The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Blah]

If and only if that could get us to something like a (stretched-case?) 6.5 Grendel GPMG that can competently replace both the 7.62 MAG and Minimi type guns and the 5.56 Minimi types, without loosing so much punch that we are still going to want the 7.62 back, then we could look into using that same calibre for rifles.

I must ask why you think adopting one caliber would be a better option than using 2 different calibers. Keep in mind that the weight saved with the 5.56 compared to a hypothetical mid-range cartridge could be used to help carry some of the slightly heavier 7.62. As you've read in the article, they are trying to reduce the weight of 7.62 so that it becomes more user-friendly at the platoon and squad level. Do you feel that pursuing an entirely different caliber is a better pursuit than this route?

I am by no means an expert in ballistics so I’ll refrain from arguing the sabot suggestion, other than to say that the concept comes across to me as promising for niche roles like armour piercing and perhaps less so for much else.

It can be used to create an effective AP cartridge, but it doesn't have to. Let's take the M855 as an example... A lot of people seem to claim that it's only effective at ranges where it fragments (not saying it's true or untrue, just that people say that). I've heard 200m from a 20" barrel, so I'll go with that for the sake of this discussion. If you were to fire an M855 bullet wrapped in a sabot from a 7.62x51 case (doesn't have to be 7.62, just using it as a reference), it would maintain that vaunted fragmentation velocity to a much greater distance due to its increase in velocity, and fragment more violenty/reliably at closer ranges.

Also, if for some reason you need the greater momentum of of 7.62 ball... simply use 7.62 ball, it would be perfectly usable in a firearm designed for 7.62 Sabot.

There would also be the significant increase in flatness of trajectory, which is (to be a bit redundant) significant.

Increasing powder weight to save weight….hmmm, dunno. A M193 has more powder per unit of bullet weight than a Mk 262.

Ahh, no no, I meant absolute powder weight, not relative powder weight.

Typically, the 2 heaviest components of a cartridge are the bullet and casing. You rarely hear someone say that 9mm NATO is more effective than 5.56, even though the 9mm uses a heavier bullet. Why is that? Obviously it's because the 5.56 is launched at a much higher velocity due to the significantly higher amount of powder behind it. 5.56 and 9mm also weigh almost exactly the same per cartridge!

My point is to draw a parallel with the 5.56 and 9mm, to 7.62 Sabot and intermediate cartridge x, respectively. While both would weigh roughly the same, I feel that the former would result in a better increase in effectiveness, with more quantifiable perks than "stopping power".

[Blah]

The correct answer is 7x46. A 175 grain bullet at 2,400 feet per second, or a 120 at 3,000 or even something in between. With a 16 inch barrel.

That seems awfully close to what a 7.62x51 would achieve with a 16" barrel.

The case is smaller than 7.62's as well, which would imply to me that it either runs at a much higher pressure, or is using some kind of special propellant.

[JMA]

a) No problem, for most defenders do not need to open fire at long range - that's the job of snipers, mortars and artillery.
b) Not true unless you omit observer positions on the ridge.
c) No problem, that's what barbed wire is for.
d) I don't get why.

An anecdote (recalled from memory, slight deviances from the original story are possible):

An U.S. army platoon dug in in a defensive position overnight sometime in 1944. It was on a froward slope.
The next day, German observers detected the new position and phoned them to Bn HQ.
There was some unidentifiable noise over the next night.
The third day began calmly, but when morning fog had cleared, a camouflaged assault gun began opening fire on the forward slope position, decimating the platoon. The Platoon 2nd in command finally decided to evacuate, but when he did so many machine gunners and snipers opened fire. Almost no-one escaped.
(The same effect could have been had on the second morning already if light infantry guns were used or even on day one if modern bazooka-type weapons were used, but the assault gun provided near-immunity to OPFOR mortars.)


Ridge position are for observers,
ridge (and forward slope) positions are for (daring) snipers.
reverse slope positions are for the counter-attacking force,
counter-slope positions and 2nd ridge positions are for the main force.

You can differ, but a capable opponent will punish you terribly.

