Owning Battlespace

[Ken White]

As I understand it, the term Battlespace Owner means that a Commander has been given effective total command -- with some exceptions -- over everything and everyone who enters, crosses or operates in a specified geographical area.

The control is total except for some SOF elements / missions and occasional other exceptions, a Battlespace Owner thus can dictate how units in his area not directly subordinate to him can or cannot operate.

I appreciate the need for delegation of authority, for accountability and for unity of command, however, it has been my observation that the thought processes of well trained Armor, Mech Infantry, Cavalry, Light Infantry and Artillery commanders vary slightly to considerably with respect to TTPs and thus perhaps a potential for friction (Clausewitzian style...) occurs when a dictatorial Light Infantry Commander has local FA elements operating in both the fire support and infantry modes...

What effect this approach has on the so-called 'human terrain' aspects of FID and COIN support is not known by me but I can see a potential for excessive focus on geography and control to the detriment of concentration on the Mission -- or as the British used to more correctly call it, the Aim.

Without getting into the details, specifics about current ops or anything that remotely violates OpSec but with an eye toward US doctrine for conflicts in general, I have two questions:

Is that understanding essentially correct?

Is the concept wise and / or combat effective?

[IntelTrooper]

1. Yes.
2. No.

[jcustis]

Ken, your observations about the process are correct, although I've never seen a battlepace owner playbook that describes the term and codifies the rules. Some BOs can be very effective within that construct, so staff and personality influences still have a significant impact,

My boss has owned two Regt/BDE-sized AOs in Iraq and Afg. He didn't care who got the credit, SOF, or GPF, but he preferred that the homegrown security forces were in on the kill as well. We had our challenges, but were not otherwise restricted.

As for your comments about Branch influence, even among like-pedigree commanders, their notions of command can differ significantly, along with their ability to execute FID and COIN. The provisional guys don't suffer too much from these matters when it comes to being employed, unless the respective staff cannot communicate their capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses to the HHQ staff.

[82redleg]

As I understand it, the term Battlespace Owner means that a Commander has been given effective total command -- with some exceptions -- over everything and everyone who enters, crosses or operates in a specified geographical area.

The control is total except for some SOF elements / missions and occasional other exceptions, a Battlespace Owner thus can dictate how units in his area not directly subordinate to him can or cannot operate.

I don't think this is completely accurate, and I also thought that whoever owned an AO has always been responsible for it.

Some examples:

1- If you are assigned an AO, you should know who is moving in that AO? So units transiting that AO should check in with your TOC (operations center of whatever type) when the enter and leave. This helps prevent fratricide, aids in battle tracking, and assists the moving unit in case it needs QRF, etc.

2- If you are responsible for the reconstruction of an AO, you should have a hand in ALL projects in that AO, right? I've seen logistics units attempting to implement CA projects along their routes- to me, this is totally backa$$wards- and the responsibility of the unit in charge of the AO.

I guess that I am of the opinion that the more control we give to the guy that is in the AO day-in/day-out, and responsible for what happens there, the better. Letting transient units, of whatever type (logistics, SOF, whatever) operate without coordinating with the guy in charge seems like a bad thing to me.

[sullygoarmy]

Add in the fact that, at least in Baghdad, technically the Iraqi Security Forces are the battlespace owners and you get an even more difficult situation.

That being said, our Brigade, which was responsible for all of Baghdad Province, was the U.S. battlespace owner if you will. As 82redleg mentioned, we maintained situational awareness of all units/convoys/PRTs/Transition Teams/State Department moving in, out and through our area. If any incidents happened from an IED strike to a vehicle breaking down in a convoy (civilian or military), one of our organic battalions would have to respond. We fought daily with getting outside units to report in as they transited our battlespace to ensure we had visibility in case of an incident so we could rapidly respond with assets to assist.

We did not have operational control over units transiting our battlespace nor would any other battlespace owner without prior coordination.

I've personally seen a major shift in how outside units (i.e. SOF) operated in our battlespace. A few years ago, a box would go up over an area without warning, SOF would do their thing, then leave the mess behind for the battlespace owner to deal with. What I saw this tour was a lot more coordination between SOF and the battlespace owners. We knew where every SOF mission was going prior to launch so we could be prepared to assist with QRF assets and coordinate with the ISF battlespace owners as well. Definitely a plus from how things were a few years back.

[Bob's World]

Ken,

This was my daily drama as the Chief of the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOPLE, a NATO term adopted mid tour, began as a SOCOORD) in RC-South.

Personally, I think we need to evolve from traditional concepts rooted in Physical Battle Space, and adopt more effective constructs that take into account "functional battle space" as well.

