"Two examples of victory through isolating the insurgency are the Philippines Insurgency, or the Warsaw Ghetto Uprisings."

Rather, those are examples of two insurgencies that were effectively suppressed for a period of time. The conditions of insurgency were made worse in both cases, as such operations typically guilty of. Once the suppressive force is removed, the insurgency rapidly advances to its natural state.

As to "criminal insurgencies" I know that is used a great deal, and believe it is a dangerous conflation that focuses on the objective for definition rather than on the purpose for action. The reason this is dangerous is that knowing the objective does not suggest a cure for the problem; but understanding the purpose for action does.

What I am trying to do in my work is focus on separating these similar looking, or similar objective conflicts into more logical categories that are rooted in purpose for action.

So, if the purpose is criminal profit, it is not "insurgency" as I would define it, as it is not political even though the objective is control of the political system to enhance their criminal profits.

Power and profits are closely related. Some men are more about the power than the profit, some more about the profit than the power, but both men end up with a good dose of both and feed on both. This is not insurgency; as such men may well emerge in a society where the populace is generally satisfied and the governance is reasonably "good." The solution is as simple as taking out the one seeking power; or if power is based on some illegal market, taking away the illegal nature of the market.

If one is dealing with an insurgency, illegal politics by a populace living in conditions of poor governance, then one must address the aspects of governance that are fueling those conditions. To suppress such a movement is to merely delay the inevitable.