Of course your story is possible. But it appears that the this US Army platoon was isolated and had no fire support of its own. Does not seem likely.

At the School of Infantry we had TEWTs (Tactical Exercises Without Troops) which were designed to exercise ground appreciations for all phases of war. For the defence there were specific ones which lent towards both forward and reverse slope positions and even those where there was no other option other than for one a forward slope position and for another a reverse slope position. These were designed to exercise officers on a wide range of terrain variations.

A capable opponent would love to know that his enemy would always site his defence on a reverse slope without fail

[Fuchs]

Fire support did not help the U.S. platoon because there wasn't much it could have done in the few minutes. Calls for artillery fire are slow and calls for company mortar fire not really effective against an assault gun and dispersed infantry.

No opponent would always "know" that the line of defence is reverse/counter slope, for there are usually several slopes and the first one could be largely a decoy. German defence doctrine advocated a deep defence which had a zone for skirmishing and delaying in front of the real deal. There were often even two fully prepared defensive positions plus if possible decoy positions. The secondary defensive position was a necessity against Soviet offensive preparatory shelling, and the Soviets rarely kept both positions under simultaneous fire.

You do not increase the uncertainty for the opponent by presenting your troops in the showcase.

Besides; forward slope defensive positions are easily detected, thus never an advantage from a detectability point of view. A defensive position that's well done does not tell to an aerial photo interpreter what's decoy and what not.
Reverse slope defences on the other hand cannot be observed permanently like forward slope defences and allow thus for much less reconnaissance by the enemy.


JMA; the key is -as so often- that I wrote about capable opponents. Some dinosaur calls it METT-T. The "E" stands for "enemy". Forward slopes defences ARE suicidal against capable enemies. I doubt that the Rhodesian army cared much about capable enemies. It didn't fight one for a generation in the 70's.
The WW2 booklet in question was about a war between first and second-rate powers. A forward slope defence was suicidal in that war. Even Romanian infantry regiments of '44 and Italian Bersaglieri of '42 were capable enough to rip forward slope defences apart, even the ones set up by the Argentinians in '82.


I know many gimmick and have added some gimmicks* to counterslope, reverse slope and ridge defence positions. The forward slope on the other hand is simply hopeless.

*: One gimmick is for example to set up an additional concealing screen (a fence of netting, for example) a metre ahead of the ridge in order to increase the survivability of the ridge defenders and observers. Gaps created by shelling can be plugged with the concealing "umbrella frame" trick of snipers, even in the midst of a fight.
This gimmick solves a problem which occurs on very straight ridges; the problematic silhouettes of the defenders.

[SethB]

That seems awfully close to what a 7.62x51 would achieve with a 16" barrel.

The case is smaller than 7.62's as well, which would imply to me that it either runs at a much higher pressure, or is using some kind of special propellant.

It is around the same bullet weight and velocity, but the bullets have a better form factor and so they essentially have a much longer range. Tracer burnout will occur sooner.

As for how that velocity is achieved, for every 4% increase in powder you have a 1% increase in velocity. The rest of that energy is heat and blast. The smaller cartridge has less powder, but that is a good thing.

It runs at the same pressure as 7.62x51. And it is well adapted to short barrels. In fact, some cartridges shouldn't be run from long barrels. 7.62x39 is an example of a cartridge that gains almost nothing with a barrel over 12 inches long.

[Ken White]

Hmmph!!!

[JMA]

Fire support did not help the U.S. platoon because there wasn't much it could have done in the few minutes. Calls for artillery fire are slow and calls for company mortar fire not really effective against an assault gun and dispersed infantry.

No opponent would always "know" that the line of defence is reverse/counter slope, for there are usually several slopes and the first one could be largely a decoy. German defence doctrine advocated a deep defence which had a zone for skirmishing and delaying in front of the real deal. There were often even two fully prepared defensive positions plus if possible decoy positions. The secondary defensive position was a necessity against Soviet offensive preparatory shelling, and the Soviets rarely kept both positions under simultaneous fire.

You do not increase the uncertainty for the opponent by presenting your troops in the showcase.

