The degree to which the Chevron and Total stakes in the Yabama pipeline "enable" the military regime is I think substantially exaggerated. It's appealing stuff for the knee-jerk anti-corporate crowd but the argument doesn't stand up to scrutiny. The pipeline exists, and the Thais are going to buy the gas in any event: they don't give a hot round one about human rights abuses in Burma. If Total and Chevron tried to influence the Burmese government they'd simply be forced to sell their stakes, which would be bought by Chinese or Thai interests and business would go on as usual. If Total and Chevron backed out the same would happen. If retrospectively, Total and Chevron had refused to build the pipeline, someone else would have. No shortage of oil companies in Russia and China willing and able to take on a project like that. Burma's energy reserves, and the willingness of the neighbors to buy the product, are enabling factors, but placing the blame on those contracted to build the infrastructure doesn't accomplish much.

I don't see how the Chinese are in any way "stuck" by current circumstances. The status quo is acceptable to them. They don't have a US or western ally on that part of their border. The disorder in Burma has no major adverse impact on them. Burma would not be a major market for Chinese goods in any event and an open Burmese economy could emerge as a competitor in industries demanding cheap labor. The Chinese will be perfectly happy to deal with what is. Like the Thais, they don't care about the human rights abuses, any more than they do in Angola, the DRC, or Sudan. They will develop energy resources and build pipelines no matter what anyone else thinks. Of course there's a risk that pipelines could be sabotaged during a rebellion, or that a new government could cancel existing deals and nationalize projects, but the Chinese are taking similar risks in many places and apparently see them as acceptable.

I could be mistaken, but a significant source of the Junta's revenue seems to flow from the gas pipeline. How feasible would a dedicated effort to sabotage the pipeline be? How would you describe or imagine the effect cycle of such a course of action? What about the assassination of military and civilian leadership, to include outside enablers of the regime? Would such activities be helpful or unhelpful?
You'd get some publicity by whacking the CEOs of Chevron and Total, but there wouldn't be much impact on Burma. You could certainly wreck the Burmese economy (in a loose sort of way I suppose you could call it an economy) by sabotaging energy projects, or create a leadership vacuum by killing officials... but really, who cares enough to bother? There would be all manner of legal implications and risks, and whose interests are sufficiently threatened by the status quo to take them? As in many other backwaters, Burma's leaders are protected largely by their nation's economic and strategic irrelevance: lots of people will preach and deplore, but at the end of the day nobody is willing to do something about it.