons platoon HQ in the USMC. AIUI, however, the weapons PLT CDR is the CO FSCOORD, and rarely operates as a HQ for the MG squads.
Last edited by Rifleman; 01-22-2011 at 02:08 AM.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
I agree with you that the strength of the GPMG is more important that the strength (or weakness for that matter) of the IW. However, the problematic balancing act that we have been performing now for a few decades, where we want 7,62 punchability for 5.56 weight and size, just doesn’t seem to go away. In the sandbox, GPMGs seem to have a habit of working their way down to section/squad level. And now it seems the US army (UK and NZ are also looking into this) want to replace their 5.56 Minimi’s with 7.62 variants. We are going full circle so we can predict the outcome.
So to me it would seem more prudent to first try to knock weight and size for GPMGs down as far as possible without loosing too much punch, although some loss would be unavoidable. If and only if that could get us to something like a (stretched-case?) 6.5 Grendel GPMG that can competently replace both the 7.62 MAG and Minimi type guns and the 5.56 Minimi types, without loosing so much punch that we are still going to want the 7.62 back, then we could look into using that same calibre for rifles. So yes, GPMG-ability trumps, me thinks. Now it does of course pay to keep IW-ability in mind throughout the process, but if too much focus is there then I think we will again end up with something that won’t work for true GPMGs (light enough for the LMG role and heavy enough for the MMG role). And then the resulting balance will be the same (type and number of) 7.62 guns with heavier rifles; an overall increase in weight.
For me the attraction would be in making the GPMG more user-friendly at lower levels without giving away too much of its current attributes. That, rather than trying to (a) improve on the current GPMG capabilities (since I don’t think they are in question), or (b) improve on current 5.56 support weapons capabilities. The latter I think would be trying to push a losing envelope, while never coming up with anything that will ever be more than a stop-gap between rifles and GPMGs.
I am by no means an expert in ballistics so I’ll refrain from arguing the sabot suggestion, other than to say that the concept comes across to me as promising for niche roles like armour piercing and perhaps less so for much else. Increasing powder weight to save weight….hmmm, dunno. A M193 has more powder per unit of bullet weight than a Mk 262.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
The correct answer is 7x46. A 175 grain bullet at 2,400 feet per second, or a 120 at 3,000 or even something in between. With a 16 inch barrel.
If a PKM weighs in at 18 pounds, then a 16 inch LMG could weigh more like 12 without sacrificing durability.
I don't know what your problem is with forward slope positions but perhaps we should post the advantages and disadvantages of each in case impressionable people read this and think that forward slope is always a no-no.
From the Brits then:
0225. Forward and Reverse Slopes. A clear understanding is needed of the
tactical difference between forward and reverse slopes and their respective advantages and disadvantages.
a. Reverse Slope Positions. A reverse slope position is a position on
ground not exposed to direct fire or observation. Although in each case the
choice of a forward or reverse slope position should be decided on its merits,
reverse slopes almost invariably provide the best position for defence. The
advantages and disadvantages are as follows:
(1) Advantages. The advantages are:
(a) Hidden from enemy observation, except from the air.
(b) Enemy cannot use direct fire weapons.
(c) Enemy indirect fire less effective owing to lack of observation.
(d) Movement is possible therefore easing the problems of resupply, etc.
(2) Disadvantages. The disadvantages are:
(a) Shorter fields of fire.
(b) Enemy can approach in cover.
(c) Enemy will have a downhill assault.
(d) More manpower is needed to patrol, observe and cover dead
ground.
b. Forward Slope Positions. A forward slope position is a position which is
exposed to direct fire and to observed indirect fire. The advantages and disadvantages are:
(1) Advantages. The advantages are:
(a) Good fields of fire.
(b) Little dead ground.
(c) Enemy approaches are dominated.
(2) Disadvantages. The disadvantages are:
(a) Little cover and natural concealment from enemy direct fire
and observed indirect fire.
(b) Easier to disclose positions.
(c) Movement and administration can be done only at night.
Last edited by JMA; 01-22-2011 at 08:14 AM.
Why would one need to reduce the weigh and size of GPMGs?
I suggest that this point of departure is wrong. The current weigh factor is exacerbated primarily by the weigh of body armour. It is accepted that the use of body armour is non negotiable and as such the primary effort should be to reduce the weight of body armour "without loosing too much" protection.
The second weight factor is all the stuff soldiers take along in case they might need them. This can be fixed at subunit level and would be made easier if CAS reaction times were short enough to give confidence to soldiers who may get caught out in a contact.
The third weight factor is that of weapons and ammunition. Its fine (IMO) to have a special weapon for CQB or jungle COIN warfare which is more suited to the conditions of that war.
But with the utmost respect how can anyone discuss the weight reduction and calibre issues of a GPMG without consideration of the employment of such weapons in a conventional setting where interlocking and overlapping arcs of fire and mutual support are critical success factors? You see when the Brits switched to the SA-80 no one seemed to take into account the reduction in the effective section fire range.
I suggest that you qualify what you are recommending as a use for a lighter GPMG with an application you see it being used in. Light hearted comments about "loss of punch" in a trade off for weight savings need to be explained.
Why for example does one need to reduce the weight of a GPMG and its ammo?
Last edited by JMA; 01-22-2011 at 09:26 AM.
a) No problem, for most defenders do not need to open fire at long range - that's the job of snipers, mortars and artillery.(2) Disadvantages. The disadvantages are:
(a) Shorter fields of fire.
(b) Enemy can approach in cover.
(c) Enemy will have a downhill assault.
(d) More manpower is needed to patrol, observe and cover dead
ground.
b) Not true unless you omit observer positions on the ridge.
c) No problem, that's what barbed wire is for.
d) I don't get why.
An anecdote (recalled from memory, slight deviances from the original story are possible):
An U.S. army platoon dug in in a defensive position overnight sometime in 1944. It was on a froward slope.
The next day, German observers detected the new position and phoned them to Bn HQ.
There was some unidentifiable noise over the next night.
The third day began calmly, but when morning fog had cleared, a camouflaged assault gun began opening fire on the forward slope position, decimating the platoon. The Platoon 2nd in command finally decided to evacuate, but when he did so many machine gunners and snipers opened fire. Almost no-one escaped.
(The same effect could have been had on the second morning already if light infantry guns were used or even on day one if modern bazooka-type weapons were used, but the assault gun provided near-immunity to OPFOR mortars.)
Ridge position are for observers,
ridge (and forward slope) positions are for (daring) snipers.
reverse slope positions are for the counter-attacking force,
counter-slope positions and 2nd ridge positions are for the main force.
You can differ, but a capable opponent will punish you terribly.
At the core the argument is sound, however one must add "it depends" (METT-T). How much cover, how much concealment, how difficult is the terrain, how easily can it be covered by (indirect, direct) fire and mines, how easily can the enemy observe, detect, move, defeat forward positions, and soon...
....
On the Mk 48. The loss of four inches should not greatly affect range and firepower, as the bullets should not lose too much velocity, roughly 100 fps or even less, depending on the barrel, bullet and powder. Blast and Flash will likely increase.
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