Besides; forward slope defensive positions are easily detected, thus never an advantage from a detectability point of view. A defensive position that's well done does not tell to an aerial photo interpreter what's decoy and what not.
Reverse slope defences on the other hand cannot be observed permanently like forward slope defences and allow thus for much less reconnaissance by the enemy.


JMA; the key is -as so often- that I wrote about capable opponents. Some dinosaur calls it METT-T. The "E" stands for "enemy". Forward slopes defences ARE suicidal against capable enemies. I doubt that the Rhodesian army cared much about capable enemies. It didn't fight one for a generation in the 70's.
The WW2 booklet in question was about a war between first and second-rate powers. A forward slope defence was suicidal in that war. Even Romanian infantry regiments of '44 and Italian Bersaglieri of '42 were capable enough to rip forward slope defences apart, even the ones set up by the Argentinians in '82.


I know many gimmick and have added some gimmicks* to counterslope, reverse slope and ridge defence positions. The forward slope on the other hand is simply hopeless.

*: One gimmick is for example to set up an additional concealing screen (a fence of netting, for example) a metre ahead of the ridge in order to increase the survivability of the ridge defenders and observers. Gaps created by shelling can be plugged with the concealing "umbrella frame" trick of snipers, even in the midst of a fight.
This gimmick solves a problem which occurs on very straight ridges; the problematic silhouettes of the defenders.

I agree with most of what you say and will add that trying to hold ground in the traditional sense is pointless against a mobile (mechanised) enemy capable of rapid maneuver and bypass. As to a reverse slope defensive position modern observation through satellite and drone make it just about as vulnerable as a forward slope.

Yes competence together with the necessary weapons and equipment make for a tough opponent but take away most of the supporting weapons and Air Effort available to modern armies and the playing field is leveled pretty soon.

I quote again from the Brits: "Although in each case the choice of a forward or reverse slope position should be decided on its merits, reverse slopes almost invariably provide the best position for defence."

Your reference to Rhodesia needs to be addressed.

Yes the enemy (being the guerrilla forces - ZANLA and ZIPRA) were pathetic against even the most basic standard. We had few troops so had to work out how best to take then on with what we had. So we were able to take them on on ratios of (not 3:1 but) 1:30 (Op Dingo) or more if we used what little air we had to maximum effect and achieved the element of surprise. ZANLA (Mugabe) kept pushing ill trained cannon fodder over the border which we culled in turkey shoot after turkey shoot so in reality the numbers of so-called insurgents was not as significant as some latter day observers would like to make out. ZIPRA (Nkomo) had Russian advisors who prepared them for a mechanised invasion from Zambia down one of two routes (or both), Victoria Falls-Bulawayo and Kariba-Salisbury. Too many bridges on those routes which we could cut and the advance would grind to a halt. (What were the Russians thinking). So what you are capable of, what your enemy is capable of and the terrain you will be fighting on is important - METT-TC - if you like.

As the man said..."If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles." - Sun Tzu

So true.

[Firn]

No opponent would always "know" that the line of defence is reverse/counter slope, for there are usually several slopes and the first one could be largely a decoy. German defence doctrine advocated a deep defence which had a zone for skirmishing and delaying in front of the real deal. There were often even two fully prepared defensive positions plus if possible decoy positions. The secondary defensive position was a necessity against Soviet offensive preparatory shelling, and the Soviets rarely kept both positions under simultaneous fire.

Actually the need to deny the forward zone to the enemy of the MLR was already present in WWI, if in more static form. Through heavy patrolling, scouting, trench raids and strictly limited attacks the Allies tried often to gnaw this screening zone away. The Soviets put a great deal of effort in many directions to gather as many information as possible about the composition of the enemy defenses and operational intent. Heavy night attacks were at least once used to pull more German troops into the front zones.

You do not increase the uncertainty for the opponent by presenting your troops in the showcase.

Besides; forward slope defensive positions are easily detected, thus never an advantage from a detectability point of view. A defensive position that's well done does not tell to an aerial photo interpreter what's decoy and what not.
Reverse slope defences on the other hand cannot be observed permanently like forward slope defences and allow thus for much less reconnaissance by the enemy.