As to "SOF," as you well know, that is a broad term. In Afghanistan there are what we called "the three tribes" all operating under distinct and independent chains of command, outside the control of the BSO, that are "SOF." In descending order of degree of BSO influence over, there are the NATO SOF operating under NATO authorities; There are US and certain coalition SOF that operate under OEF authorities; and then there are the JSOC crowd.

Probably more a conversation to have over a couple of beers than over the web, but I'll add more tomorrow, or field any specific questions.

In general though the BSO is left holding the bag and is always left responsible for whatever the SOF guys break (and benefits from what they do well, which is much more and less recognized). Ironically, the SF guys are arguably more frustrated by the efforts of the JSOC guys than the conventional forces are.

One incremental step to smooth this out would be to put all SOF under one set of authorities. That means compromise though. I would, however, open the door to a cleaner C2 lash up.

As to putting SOF under the BSO, it always sounds good, but it also always ends up in some tragic application of SOF to solve problems that are merely difficult and dangerous, rather than SOF-unique in the skills and capabilities required.

[jmm99]

from BW
....[1] there are the NATO SOF operating under NATO authorities; [2] There are US and certain coalition SOF that operate under OEF authorities; and [3] then there are the JSOC crowd ....

Each of these operates under a different charter, policies and end goals (to the extent these can be identified) at the policy-strategy interface. They also include some very different folks - "just stayoff our concrete".

Open-ended question (soft ball): how would a unified SOF command obviate the "problems" of three different commands (each following different policy objectives - where, in any probable case, military operational considerations will be subordinated to political and diplomatic concerns) ?

Regards

Mike

PS: Query whether use of a legal metaphor ("ownership") is appropriate - "ownership" means different things to different legal systems.

E.g., from my Japanese apartment-sharing genius in the 60s: Your common law concept of "ownership" is quite different from ours. Your "ownership" rice bowl has to be completely filled with incidents of ownership - even if you have to invent some to fill the empty spaces. We fill our "ownership" rice bowl with the incidents of ownership as we develop and need them - so, our rice bowl may be partially empty (to you).

I suspect different things to different people may also be something of a problem here.

[max161]

That is my snarky answer on a quick break from the ball game tonight. If the host nation does not own its battlespace then their is a military occupation by a foreign force. Think about that from the host nation's perspective and how that usually provides legitimacy in the eyes of the insurgents and the population who does not like foreign intervention, regardless of the foreign force's good intentions.

But on a serious note, until we learn to operate in support of the host nation's internal defense and development programs that are focused on their security forces defeating the security threats and bringing good governance and development to ungoverned or under-governed spaces we are not going to get these types of operations right. Even if we have to "own" battlespace in terms of our own organizations we should not forget that 8 times out of 10 we are going to be operating in a sovereign nation (the 2 out of 10 being Iraq and Afghanistan when we took their sovereignty from them and they were incapable of acting as a sovereign nation)

But to get into the discussion between regular and special operations forces let me offer this perspective. When regular forces organize geographically obviously gaps or seams are created. This is especially true when there are tribal boundaries that are different from the political boundaries that are different from the practical and logical and efficient military boundaries organized along geographic lines to make military operations as effective and efficient as possible.

If there is good coordination and cooperation among regular and special operations forces and if all are in tune with the Joint Force commander's mission and intent, special operations forces with a wider focus that may be less geographic and more politically and tribal focused can be of great value in reducing gaps and seams if there is good and effective information sharing. Everyone has their horror stories about lack of coordination and cooperation and there will always be friction, challenges and of course personalities, but if everyone is on the same page with the Joint Force commander (and if the Reagan principle is in effect - along the lines of "it is amazing what can be accomplished when no one worries about who gets the credit") the coordination and cooperation between regular and special operations forces can achieve effective results. There are a great many vignettes that can be told about that to match all the horror stories.

If you put special operations forces under the regular forces C2 then you are going to have all forces limited to the same geographic areas and everyone will have the same gaps and seams. Furthermore the Joint Force Commander's campaign plan gives the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander missions with different focus and tasks and purposes than the ground forces. Yes it is hard when there are forces operating in close proximity with regular and special operations forces all conducting complex operations, but great synergy can be achieved if regular and special operations forces understand the different focus of each as directed by the Joint Force Commander and learn to coordinate cooperate, and collaborate and follow the Reagan principle. But when personalities dominate rather than mission focus, we may as well just accept that there will be more friction than necessary and operations will be much less effective (and maybe ineffective) than they should be.

Just my 2 cents. Back to the half time show and then the game.

