The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[William F. Owen]

May I suggest that you access and read the following without delay:

Army Field Manual (AFM)
Volume One - Combined Arms Operations
Part 10 - Counter Insurgency Operations
ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 8
FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASES

All will be revealed....

Don't need to read it. I spend a lot of time pointing out why what in the manual is complete rubbish. Most of what is wrong today is because of what is written in the manual.

Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy. IF the AFM you cite, does not make that clear, then it is just wrong. - like a great deal of British AFMs.

[BushrangerCZ]

Were you in a combat zone at that time. I can't see you trusting your life to a rifle with so little care esp a M16/M4





The problem is that you don't have the luxury to quickly change the bolt and carrier group in combat. That is why soldiers are finding it hard to find the time to clean their weapons 3 or 4 times a day as new policy requires. But you don't have a choice because their life depends on it.

I used the M16 in training and if I had a missfire, I just raised my hand and shouted out that I had a malfunction. When I got in combat there was no one to tell I had a malfunction. All it matterd that if your weapon malfunctioned then you were helpless for however long it took you to clear it. I have more than a few gray hairs today because of this.





First, the M16 went into cambat in 1965, it shouldn't still be having teething problems.

Secondly, I took the flak as a platoon leader because I had a AKMS (folding stock) made in Czechoslovakia. There were problems such as battle field identification (AKs and M16 sounded different, AKs also went "Clack" when you went from safe to fire mode), also you had to scrounge your own ammunition. However, that was a help in some operations when they couldn't supply you properly. Airmobile relied on a thin supply line.

There has never been a single AK made in Czechoslovakia. If you look a bit closer, or better strip the bolt, you will see a difference...

[JMA]

Don't need to read it. I spend a lot of time pointing out why what in the manual is complete rubbish. Most of what is wrong today is because of what is written in the manual.

Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy. IF the AFM you cite, does not make that clear, then it is just wrong. - like a great deal of British AFMs.

Wilf, that you have strong opinions on certain matters does not necessarily make you correct (I assume you realise this).

I'm not sure what your military service and counter insurgency credentials are but I suggest that you may be making to bold a use of the red pen.

The Brits normally place the following in the Preface:

"The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement."

So where does the problem lie? With the doctrine or the military judgement of commanders on the ground?

[Pete]

How come siting and defending a base in Afghanistan is not governed by standard defensive principles?

The use of fortified bases in low-intensity conflicts such as in Afghanistan or Iraq isn't the same thing as trying to use them to defend against a corps of German Panzer and Panzer-Grenadier divisions during World War II. This goes back to the many different permutations of tactical and operational situations that come under the all-encompassing category of "Full-Spectrum Operations."

[JMA]

The use of fortified bases in low-intensity conflicts such as in Afghanistan or Iraq isn't the same thing as trying to use them to defend against a corps of German Panzer and Panzer-Grenadier divisions during World War II. This goes back to the many different permutations of tactical and operational situations that come under the all-encompassing category of "Full-Spectrum Operations."

Pete, I would have thought it was obvious that the enemy capabilities would be taken into account when such a based is sited.

Neither you nor Wilf seem able to explain that if the Principles of Defence are not used to guide the siting and development of an FOB then what basis is used.

[82redleg]

Pete, I would have thought it was obvious that the enemy capabilities would be taken into account when such a based is sited.

Neither you nor Wilf seem able to explain that if the Principles of Defence are not used to guide the siting and development of an FOB then what basis is used.

Frankly, in most places, the capabilities of the Taliban and other associated militants (HIG, Haqqani network, etc.) against a well-established fixed-site defense are negligible. Witness exactly ZERO coalition outposts overrun in the last 9 plus years, and only one fully set outpost even seriously threatened, AFAIK.

Sometimes, you have to fight where you need to be for operational and/or strategic reasons (population centers, etc), instead of getting to choose to fight from the best tactical position. It sucks, but that's the way it is.