If we consider the fact that the construction, supply and relieve of relatively exposed defensive positions and outposts were in WWII usually done under the screen of darkness the advances of modern sensors and optics certainly don't help the forward slope defense, especially in relative open terrain and static situations and a highly capable "E". Factors of the METT-TC like Urban areas, dense vegetation, available and useable firepower and so on will ever influence this debate.

...............

To come back to the topic. Is it just me or isn't it striking that despite all the words and ink spread about the need to lighten the load at least two key weapons systems tested by US Army, the Mk 48 or the XM25? will be heavier then the ones they replace?

[Pete]

An U.S. army platoon dug in in a defensive position overnight sometime in 1944. It was on a forward slope ... when morning fog had cleared, a camouflaged assault gun began opening fire on the forward slope position, decimating the platoon.

At the risk of being another old f*rt who repeats himself, the following is from Paul Gorman in The Secret of Future Victories.

DePuy was at odds with both propensities, being convinced that field fortifications should primarily provide cover from frontal fire, and should be wholly concealed from the enemy. In 1973, in explaining to the Commandant of the Infantry School and the Combat Arms Training Board what he expected them to do, and why, he told of an incident toward the end of the Battle of the Bulge, in early February 1945, when his battalion had pushed forward toward the Belgian-German border against stiffening German resistance. One company had dug in one evening along the military crest of a high, open snow-covered ridge, the soldiers' exertions with their entrenching tools ringing each foxhole with "dark doughnuts in the snow." After dawn the next day, from a ridge facing them, the Germans opened fire with high velocity, pinpoint-accurate cannon, probably from Jagdpanzer. "It was murder":17

I do not believe that infantry can survive on the modem battlefield against a modem enemy if our positions can be seen by their side. The issue ... is field of fire, cover and concealment. The reason that I feel [so strongly] is because I just happened to see German tanks kill a lot of my soldiers.... (My battalion) dug in where they could be seen, and a couple of tanks on a hill opposite just picked them off one by one. They couldn't get out and run, couldn't get away. [The enemy] just walked his tank cannon right down that one company--C Company--[I had] a pretty awful, hopeless, and helpless feeling. They were dug in wrong. They could be seen ... the lesson I hoisted aboard back in World War II is still valid for today and the future.

DePuy taught his troops to employ rear slope defenses when they could, and to dig cover and concealment when they could not. His ideas did not always agree with concepts of contemporaries.18 DePuy tells of a clash with Army Training Test umpires when he was commanding 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, in Germany in 1953. Because of his World War II experiences, DePuy had trained his battalion to dig defensive positions in such a way that they were wholly invisible from the front. Typically, a 2/8 Inf soldier would dig his foxhole directly behind a tree or a rock, or in the midst of a bush, with his field of fire across the front of adjacent holes similarly sited. Spoil was concealed, and great pains taken to maintain the "natural appearance" of the position as seen from the enemy perspective. Emplacements with extensive frontal views were reserved for indirect fire observers, or for accompanying tanks. Many of the Army Training Test umpires were veterans of Korea, and most were graduates of the Infantry School. They held that the 2/8 Infantry positions little resembled a proper defense. DePuy knew why:19

[In Korea] they built big forts. When you got out in front, you could see everything.... The umpires who came to test [2/8 Inf] thought I was crazy. They didn't understand why I hadn't built Korean pillboxes on the military crest or at the bottom of the hill. Instead I had my guys behind rocks, trees and bushes. I wouldn't let them disturb the bushes, so you couldn't see a thing from the front.... All the company and platoon umpires ran back to the battalion umpire and said, "This battalion is totally unsatisfactory. They don't know how to dig in." They were also sceptical about the overwatch and bounding [in the atack]....

(Fortuitously, it turned out the the Chief Umpire was a Colonel who had served in the 5th RTC in Korea, and who readily agreed with DePuy; the 2/8 Infantry passed its test.)