[Ken White]

Intel Trooper cuts to the gist concisely, thanks for the confirmation (1) and shared opinion (2).

jcustis Thanks, Jon. I suspected as much -- the qualities of the Commander in this technique, as in most others, make a tremendous difference. Curiously, we know that but do not really select for it...

82redlegI'm sure it isn't completely accurate, that's why I asked the question -- to get some accuracy. What in your opinion should be changed?

You are correct as far as I know in you statement that whoever owned an AO has been responsible for it. However, this owner thing has three aspects. First and basically -- should there be such a thing as an AO in this kind of war? Don't reject it automatically, please give it some thought. If you say there should be, fine, then consider whether an AO and a 'Battlespace' are the same thing and if they are, consider which term is most appropriate, flexible and accurate .

Second, as jmm says below, 'ownership' means different things to different people. I do not question allocation of responsibility for 'battle space' or a Zone, Sector, AO, TAOR or whatever we'll decide to call it next year. I do question the terminology in total and very particularly the 'ownership' aspect-- as the old Gen-Gen said, 'words are important.' Our doctrinal Command processes and procedures have been worked out over a long time. They work. Ad Hocery is often necessary in combat but it can also get out of control. Not to mention that we are not occupation troops. Afghanistan IS a sovereign nation...

Thirdly and the most important reason for my question, I understand the need to prevent fratricide, aid in battle tracking, and assist the moving units in case they need QRF, etc. This:

I guess that I am of the opinion that the more control we give to the guy that is in the AO day-in/day-out, and responsible for what happens there, the better. Letting transient units, of whatever type (logistics, SOF, whatever) operate without coordinating with the guy in charge seems like a bad thing to me.

I also agree with. That doesn't address two things; coordination or being under control or de facto command? I totally agree with the former but have heard that some insist on the latter -- which I emphatically do not agree with.

Plus the "exceptions" I mentioned of which I understand SOF/SF is just on example -- who determines those that are valid and those that are not? The important reason -- is the 'ownership' of space militarily sound and should the concept be incorporated in changes to our C2 doctrine. If the answer to that is 'no,' then we shouldn't be using it today.

A point on the reconstruction and / or aid and support in an AO. Should the unit preparing to battle in a battle space even be involved in that other than peripherally? I understand that's the way it's being done -- I have operated in that mode but I also have operated in very different approaches that allowed units to concentrate on the military aspects while others handled aid and such. I fully understand where we are with all that now; again, my question is for the future -- should it be that way?

sullygoarmyI can identify with the many frustrations of having another Nation being the real 'battlespace owner.'

I think that your lack of OpCon over transiting units is important and is correct. Things can happen locally that you could not control while the man on the ground could. We really don't do as well at trusting each other as we should...

That really gets to the crux of my tertiary concern -- is it possible for the Battle Space Owner (hereafter BSO) to take the term to heart and attempt to exercise control where he or she should not? Before anyone says "what's this she bit?" there could an MI Bde tabbed to be the BSO. Unlikely and illogical but could happen. I can see the potential for both conflict and unknowing directions to transiting or other units.

I appreciate your SOF specific comments. My sensing was and is that what you describes as the change is taking place everywhere -- and that' better for everyone. The last thing we need is distrust between each other...

Bob's World:

Personally, I think we need to evolve from traditional concepts rooted in Physical Battle Space, and adopt more effective constructs that take into account "functional battle space" as well.

Totally agree and that is a big part of my concern and an unstated reason for the question; that and the potential to focus excessively on geography and 'control' (to avoid unpleasant surprises from own side and echelons above reality) as opposed to focusing on the reason one is there.

In general though the BSO is left holding the bag and is always left responsible for whatever the SOF guys break (and benefits from what they do well, which is much more and less recognized). Ironically, the SF guys are arguably more frustrated by the efforts of the JSOC guys than the conventional forces are.

I can see and believe all that (especially that last item ). That was part of my concern -- the development of ill will and enhanced parochialism and again, the words are important. An Area of Operations is one thing and Command responsibility is essentially understood and well delineated (as are OpCom and OpCon -- and when they are not appropriate...). However, 'ownership' implies something else and that can be misunderstood.

One incremental step to smooth this out would be to put all SOF under one set of authorities. That means compromise though. I would, however, open the door to a cleaner C2 lash up.

I agree and as you know there are ways to do that cleanly and easily -- but that's for the over that beer discussion.

As to putting SOF under the BSO, it always sounds good, but it also always ends up in some tragic application of SOF to solve problems that are merely difficult and dangerous, rather than SOF-unique in the skills and capabilities required.