[Ken White]

However, they are often (too often, I and some say...) modified to adapt to one to three other factors; in no particular order as that order will vary depending upon location, from time to time and from unit to unit, those are:

- Desires (presumed or real) of the next higher commander or (more scarily) one of his staff weenies. This includes those cases where a Grid reference was given, arrival on site showed it to be a poor choice but the base was established where directed anyway rather than a simple call back saying "It's not a good location, I'm moving 850m north..."

- Desired or directed (by someone who likely has not been on the ground but relied upon a map or aerial recon) proximity to a Village or feature.

- Equipment and labor available. That needs a bit explanation to anyone with Commonwealth (or similar) service. Unlike the British and many other Armies, US Troops do not defend well. They never have. Nor do they dig well. We are too lazy. We'd rather build sandbag castles to be RPG targets and hope that doesn't happen. There are many reasons, most a bit flaky in the eyes of some but in sum they mean that the US Army has never done well at defense. It may be noteworthy that most British battles of renown are defensive while almost all US battles of significance are offensive. One would think the US would adapt to that and make USE of known strengths while avoiding known weaknesses. One would think...

That explains most or at least some poor location selections by the US. Can't speak for the UK or others.

Added: Slow typing strikes again, 82redleg beat me with a more concise and good answer. His point on zero successful attack / overuns is important as it contributes to the "It's not worth a whole lot of effort" attitude. His final comment is also correct -- as it always is, in every Army...

P.S.

To the impersonator of 82redleg below: He, the real 82redleg, is smarter than that -- he noted ol' Ken couldn't even spell 'use' correctly...

[82redleg]

Added: Slow typing strikes again, 82redleg beat me with a more concise and good answer.

Anytime I get an "attaboy" from Ken, it makes me feel good

[JMA]

The principles are used.

That I suppose should read "The Principles of the Defense should be being used."

However, they are often (too often, I and some say...) modified to adapt to one to three other factors; in no particular order as that order will vary depending upon location, from time to time and from unit to unit, those are:

- Desires (presumed or real) of the next higher commander or (more scarily) one of his staff weenies. This includes those cases where a Grid reference was given, arrival on site showed it to be a poor choice but the base was established where directed anyway rather than a simple call back saying "It's not a good location, I'm moving 850m north..."

- Desired or directed (by someone who likely has not been on the ground but relied upon a map or aerial recon) proximity to a Village or feature.

- Equipment and labor available. That needs a bit explanation to anyone with Commonwealth (or similar) service. Unlike the British and many other Armies, US Troops do not defend well. They never have. Nor do they dig well. We are too lazy. We'd rather build sandbag castles to be RPG targets and hope that doesn't happen. There are many reasons, most a bit flaky in the eyes of some but in sum they mean that the US Army has never done well at defense. It may be noteworthy that most British battles of renown are defensive while almost all US battles of significance are offensive. One would think the US would adapt to that and make USE of known strengths while avoiding known weaknesses. One would think...

That explains most or at least some poor location selections by the US. Can't speak for the UK or others.

Yes, partially. There are obviously poor location selections and then there are poor defensive sitings of the positions on the locations themselves.

My sole point was in contrast with what Wilf appeared to suggest and that was that the standard Principles of Defence are indeed always important in siting a defensive or base location whether at formation level or down to even platoon outposts and temporary bases. I maintain quite simply that the Principles of Defense are universal. I asked if the Principles of Defence don't apply, what does.

Yes it is generally understood that "the US Army has never done well at defense" and that this has not been taken into account in US military planning remains a mystery.

Not sure that all the blame can be moved upwards for what happens on the ground.

Added: Slow typing strikes again, 82redleg beat me with a more concise and good answer. His point on zero successful attack / overuns is important as it contributes to the "It's not worth a whole lot of effort" attitude. His final comment is also correct -- as it always is, in every Army...

But Ken his answer is not relevant in the context of what was being discussed. Where does the measure of a base/outpost being overrun become the yardstick by which it is assessed whether the Principles of the Defence have been adhered to on the construction and development of a base or outpost?

