Criminal Insurgencies

[Mike Burgoyne]

I'm looking for some help identifying resolved "criminal insurgencies." I would define that as economically motivated non-political groups (narcos, pirates, gangs) that have successfully controlled significant terrain and gained significant autonomy from government control. I'm looking for lessons learned that could help in places like Guatemala and Mexico.

I think the Sicilian Mafia might be a good one. Perhaps Colombian actions against the Medellin and Cali cartels.

Thanks for any assistance

Mike

[MikeF]

I'm looking for some help identifying resolved "criminal insurgencies." I would define that as economically motivated non-political groups (narcos, pirates, gangs) that have successfully controlled significant terrain and gained significant autonomy from government control. I'm looking for lessons learned that could help in places like Guatemala and Mexico.

I think the Sicilian Mafia might be a good one. Perhaps Colombian actions against the Medellin and Cali cartels.

Thanks for any assistance

Mike

Mike,

First, I'd suggest that you get in touch with John P. Sullivan and Robert Bunker. I'll send you an email tomorrow with contact info.

Second,

I would define criminal insurgencies as economically motivated non-political groups (narcos, pirates, gangs) that USE VIOLENCE IN ORDER TO GAIN POWER TO successfully control terrain and gain autonomy from government control.

This definition fits Mexico and parts of modern Guatemala; however, the broader history of Guatemala ranging back to the post-WWII civil war is much more complex.

Mike

[GPaulus]

I'm looking for some help identifying resolved "criminal insurgencies." I would define that as economically motivated non-political groups (narcos, pirates, gangs) that have successfully controlled significant terrain....

We must understand the tenants of insurgencies. Inside these tenants are inherent differences between an insurgency, revolution and terrorism. Some experts will quickly say that insurgency, revolution and terrorism are inextricably linked. In doing so however, they would fail to recognize the consequence of this association. The three are only loosely connected but often each gains tremendous momentum when the language is used interchangeably.

An insurgency is a condition in which opportunistic groups organize to create chaos and disorder within their sphere of influence. They are self-serving and the population can be likened to the criminal gang and organized crime elements as opposed to terrorists or revolutionists. Insurgents exist because of a simple concept known as “Environmental Scarcity.” Some call it resource scarcity. Environmental Scarcity includes both scarcity of tangible resources and intangible society control including Rule of Law, Corruption and Legal Consequences.

As long as insurgents (organized criminal elements) run unabated they control the goods and services and everyone else including the government is marginalized within their sphere. And it is chaos that allows them to run free. The insurgency is almost always composed of men 18 to 45 year old. Although the "gang, family" have a central command and control, when the insurgency is large operating throughout the country, it will be composed of several "groups, families" and they will be decentralized from one another in their operations. From a one over the country view it looks like one big centralized operation but that is simply not the case.

Each group will operate locally within a small territorial range and recruit their fighters from local talent. When any one group gets too large, there will be internal violence, mass killings and rival rifts as members compete for upward mobility. An insurgents' cause is never an ideology or idealistic dogma, and therefore they will have the propensity to ebb and flow based on the 'winds" of the day and the targets of opportunity. Because they are not driven by a single ideology, members can quickly apostatize. This fact can be used as an important counter-insurgency weapon.

The insurgent is apolitical and PRIMAL in his motives as compared to terrorism or revolutionists. Insurgency war on the streets is not politically or religiously motivated. Notice how these statements fly in the face of the conventional war fighter’s paradigm proposed by Clausewitz, “War is the extension of politics by other means.”

If a word could describe insurgents, it is self-serving—power, money, lawlessness, food, freedom from oppression, survival, etc., and once spawned, their aim is protractedness; their aim is not to win. Simply stated, insurgencies are protracted because that provides the most utility to the insurgents; they are not protracted because it is an insurgency. Insurgents don’t have a goal of winning although they would not mind seeing their enemy fail. They win if the create chaos, fear and if the struggle continues to gain momentum. They will draw others criminal groups into the fray—that breeds more chaos. Finally, insurgency battles are small scale quick engagements that are executed locally within kilometers of their homes.

To support these assumptions let us look at the distance to insurgent attack scene from the insurgent’s home. An equation that predicts the probability that an attack is carried out by local insurgents of one group verses another is based on the exponential decay function. The probability of occurrence is approximated as: P(b) = A *e**-Bx Where A and B are empirical constants determined from data sets in the local area (generated from data from other incidents). As the distance X from the insurgent’s base increases, the less probable that this group committed it. Based on this, 90% of all insurgent attacks will occur within 15 km of their base of operation.