Also agree and that should not be done. No need for it if the parameters and command lines are clean...

jmm99 Thanks Mike, that is a valuable contribution and you apparently sensed what I was after. My answer to your question would be that such a Command line would be ideal. However, I'd have to caveat that by jabbering about personalities and parochialism.

max161Bingo!!!

I asked the Thread question for the two reasons I stated initially and for the reason you state far better than I. It was one of three unstated goals in asking the question -- the Nation whose territory it is "owns the Battle Space" -- US Forces can have an AO assigned within that and the C2 process for that are well established. The term BSO has bad connotations and implies a condition that cannot -- cetainly should not -- exist. The ANA can use the term, we should not.

A second unstated reason: To ask why on earth would we substitute dicey civilian ideas like ownership for proven doctrinal concepts and TTP? (I will not here ask about the either the Mayor or the BBQ coordinator on Afghan located FOBs...)

The third and most important of all was to suggest that yet again that it appears we are adapting unwisely and in administrative mode to a particular war and we will thus build bad habits that will not translate well to a new and different war...

[Rifleman]

A few years ago, a box would go up over an area without warning, SOF would do their thing, then leave the mess behind for the battlespace owner to deal with.

I take it by "SOF" you don't mean Army Special Forces and by "their thing" you mean a direct action and it's aftermath?

What I saw this tour was a lot more coordination between SOF and the battlespace owners. We knew where every SOF mission was going prior to launch so we could be prepared to assist with QRF assets and coordinate with the ISF battlespace owners as well.

Again, I take it you mean DA. I would have thought the battle space owner would already know about SF doing FID/UW (or whatever it's called now) or SR type stuff in his area.

[Cliff]

As I understand it, the term Battlespace Owner means that a Commander has been given effective total command -- with some exceptions -- over everything and everyone who enters, crosses or operates in a specified geographical area.

The control is total except for some SOF elements / missions and occasional other exceptions, a Battlespace Owner thus can dictate how units in his area not directly subordinate to him can or cannot operate.

I appreciate the need for delegation of authority, for accountability and for unity of command, however, it has been my observation that the thought processes of well trained Armor, Mech Infantry, Cavalry, Light Infantry and Artillery commanders vary slightly to considerably with respect to TTPs and thus perhaps a potential for friction (Clausewitzian style...) occurs when a dictatorial Light Infantry Commander has local FA elements operating in both the fire support and infantry modes...

As the token air guy, I feel compelled to mention that the CFLCC battlespace technically only extends vertically to the coordination altitude- above that, the CFACC "owns" the battlespace.

This means the "BSO" probably should coordinate any indirect fire larger than small mortars with the CFACC thru the ALO/BCD. Still doesn't avoid incidents like this, but at least my bros in the jets can hopefully not get involved...

In practice the use of kill boxes helps this coordination quite a bit, especially when "purple" kill boxes are used.

Ownership is immaterial, but coordination (and procedures to get it done right!) are critical for all the reasons you mentioned- frat, etc.

V/R,

Cliff

[jcustis]

sullygoarmy highlights that although we have a process, the reality is often widely different.

I had similar experiences when I was in N. Iraq last deploy.

[William F. Owen]

In the real world no one should ever say "Battle Space." It's utterly meaningless. OK, people use the term, but it would seem to signify more ignorance than insight. Terms I use are:

Operational Area . - that defined area of terrain and air space in which an operation will take place. The definition is also time limited.

Area of Responsibility . - that defined area where a unit or sub-unit has responsibility for activity and/or security.

As concerns "owners" is not "ownership" often contested?

[Bob's World]

(Rifleman when I mean US Army SF I say SF; I use SOF when I mean the entire array of joint and mulitnational forces.)

Concur with Dave completely about the host nation. I will only add that that is absolutely NOT how ISAF thinks about this, and it is a huge problem. There is that dang "control" word again. We are addicted to control in these operations, and it is the very fact that we seek to control outcomes that make the problems as large as they are. (That classic principle from Lawrence that everyone can quote, but no one wants to apply to their own slice of the equation regarding any HN solution, regardless of how poor being superior to any foreign solution, regardless of how good).

I was the point man for a couple months leading up to Marjah to take beatings from the RC leadership and staff for the insistence of SF on facilitating much larger Afghan units to function more effectively under their own C2 and structures; rather than disempowering their leadership and merging Afghan soldiers into Coalition units in a 1-1 ratio. (On my mental OER support form it states "Did not say 'are you F'n kidding me?' to any generals; and 'did not punch out the snarky USMC Lt Col who lectured me on how the SF model was outdated and that now partnering is defined as the 1-1 technique being employed by the Marines in Helmand.')