Months ago I raised the issue of the futile construction and occupation of Beau Geste Forts supposedly as a platform from which to launch offensive action against the Taliban (and in so doing deny them freedom of movement).

The history shows that the Taliban through the widespread use of IEDs and small arms harassment turned what was envisaged as platform from which to launch offensive action into nothing more than an isolated (from the community) fort from which ISAF soldiers ventured out at the their peril (from IEDs and ambushes).

[Ken White]

That I suppose should read "The Principles of the Defense should be being used."

No, it mean what it says. The 'Principles of Defense' have their place and should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended. They should never be slavishly followed because NO doctrine can be applicable to all situations.

My sole point was in contrast with what Wilf appeared to suggest and that was that the standard Principles of Defence are indeed always important in siting a defensive or base location whether at formation level or down to even platoon outposts and temporary bases. I maintain quite simply that the Principles of Defense are universal. I asked if the Principles of Defence don't apply, what does.

In order, as Wilf said "Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy." I agree with him, you do not. That's okay or should be. IMO, the METT-TC factors, properly or even improperly considered can lead to the omission of some principles, the modification of others and the inclusion of additional factors; flexibility and METT-TC being paramount as opposed to a rather slavish adherence to doctrine.

Such deviations will sometimes be determined on the ground, sometimes by higher echelons. Usually, they will work out well for all concerned, occasionally they will not. Sometimes that will be due to errors in the adaptations, sometimes due to other factors. The fact that it generally works out well is more important than the fact that it is not done by the book.

Yes it is generally understood that "the US Army has never done well at defense" and that this has not been taken into account in US military planning remains a mystery.

That's easy to answer, it's due to our far too strict adherence to the European model and a concomitant refusal to adapt our doctrine to our manpower predilections, insisting that the Troops must adapt to the model. The fact that they have never done so and unlikely to ever succumb is neatly overlooked by military 'scholars' as opposed to practitioners who adapt on the ground, generally successfully. Regrettably, the scholars write the books and are not about to let the unwashed review and change them...

As a possibly apocryphal story has it, the Germans in WW II were perplexed as they knew US Doctrine and sometimes had access to US plans but had to acknowledge "They never follow their doctrine or plan..."

I once complimented a Korean Officer for great performance by his unit. He said "Well, everything we do, you teach us. Why don't you do what you teach us to do?"

European Armies -- and the ROK Army -- are good and do what they should pretty well. The US Army is not too bad but it suffers from trying to emulate European TTP - the US soldier won't do much that European soldiers do automatically and will do some things rather differently. Our rather slavish adaptation of European military models means we use methods not always appropriate for the human material provided.

Not sure that all the blame can be moved upwards for what happens on the ground.

Of course it cannot. In the end analysis, errors are the responsibility of the level at which they are committed, so that portion of 'blame' remains there. However, the portion of 'blame' that accrues to the level of training and / or education of the persons involved most always defaults to ever higher levels. As does 'blame' for the culture of the Force -- are innovation and initiative encouraged or not? Sad answer for the US...

But...his answer is not relevant in the context of what was being discussed. Where does the measure of a base/outpost being overrun become the yardstick by which it is assessed whether the Principles of the Defence have been adhered to on the construction and development of a base or outpost?

It is true there is an apparent lack of relevance but if you examine it, think for a second and know Soldiers -- as you obviously do -- then it becomes apparent some relevance lies in the fact that no such overruns have occurred has led to complacency and complacency leads to sloppy performance. His second point, re 'directives,' is a burden all Soldiers have borne for centuries. My comment on the "Sandbag Castles" is reflective of that complacency and sloppiness as my "desired or directed' comment agrees with 82redleg's second point. There's relaevance there -- shouldn't be but there is...

Months ago I raised the issue of the futile construction and occupation of Beau Geste Forts...from which ISAF soldiers ventured out at the their peril (from IEDs and ambushes).

