Tunisia: catch all

[Dayuhan]

For whatever reason you feel compelled to attack whatever I say. That's cool. But it does not create in me any compulsion or duty to argue with your opinions. They are your opinions, I see little to support them, so I let them stand on their own merit.

Why is very simple: I think the course of action you promote would be counterproductive and extremely dangerous: with the best of intentions I don't doubt, but good intentions don't always lead to good places. I also think your case is based on some very questionable assumptions, most notably the continuing and unsupported claim that autocratic states in the ME - particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States - are somehow enabled and empowered by the US, and that the US therefore has some sort of influence that it could use to change their behavior. I might also cite your repeated and equally unsupported claim that the end of the Cold War increased instability in the developing world by removing some sort of benign equilibrium that existed between the US and the Soviet Union.

When these and other points are challenged, often with arguments that are by no means irrelevant, there is seldom any direct attempt to clarify or develop the points being made: they are simply repeated, as revealed truth. I admit that I find that frustrating, and that frustration produces the occasional intemperate post: temperance is perhaps not among my virtues (my wife assures me that have a few).

I cannot help but believe that the proposed intrusion of the US into the internal affairs of other nations as self-appointed "champion" of populaces that have never asked for our help, do not trust us, and whose issues and concerns are largely unfamiliar to us is not going to advance our interests in any way. I do not think that an unreasonable concern.

Omar advised, in an excellent post on another thread, that you stop looking at Afghanistan as the 51st state of the US. I agree, and I'd add Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and a few others to the list.

I believe that intervention in the internal affairs of others is like punishment for guilt: to be undertaken only when it is necessary beyond reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubts do need to be addressed if intervention is to be contemplated or even threatened.

On a few individual points...

1. Promote sustainment of the status quo of political rule in all "allied" states.

Are we actually promoting the status quo? Where? There's a huge difference between promoting a status quo and dealing with a status quo that is not within our power to change. Attempting to initiate changes in the internal status quo of an allied nation (or any nation) is every bit as dangerous as trying to promote the status quo, possibly worse: it's simply not something we have the right to do. It is meddling of the worst sort and there will be a negative backlash no matter how good our intentions are.

2. To quick to promote overthrow of rule in non-allied states, or even those that disagree with us, and replacement with a regime that will support our national interests in the region.

Agree completely: I've always thought regime change a very dangerous idea. One might point out, though, that other than the rather irrational post-9/11 lashing out, this is not something we've done a great deal of since the end of the Cold War.

3. Overly quick to brand non-state organizations that are emerging to positions of influence as "terrorist" organizations. This enables greater freedom to wage CT activities against these groups, but also effectively closes the door to other more productive forms of engagement. The State Department does not worry about establishing diplomatic relations with an organization, regardless of how influential it may be, once it goes on such a list. At that point it is just a "target" or a "threat" to be attacked or defeated.

Groups that pursue terrorist tactics are terrorists, and responding to terrorism with attempts to engage productively simply sends a message that terrorism works. We might be better advised to try to engage with groups that disagree with us but have not embraced terrorism. In the case of AQ, there was going to be a confrontation no matter what we did: AQ needed it and was going to pursue it in any event. It takes two to talk and only one to fight. They needed a fight and they were going to push until they got one.

4. Over reliance on CT tactics to target individuals and organizations that emerge to challenge the status quo through illegal means.

Agreed... though just as we should not be too quick to assume that every insurgent is a terrorist, we must also not be too quick to brand every terrorist an insurgent. Blowing something up doesn't automatically make you a noble fighter for freedom: there are people out there trying to use violence to proactively impose an agenda that has nothing at all to do with freedom, and they are not necessarily wounded respondents to American provocation.

5. Over reliance on building the CT capacity of allied nation security forces to more effectively engage or suppress such nationalist organizations that emerge from their own populace to illegally challenge the status quo government.

The extent to which this occurs is quite exaggerated. Most of these nations do not need our help to suppress opposition, whether nationalist or otherwise. They do it very effectively on their own. They have lots of practice.

6. Being so desperate for "friends" that we begin to hang out with some very shady characters, or just as bad, ignore the growing unacceptable nature of the behavior of our old friends.

Agreed, to a point. "Friends", though, doesn't mean much in politics and diplomacy. There are shady characters that we have to deal with: they exist and we haven't the power to remove them. There are real limits to the extent to which the US can brand the behavior of other nations as "unacceptable". We are not the global morality police.

7. The coming shift of lead from Defense to State (good); and from combat to development (ok...) without a corresponding shift of Strategy.
We are merely changing the Ways and Means without updating our Ends or our understanding of the problem. Massive development in support of illegitimate and failing regimes is no more able to prop them up against a growing Tsunami of popular opposition than massive military support is. In fact, if suppression of symptoms is the goal, history is on the side of ruthless application of force as the most effective technique.

I don't see any reason to view political change as a problem. It happens when it's ready to happen. We should work with it as it happens, but if we try to initiate it or direct it we're only going to make a mess.

I quite agree that we should not be defending despots from their own populaces. Taking the opposite approach and trying to overthrow despots, or trying to impose ourselves as uninvited champion of the populace, is stepping way beyond any kind of appropriate role.

My point on this Tunisian thread is that here is an event that pokes big holes in the "expert" positions that have shaped our GWOT strategy and engagement over the past several years. Here is an opportunity to take a hard look into that hole, and gain a clearer perspective of what is going on and why. Here is an opportunity to make a substantive change in how we see and address such problems; and in how we promote and preserve our interests. The world is changing, the US and the West must evolve as well.

I don't see this is a problem, in any way. A crumbling regime fell, that's been expected for some time. It's not exactly a surprise. Political change is underway. There's no need for us to try and control or direct it: to the greatest possible extent this is something the Tunisians need to resolve on their own. If they ask for our help we should give it. If they don't - and they almost certainly won't - our role is to observe and to participate in whatever multilateral actions are deemed necessary.

Of course we should observe, learn, reconsider our positions. We should always be doing that. Bringing Marines into the picture is a matter of last resort and we're nowhere near that.

Too often in the past we've intervened on the wrong side of these situations. The antidote to that is not to try to intervene on the "right" side. The antidote is to stop intervening, unless it's requested and/or absolutely - beyond all reasonable doubt - necessary.

Argh. That was way too long...