DePuy's field fortification techniques received a rigorous test in Vietnam. There his troops in the 1st Infantry Division were taught to erect a frontal parapet of earth constructed of spoil from the foxhole, camouflaged with vegetation, with partial overhead cover as well. In 1967, shortly after DePuy's departure from command of the Big Red One, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, dug in after that fashion, defeated an all-out attack by a regiment, with an enemy-to-friendly mortality ratio of 198 to 1.20.

[Fuchs]

I also recall from my basic training an episode that fits here:
I was in the Luftwaffe and had my very first 36 hr exercise in an old IHAWK SAM battery. These things have artificial ridges, about 5 m high.

I was told to build a shallow defensive position on such a ridge; for two persons, with sandbag cover and camouflage. I declared it ready after a while, but the trainer disagreed and I had to add another layer of sandbags.

I looked at it from the OPFOR direction and it stood out very much. The camo was a joke, no matter how much vegetation I applied.

Later that night, I simply left the position (which was easily visible even in quarter moonlight!) and prepared under the cover of darkness a very, very shallow fighting position 10m next to it (an OPFOR NCO, our original platoon leader, had been allowed to inspect our positions in daylight).
That night OPFOR tried to break through 50m to my right side and attempted to suppress/destroy my position. They did merely hit the empty, easily visible sandbag castle. I would have been declared dead in the first second of the attack if I hadn't left it earlier in the night.
I never, ever used a ridgeline or forward slope position again. I even relocated some bushes behind my other positions to avoid a helmet-shaped silhouette in later exercises.


If I - as a 18 y.o. private - was able to figure this out on in advance of my first try, why are there still proponents of main defences on forward slopes and ridgelines?

[JMA]

If I - as a 18 y.o. private - was able to figure this out on in advance of my first try, why are there still proponents of main defences on forward slopes and ridgelines?

It seems universal that 18 year olds have always had all the answers

We can go and on with this for ever but...

[Fuchs]

It seems universal that 18 year olds have always had all the answers

We can go and on with this for ever but...

Tragic fact is that humans lose intelligence after their 15th year. We become dumber and dumber and need to compensate for this with education, training and experience.
That's why your age is relevant for IQ test; the IQ is a measure relative to your age group only. An IQ 120 person at 70 years answers much less questions correctly in such a test than an IQ 120 person at 20 years.

Young people are also less encrusted with cognitive dissonance issues yet.

[Rifleman]

Tragic fact is that humans lose intelligence after their 15th year. We become dumber and dumber and need to compensate for this with education, training and experience.
That's why your age is relevant for IQ test; the IQ is a measure relative to your age group only. An IQ 120 person at 70 years answers much less questions correctly in such a test than an IQ 120 person at 20 years.

Young people are also less encrusted with cognitive dissonance issues yet.

That's it, Ken. "Cognitive dissonance issues." You're done.

[Ken White]

That's it, Ken. "Cognitive dissonance issues." You're done.

Especially in my case. I not only have cognitive dissonance issues, I have plain old cognitive issues.

Lessee. IQ 120 at 20 + 58 years = ((120-58)² - (20+58)² ) / 78 =~29. Seems about right...

My Wife also says I have dissonance issues but she just doesn't appreciate good singing...

[William F. Owen]

I agree with most of what you say and will add that trying to hold ground in the traditional sense is pointless against a mobile (mechanised) enemy capable of rapid maneuver and bypass. As to a reverse slope defensive position modern observation through satellite and drone make it just about as vulnerable as a forward slope.

Just some rather obvious things to consider.

a.) Reverse slope is only relative to one direction of enemy threat.
b.) What reverse slope actually means is not positioning your defensive position were it can be reduced by stand-off direct fires or from observed fires, outside the range where your weapons and TA systems can destroy/detect the enemy before they engage.

c.) The best general advice I am aware of, and have tested to my satisfaction, is to locate defensive positions in terrain that ensure the greatest freedom of action. In other words, defensive positions should be viewed as assembly areas or start lines. Not little forts to fight and die from.

d.) and again, core functions. FIND, FIX, STRIKE, EXPLOIT. Do them, while not having them done to you.