I am sure the rationale is along the lines of "we can't put the HN in the lead in their own country now because there is too much that needs to be done so that we can withdraw and leave them in charge on their own then."

(Warning, self-induced rant to follow. Chalk this up to PTSD: God. Colonial intervention counter guerrilla operations cloaked as "COIN" makes my head hurt. We would never pull this crap if it was at home. We would not even attempt to pull this crap if we were supporting a "first world" nation. We only pull this crap when we go some place we assess as inferior. We are arrogant a-holes, and our doctrine is a codification of that arrogance derived from the arrogant lessons of the European colonial experience. Trying to sugar coat that with "pop-centric" tactics is like putting sugar sprinkles on a bowl of dog####.)

[SJPONeill]

Personally, I think we need to evolve from traditional concepts rooted in Physical Battle Space, and adopt more effective constructs that take into account "functional battle space" as well.

Good point as 'battlespace' always conjures up thoughts of good old-fashioned force-on-force state-versus-state MCO e.g. DESERT STORM, OIF Part 1, the Fulda Gap, etc...

My understanding is that, doctrinally, after fiddling with 'missionspace' the incoming terminology is now 'operating environment' in an attempt to better clutch up those other features, often less-tangible, of the COE...i.e those in the PMESCII-PT ASCOPE areas which were not the focus of operational training for those of use who went to school pre-21C...

So far as the C2 question in concerned...I think that it all comes down to the training and development of the commanders concerned - if you have those that operate strictly by the letter of the law (or doctrine) then, yes, that friction or worse is going to occur. Regardless of the doctrine, the guiding principle should always be 'apply with judgement' and all our systems do do their utmost to ensure that judgement is good...

With this caveat, I'm quite comfortable with Ken's definition's at the top of the thread...

[Ken White]

(Rifleman when I mean US Army SF I say SF; I use SOF when I mean the entire array of joint and mulitnational forces.)

Me too. Though I'm contemplating adding CRAF and WTFMF. Those would be 'CIFs Running Amok Forces' and 'Wrong Time For [this] Mission Forces' (another expansion of the abbreviation may be alternatively used). They seem to be amalgams and over present...

There is that dang "control" word again. We are addicted to control in these operations, and it is the very fact that we seek to control outcomes that make the problems as large as they are.

Yes!

Colonial intervention counter guerrilla operations cloaked as "COIN" makes my head hurt. We would never pull this crap if it was at home. We would not even attempt to pull this crap if we were supporting a "first world" nation. We only pull this crap when we go some place we assess as inferior. We are arrogant a-holes, and our doctrine is a codification of that arrogance derived from the arrogant lessons of the European colonial experience. Trying to sugar coat that with "pop-centric" tactics is like putting sugar sprinkles on a bowl of dog####.)

Yes!

[Fuchs]

(Warning, self-induced rant to follow. Chalk this up to PTSD: God. Colonial intervention counter guerrilla operations cloaked as "COIN" makes my head hurt. We would never pull this crap if it was at home. We would not even attempt to pull this crap if we were supporting a "first world" nation. We only pull this crap when we go some place we assess as inferior.

I'm not so sure about that. The counter-insurgency influence of the U.S. in Greece wasn't exactly diplomatic either.

[Bob's World]

Greece fell in a unique time and place. Still establishing the lines for post WWII spheres of influence; and still in the realist "contain expansion of Sovietness" era of the Cold War. It was a few years later after the fall of Nationalist China that we began to morph to what I see as a much more Idealist "contain communism" era the dominated the Cold War proper; and shapes how we look at Islamism today. Still trying to contain ideologies, when the real energy fueling most of the conflicts were people seeking a liberty not controlled by some Colonial power or their appointed successor.

People are still seeking such liberty today. Tunisia is a current testament to that fact. Everyone is asking "where are the Islamists?" Meanwhile the people are talking in terms of "Liberty" "Democracy" "Justice" and "Self-Determination." Appears that the intel guys and ideologues are wrong again. No big surprise there.

So, back to my original point. We need to trade in the relentless pursuit of control for the relentless pursuit of influence. Once we make that paradigm shift, the rest will begin to fall in place. Oh, and that influence must be with populaces and non-state actors as well as with official governments. We're going to need a new playbook.

[Infanteer]

So, back to my original point. We need to trade in the relentless pursuit of control for the relentless pursuit of influence. Once we make that paradigm shift, the rest will begin to fall in place. Oh, and that influence must be with populaces and non-state actors as well as with official governments. We're going to need a new playbook.

I feel like I'm reading something by Joseph S. Nye....

[Ken White]

You noticed...