The insurgent acts locally without thinking globally. The terrorist in contrast is based on the terrorist’s commitment to violence as a small group (usually ranging in group size from few to less than one thousand members) in order to intimidate a population or government to cause their perceived fundamental change. The group size is limited by command and control capabilities. Their cause is ideological and political, based on group-actualization rather than self-serving. It is aimed at the establishment, not decapitated states. Terrorism however enjoys the freedom to operate unabated in failed states. Finally, rarely will anyone ever develop a counter- terrorist strategy to change this group’s apostasy. Their beliefs are so deeply held that they appear to the world as radical and extreme. Terrorists may or may not be highly trained and their operations are top driven and centralized from the command and control elements.

An interesting phenomenon occurs for insurgencies; they gain energy each time it is mistakenly associated with an ideological cause such as religion, oppression, Jihad, Al Qa’ida, etc. Nearly every time the insurgency will win the information warfare campaign because bad news is news. Again, it is an attempt to enrage others to carry the banner as this provides the utility necessary to support the insurgency’s need for protractedness. The greater the madness, the greater the chaos. And, the greater the chaos the more protracted the struggle.
There is a critical point to be made and that is isolating the insurgents. This is a sine qua non to victory. In Iraq for example, we restricted movement and isolated the insurgents using T-walls and this fact will probably never make the history books.

In cases where the conventional army has quelled an uprising, they were able to separate, segregate and isolate the enemy on the battlefield. This is an important tenant of counter-insurgency warfare and more often than not it is missed. Two examples of victory through isolating the insurgency are the Philippines Insurgency, or the Warsaw Ghetto Uprisings.

[Bob's World]

"Two examples of victory through isolating the insurgency are the Philippines Insurgency, or the Warsaw Ghetto Uprisings."

Rather, those are examples of two insurgencies that were effectively suppressed for a period of time. The conditions of insurgency were made worse in both cases, as such operations typically guilty of. Once the suppressive force is removed, the insurgency rapidly advances to its natural state.

As to "criminal insurgencies" I know that is used a great deal, and believe it is a dangerous conflation that focuses on the objective for definition rather than on the purpose for action. The reason this is dangerous is that knowing the objective does not suggest a cure for the problem; but understanding the purpose for action does.

What I am trying to do in my work is focus on separating these similar looking, or similar objective conflicts into more logical categories that are rooted in purpose for action.

So, if the purpose is criminal profit, it is not "insurgency" as I would define it, as it is not political even though the objective is control of the political system to enhance their criminal profits.

Power and profits are closely related. Some men are more about the power than the profit, some more about the profit than the power, but both men end up with a good dose of both and feed on both. This is not insurgency; as such men may well emerge in a society where the populace is generally satisfied and the governance is reasonably "good." The solution is as simple as taking out the one seeking power; or if power is based on some illegal market, taking away the illegal nature of the market.

If one is dealing with an insurgency, illegal politics by a populace living in conditions of poor governance, then one must address the aspects of governance that are fueling those conditions. To suppress such a movement is to merely delay the inevitable.

[Mike Burgoyne]

Thanks for the comments. I am aware of the problems with the term "criminal insurgency." I don't have a better term for it and I think John Sullivan and Adam Elkus make a compelling case for it. That being said I think the term causes real problems when coordinating with foreign nations.

I'm looking for examples of security problems that resemble the current crisis in Mexico and Guatemala by any name. For me that means violent, criminal, economically motivated groups that have successfully challenged the state and taken control of significant territory. We could call it a Big Organized Crime Situation or a Criminal Autonomous Movement or whatever term is most agreeable.

I'm looking for lessons learned on how other governments defeated these types of threats inthe past and how some of these lessons can be applied to current conflicts.

V/R

Mike

[Bob's World]

One example is the US: We repealed prohibition.

Another is Sierra Leone: The RUF seize the diamond mines and threaten the capital. The government attempts appeasement (granting legal ownership of the mines to the RUF, and making its leader the national VP), which failed, resulting in a Brit intervention to simply crush the criminals.

[Graycap]

I'm looking for some help identifying resolved "criminal insurgencies."

......

I think the Sicilian Mafia might be a good one.

.....

Thanks for any assistance

Mike

When you think about the Mafia as ae example of a "resolved" criminal insurgency you'd better specify that it has abandoned in 1993 the terrorist line of operation. But at huge cost for the legitimacy of the State.
After a string of terrorist actions a secret deal has been struck. The Italian State has partially abandoned the use of harsh detention (art. 41/bis) that the mafia so feared. Tha Mafia has reached his political objective with the use of force.

Today "Cosa Nostra" is not the most dangerous, insurgency wise, of the criminal organizations directly threathening the state control of territory and population.

The N'drangheta (in Calabria not in Sicily) is far more strong and rich.

One aspect to consider when we talk about this organizations is the relevance they attach to local control of the original territory even whenthe organization is spread around the world. Even when Mafia or N'Drangheta control billion of dollars in half of the world by the most technological means the leadership is always located very near to the original small town of origin and they doesn't accept any kind of interference in their homebases.

[slapout9]

I would suggest you think more in terms of "Crime Families" as opposed to Criminal Organizations or Insurgencies per say.