[JMA]

Not little forts to fight and die from.

I could swear that some months ago you argued when I criticised this very thing in Helmand. What's changed?

[William F. Owen]

I could swear that some months ago you argued when I criticised this very thing in Helmand. What's changed?

The "little forts" in Helmand are FOBs. - Patrol Bases. I was referring to the conduct of defence in combat operations. Two entirely different conditions.

[JMA]

The "little forts" in Helmand are FOBs. - Patrol Bases. I was referring to the conduct of defence in combat operations. Two entirely different conditions.

How come siting and defending a base in Afghanistan is not governed by standard defensive principles?

[William F. Owen]

How come siting and defending a base in Afghanistan is not governed by standard defensive principles?

...and what standard defensive principle would those be?

A FOB is a facility from which to mount operations, and the location itself may provide operational advantages, such as surveillance of a route or an area. The Surveillance Towers in South Armagh, were sited to give the most efficient coverage of the boarder. Had a Soviet MRR been coming north from the Republic, they would not have been where they were.

A FOB in A'Stan is in a very, very low threat environment. Siting is in no way critical. Taking on a proficient mobile enemy with AFVs is a different game altogether.

Having said that, the base at Wanat was clearly badly sited and there for all the wrong reasons. The SF Base at Lang-Vei, over run during Tet, was never constructed with Tanks (PT-76's) in mind. Compare and contrast, the SF Base at Kontum, which straddled the main road.

The differentiation is really all down to your core functions analysis. A FOB in A'Stan is "Found." If you were an Armoured Coy in Germany facing the Soviets, and you got "found" you were probably going to be dead before the fight began.

[JMA]

...and what standard defensive principle would those be?

A FOB is a facility from which to mount operations, and the location itself may provide operational advantages, such as surveillance of a route or an area. The Surveillance Towers in South Armagh, were sited to give the most efficient coverage of the boarder. Had a Soviet MRR been coming north from the Republic, they would not have been where they were.

A FOB in A'Stan is in a very, very low threat environment. Siting is in no way critical. Taking on a proficient mobile enemy with AFVs is a different game altogether.

Having said that, the base at Wanat was clearly badly sited and there for all the wrong reasons. The SF Base at Lang-Vei, over run during Tet, was never constructed with Tanks (PT-76's) in mind. Compare and contrast, the SF Base at Kontum, which straddled the main road.

The differentiation is really all down to your core functions analysis. A FOB in A'Stan is "Found." If you were an Armoured Coy in Germany facing the Soviets, and you got "found" you were probably going to be dead before the fight began.

May I suggest that you access and read the following without delay:

Army Field Manual (AFM)
Volume One - Combined Arms Operations
Part 10 - Counter Insurgency Operations
ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 8
FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASES

All will be revealed.

OK so getting found is the problem. So in the defence you have have resources that will find the enemy forming up/gathering/grouping then you have the ability to break up their attack before it begins, yes?
(See:
ARMY FIELD MANUAL
VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATION
PART 1 - FORMATION TACTIC
PART 2 – THE CONDUCT OF FORMATION LEVEL OPERATIONS
SECTION 4 — OFFENSIVE SUPPORT
712. General
a. (1) Engaging the enemy early to disrupt the cohesion of his attack, reduce his information gathering capability and his ability to mass combat power.)

OK, so that said you also need to make urgent reference to the following:

ARMY FIELD MANUAL
VOLUME 1 - COMBINED ARMS OPERATION
PART 2 - BATTLEGROUP TACTICS
PART B - TACTICS AT THE BATTLEGROUP LEVEL
CHAPTER 7 - DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 1 - THE FUNDAMENTALS

Trust me its all there...

The problem in Afghanistan is that "young" and inexperienced Brigadiers, Lt Cols and majors have been allowed to make it up as they go along.

...sadly the Brits have never been able to learn from their own mistakes. I'm told by those who know that it is due to the levels of arrogance which rise in step with officer promotions. That is why it is widely accepted that apart from a rare few, British officers are mainly followed out of curiosity.