That was true then and still is today -- but only at some times and in some places. Afghanistan is too large, the enemy too varied and the rotation of Coalition troops (and their overshadowing of Afghan National Army troops) causes too many variations for any theme or seeming trend -- bad or good -- to be universally applicable.

[Fuchs]

In order, as Wilf said "Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy." I agree with him, you do not.

I think the problem is rather that certain practices are a no-no in either case, and were still applied in AFG. An example would be setting up a base on (relatively) low ground - until it's being harassed by fire from a higher position (I don't call it an assault if it's just fire).


There are also certain fighting positions known from photos and videos that were either never meant to be used as such or were the result of an extremely stupid (and eventually lucky because few get hurt in them) order.
I mean stone/sandbag walls over which the soldiers need to peek in order to return fire. No firing slits, no camo net concealment. The sophistication of these fighting positions was not only inferior to 15th century angle bastions, but even inferior to Hellenic Age fortifications! I don't mean materials (which are certainly an difficult to come by on an Afghan hill), but principles of construction.
A simple camo net can largely prevent aimed fire at defenders/guards, but I have yet to see it in use. Even the lesser alternative - setting up a background that looks just like the soldier - was not seen on published photos yet.

[Ken White]

I think the problem is rather that certain practices are a no-no in either case, and were still applied in AFG.

True. Same thing happened in all the Armies involved in WW II -- and To the Caesars -- among many others...

Poor tactical employment and siting is not a new phenomenon nor is it likely to disappear in the future. Even superbly trained folks can do dumb things -- and no Army operating in Afghanistan today is superbly trained (though several have some units and / or SOF elements that come close).

[JMA]

No, it mean what it says. The 'Principles of Defense' have their place and should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended. They should never be slavishly followed because NO doctrine can be applicable to all situations.

OK so we have come full circle.

That you say the Principles of Defence "should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended" actually indicates that we agree.

Then your qualification in the next sentence seems to be in agreement with an extract which I posted from Brit doctrine pamphlets a while ago, "The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement." Which again places us in agreement.

In order, as Wilf said "Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy." I agree with him, you do not.

...but does that mean that one throws all existing doctrine out the window? Of course not what it means is that in siting such a position under a given set of circumstances (enemy capabilities or METT-TC) "military judgement" is applied to how best to site the position.

That said now please explain to me which of the Principle of Defence can be ignored:

Offensive Action
All Round Defence
Depth
Mutual Support
Concealment
Deception
Striking forces

That's okay or should be. IMO, the METT-TC factors, properly or even improperly considered can lead to the omission of some principles, the modification of others and the inclusion of additional factors; flexibility and METT-TC being paramount as opposed to a rather slavish adherence to doctrine.

Yes as I quoted: "The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement." Still not sure of where we disagree (other than for the sake of it

[JMA]

I think the problem is rather that certain practices are a no-no in either case, and were still applied in AFG. An example would be setting up a base on (relatively) low ground - until it's being harassed by fire from a higher position (I don't call it an assault if it's just fire).


There are also certain fighting positions known from photos and videos that were either never meant to be used as such or were the result of an extremely stupid (and eventually lucky because few get hurt in them) order.
I mean stone/sandbag walls over which the soldiers need to peek in order to return fire. No firing slits, no camo net concealment. The sophistication of these fighting positions was not only inferior to 15th century angle bastions, but even inferior to Hellenic Age fortifications! I don't mean materials (which are certainly an difficult to come by on an Afghan hill), but principles of construction.
A simple camo net can largely prevent aimed fire at defenders/guards, but I have yet to see it in use. Even the lesser alternative - setting up a background that looks just like the soldier - was not seen on published photos yet.

Well if the yardstick that justifies where these outposts are located and how their defenses are sited is whether any have been "overrun" then one can see why the tactical and defence-works standards are so low.

(I agree with your comment on camo nets)

[Ken White]

That you say the Principles of Defence "should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended" actually indicates that we agree.