[Polarbear1605]

My opinion is your using a confusing term "Criminal Insurgencies". The resolution is in the necessary approach to the issue. Insurgencies are fought (or should be fought) using the Laws of War. Crime is fought using the Rules of Law. They are very different and get folks in a lot of trouble when you try and mix them with buzz words like "Criminal Insurgencies". It is either a crime or an insurgency. When you mix the approach there is a set of bagage that develops that works against what your trying to do at the strategic and tactical level.

[jmm99]

which means "I object to that statement - and, moreover, I strenuously object to that statement." The Great White Bear auditioned for Jessep's character in A Few Good Men, but Jack Nicholson won out.

That being said, I strenuously agree with this statement:

from GWB
The resolution is in the necessary approach to the issue. Insurgencies are fought (or should be fought) using the Laws of War. Crime is fought using the Rules of Law. They are very different and get folks in a lot of trouble when you try and mix them with buzz words like "Criminal Insurgencies". It is either a crime or an insurgency. When you mix the approach there is a set of baggage that develops that works against what your trying to do at the strategic and tactical level.

and, moreover, that mixture creates confusion (and some bad prosecutions) at the operational law level to boot.

That being said, a criminal organization can become enough of a threat to the political institutions and stability of a state that the government would be justified in enacting its constitutional equivalent of an AUMF (Authorization to Use Miliatary Force). Since the criminal organization is not a state, the "AUMF" would kick in the Laws of War that apply to irregular forces, including Common Article 3 of the 1949 GCs.

That legal analysis is based on the US Laws of War as interpreted by the DC Circuit, based on the SCOTUS plurality, in the Gitmo detainee cases. The EU (for example) would have a different take - e.g., "terrorism" and "terrorists" must be dealt with under the Rules of Law. Which way to go is really a policy question; and depends for its resolution on the specific circumstances then current in the country having the particular problem.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

I would just add that neither the requirement nor the authorization to employ "military force" against some party should automatically elevate the legal status of some situation to "war."

War comes with baggage that is best avoided, and is only triggered if the survival of the state is in question. Certainly the survival of the US state is not in question when it intervenes in the insurgency of another, so that is neither "war" nor "COIN," but is an intervention operation that could include a wide range of LOOs.

Similarly the State conduction COIN is typically not at "war" either, as the insurgent is as much a part of the state as the government is, but is engaged in illegal politics to compete for leadership of the state. It may get as violent as a war, but it is not war necessarily.

If, however, a third party conducts UW to incite and support said insurgency, then there may in fact be a state of war between the two states in question, but even that does not elevate the COIN operations against the supported nationalist insurgency to war. Wage war against the UW party, but conduct COIN as a civil emergency among one's own populace.

Out doctrine is a mess in this regards, and just dumps all of this inartfully into the "war" bucket, with predictably poor results.

[jmm99]

from BW
I would just add that neither the requirement nor the authorization to employ "military force" against some party should automatically elevate the legal status of some situation to "war."

has lost in the court where it counts (DC Circuit), which has followed the SCOTUS plurality in Boumedienne.

I've no problem with the power of the Legislative and Executive branches to join in an authorization to use military force against a designated violent non-state actor - and neither does the DC Circuit. That is the constitutional role of those branches - and it is a political question.

That being said, just because you have a hunting license does not mean that you have to kill everything in the forest. But, it is not up to the courts and lawyers to pontificate on the limits of wisdom and discretion granted the military under a constitutional AUMF.

Armed conflict under the Laws of War (Laws of Armed Conflict; International Humanitarian Law - to use all the terms) comes in many sizes and shapes. You, Bob, are taking the extreme existential case as the only permissible "war"; and thereby, seeking to limit the Laws of War to that.

In that, you are dead wrong. Of course, you can assert your beliefs until the cows come home or stray away; but that doesn't make them a winner.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

lol. Dead wrong in court? Perhaps.

Dead wrong as to the implications on our nation when we elevate every situation where we want the authorities to employ military force to one of "war"? I'm comfortable that that I am spot on in that regard. I really don't know or care what courts have held in this regard, I only state what I believe to be the realities of the matter.

Lawyers argue the facts and the law, and Judges interpret the law; but this is a matter of the implications of the law. Fact is, sometimes the law is wrong, and sometimes it's well intended but ignorant of the negative higher order effects.

What those operational lawyers (and congressmen) need to be working on is a way to give commanders the authorities they need to do their job without at the same time exposing the entire nation to unnecessary strategic risks associated with warfare.

[jmm99]

In truth, "every situation where we want the authorities to employ military force" can be, by definition of "military force", designated an "armed conflict" (formerly known as "war"). Not every "military operation" involves "military force"; and so, some military operations cannot involve an "armed conflict".

The major disconnects in our policies have come from a refusal to state openly what is going on in fact - the employment of military force - and, therefore, a situation of "armed conflict". Your arguments throughout this entire area are based on your own derivations from what you consider general principles. