Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
That I suppose should read "The Principles of the Defense should be being used."
No, it mean what it says. The 'Principles of Defense' have their place and should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended. They should never be slavishly followed because NO doctrine can be applicable to all situations.
My sole point was in contrast with what Wilf appeared to suggest and that was that the standard Principles of Defence are indeed always important in siting a defensive or base location whether at formation level or down to even platoon outposts and temporary bases. I maintain quite simply that the Principles of Defense are universal. I asked if the Principles of Defence don't apply, what does.
In order, as Wilf said "Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy." I agree with him, you do not. That's okay or should be. IMO, the METT-TC factors, properly or even improperly considered can lead to the omission of some principles, the modification of others and the inclusion of additional factors; flexibility and METT-TC being paramount as opposed to a rather slavish adherence to doctrine.

Such deviations will sometimes be determined on the ground, sometimes by higher echelons. Usually, they will work out well for all concerned, occasionally they will not. Sometimes that will be due to errors in the adaptations, sometimes due to other factors. The fact that it generally works out well is more important than the fact that it is not done by the book.
Yes it is generally understood that "the US Army has never done well at defense" and that this has not been taken into account in US military planning remains a mystery.
That's easy to answer, it's due to our far too strict adherence to the European model and a concomitant refusal to adapt our doctrine to our manpower predilections, insisting that the Troops must adapt to the model. The fact that they have never done so and unlikely to ever succumb is neatly overlooked by military 'scholars' as opposed to practitioners who adapt on the ground, generally successfully. Regrettably, the scholars write the books and are not about to let the unwashed review and change them...

As a possibly apocryphal story has it, the Germans in WW II were perplexed as they knew US Doctrine and sometimes had access to US plans but had to acknowledge "They never follow their doctrine or plan..."

I once complimented a Korean Officer for great performance by his unit. He said "Well, everything we do, you teach us. Why don't you do what you teach us to do?"

European Armies -- and the ROK Army -- are good and do what they should pretty well. The US Army is not too bad but it suffers from trying to emulate European TTP - the US soldier won't do much that European soldiers do automatically and will do some things rather differently. Our rather slavish adaptation of European military models means we use methods not always appropriate for the human material provided.
Not sure that all the blame can be moved upwards for what happens on the ground.
Of course it cannot. In the end analysis, errors are the responsibility of the level at which they are committed, so that portion of 'blame' remains there. However, the portion of 'blame' that accrues to the level of training and / or education of the persons involved most always defaults to ever higher levels. As does 'blame' for the culture of the Force -- are innovation and initiative encouraged or not? Sad answer for the US...
But...his answer is not relevant in the context of what was being discussed. Where does the measure of a base/outpost being overrun become the yardstick by which it is assessed whether the Principles of the Defence have been adhered to on the construction and development of a base or outpost?
It is true there is an apparent lack of relevance but if you examine it, think for a second and know Soldiers -- as you obviously do -- then it becomes apparent some relevance lies in the fact that no such overruns have occurred has led to complacency and complacency leads to sloppy performance. His second point, re 'directives,' is a burden all Soldiers have borne for centuries. My comment on the "Sandbag Castles" is reflective of that complacency and sloppiness as my "desired or directed' comment agrees with 82redleg's second point. There's relaevance there -- shouldn't be but there is...
Months ago I raised the issue of the futile construction and occupation of Beau Geste Forts...from which ISAF soldiers ventured out at the their peril (from IEDs and ambushes).
That was true then and still is today -- but only at some times and in some places. Afghanistan is too large, the enemy too varied and the rotation of Coalition troops (and their overshadowing of Afghan National Army troops) causes too many variations for any theme or seeming trend -- bad or good -- to be universally applicable.