"The war in Afghanistan is, ultimately, a tactical war, fought at the local level over year-long deployments. When those small, tactical decisions are made for the wrong reasons, it can add up to big, strategic failure."

This is true, but only because:

A. Lead for operations is in the hands of a military headquarters, and such headquarters do not take on political objectives and are also subject to the effects of regular rotations; and

B. Current COIN doctrine, so rooted in the colonial experience, defines success as the preservation of the current regime through a construct of "warfare;" and

C. Failing to fully appreciate the causal effects radiating outward from the Karzai government, we create a functional sanctuary for the government to operate from. This protects and emboldens them to act with ever greater impunity toward their own populace, with little incentive to identify and address areas requiring substantive changes, or to seek reasonable reconciliation with the insurgent leadership of the issues that are most central to their illegal challenge and resistance.