Never said I disagreed with anything other than your assertion "That I suppose should read "The Principles of the Defense should be being used." I simply said my statement was what I meant, then agreed there should be considered in all things defensive or potentially so...

...but does that mean that one throws all existing doctrine out the window? Of course not what it means is that in siting such a position under a given set of circumstances (enemy capabilities or METT-TC) "military judgement" is applied to how best to site the position.

True.

That said now please explain to me which of the Principle of Defence can be ignored:

Offensive Action
All Round Defence
Depth
Mutual Support
Concealment
Deception
Striking forces

Give me the map, a troop list, the principal locations, the assessment of the enemy (broad based, don't need a detailed OB workup...), log and perstats -- all that OpOrd / METT-TC stuff and I'll be happy to do so.

Lacking that I'll quickly point out that in most COIN / FID situations, Depth (classic type) is neither available or required, Concealment may be undesirable or even directed to not be applied in some cases and mutual support is rarely achieved or available...

[82redleg]

But Ken his answer is not relevant in the context of what was being discussed. Where does the measure of a base/outpost being overrun become the yardstick by which it is assessed whether the Principles of the Defence have been adhered to on the construction and development of a base or outpost?

Regarding my first point- If the principles are truly principles, then 100% success must show their application in some form. The specific application may be different based on the circumstances, but they are applied none-the-less.

Regarding my second point- There are many reasons that the tactical military commander may be forced to accept less than optimal positions, especially in pseudo-war operations like what we are currently engaged in. While many (if not all) of the principles remain the same, the details of their application change, and sometimes higher considerations (operational, strategic) supersede tactical considerations.

Provide the principles that you feel are being violated, and I will attempt to explain to you the TTPs with which those principles are employed in OEF, limited by OPSEC (of course), my own knowledge limitations (I'm 5 years out of OEF now) and the separation caused by this means of communication.

[JMA]

Regarding my first point- If the principles are truly principles, then 100% success must show their application in some form. The specific application may be different based on the circumstances, but they are applied none-the-less.

Regarding my second point- There are many reasons that the tactical military commander may be forced to accept less than optimal positions, especially in pseudo-war operations like what we are currently engaged in. While many (if not all) of the principles remain the same, the details of their application change, and sometimes higher considerations (operational, strategic) supersede tactical considerations.

Provide the principles that you feel are being violated, and I will attempt to explain to you the TTPs with which those principles are employed in OEF, limited by OPSEC (of course), my own knowledge limitations (I'm 5 years out of OEF now) and the separation caused by this means of communication.

My comment on your post was simply that whether any bases had been overrun or not had little or nothing to do with what was being discussed and that being that the Principles of the Defence should be considered in every defensive instance or ignored in a counter insurgency setting.

My point was simply that they should always be considered... but with the rider (I borrowed from the introduction to that Brit doctrine pamphlet) "The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement."

I'm happy to leave it there... unless you want to put up the costs for a trip to Afghanistan (when it warms up) where we can discuss the matter further on the ground.

[BushrangerCZ]

Guys, I have no interest in breaking your discussion, but here is what makes me most wonder about today´s small teams composition:
What sense does it make to train and deploy, let´s say, army LRS teams, consisting of six soldiers, to A-stan, if they will never be allowed to leave the base in such a small number?

[Ken White]

What sense does it make to train and deploy, let´s say, army LRS teams, consisting of six soldiers, to A-stan, if they will never be allowed to leave the base in such a small number?

Really good. Embarrassing but good. Really embarrassing...

I await an answer from some serving senior Field Grade Officer on the board...

[82redleg]

Really good. Embarrassing but good. Really embarrassing...

I await an answer from some serving senior Field Grade Officer on the board...

I don't think I qualify as a senior field grade, but it doesn't make sense to me. I know a couple of people that had LRS-D or Pathfinder commands in OEF- I'll have to ask them their thoughts on operations.