The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[JMA]

Fire support did not help the U.S. platoon because there wasn't much it could have done in the few minutes. Calls for artillery fire are slow and calls for company mortar fire not really effective against an assault gun and dispersed infantry.

No opponent would always "know" that the line of defence is reverse/counter slope, for there are usually several slopes and the first one could be largely a decoy. German defence doctrine advocated a deep defence which had a zone for skirmishing and delaying in front of the real deal. There were often even two fully prepared defensive positions plus if possible decoy positions. The secondary defensive position was a necessity against Soviet offensive preparatory shelling, and the Soviets rarely kept both positions under simultaneous fire.

You do not increase the uncertainty for the opponent by presenting your troops in the showcase.

Besides; forward slope defensive positions are easily detected, thus never an advantage from a detectability point of view. A defensive position that's well done does not tell to an aerial photo interpreter what's decoy and what not.
Reverse slope defences on the other hand cannot be observed permanently like forward slope defences and allow thus for much less reconnaissance by the enemy.


JMA; the key is -as so often- that I wrote about capable opponents. Some dinosaur calls it METT-T. The "E" stands for "enemy". Forward slopes defences ARE suicidal against capable enemies. I doubt that the Rhodesian army cared much about capable enemies. It didn't fight one for a generation in the 70's.
The WW2 booklet in question was about a war between first and second-rate powers. A forward slope defence was suicidal in that war. Even Romanian infantry regiments of '44 and Italian Bersaglieri of '42 were capable enough to rip forward slope defences apart, even the ones set up by the Argentinians in '82.


I know many gimmick and have added some gimmicks* to counterslope, reverse slope and ridge defence positions. The forward slope on the other hand is simply hopeless.

*: One gimmick is for example to set up an additional concealing screen (a fence of netting, for example) a metre ahead of the ridge in order to increase the survivability of the ridge defenders and observers. Gaps created by shelling can be plugged with the concealing "umbrella frame" trick of snipers, even in the midst of a fight.
This gimmick solves a problem which occurs on very straight ridges; the problematic silhouettes of the defenders.

I agree with most of what you say and will add that trying to hold ground in the traditional sense is pointless against a mobile (mechanised) enemy capable of rapid maneuver and bypass. As to a reverse slope defensive position modern observation through satellite and drone make it just about as vulnerable as a forward slope.

Yes competence together with the necessary weapons and equipment make for a tough opponent but take away most of the supporting weapons and Air Effort available to modern armies and the playing field is leveled pretty soon.

I quote again from the Brits: "Although in each case the choice of a forward or reverse slope position should be decided on its merits, reverse slopes almost invariably provide the best position for defence."

Your reference to Rhodesia needs to be addressed.

Yes the enemy (being the guerrilla forces - ZANLA and ZIPRA) were pathetic against even the most basic standard. We had few troops so had to work out how best to take then on with what we had. So we were able to take them on on ratios of (not 3:1 but) 1:30 (Op Dingo) or more if we used what little air we had to maximum effect and achieved the element of surprise. ZANLA (Mugabe) kept pushing ill trained cannon fodder over the border which we culled in turkey shoot after turkey shoot so in reality the numbers of so-called insurgents was not as significant as some latter day observers would like to make out. ZIPRA (Nkomo) had Russian advisors who prepared them for a mechanised invasion from Zambia down one of two routes (or both), Victoria Falls-Bulawayo and Kariba-Salisbury. Too many bridges on those routes which we could cut and the advance would grind to a halt. (What were the Russians thinking). So what you are capable of, what your enemy is capable of and the terrain you will be fighting on is important - METT-TC - if you like.

As the man said..."If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles." - Sun Tzu

So true.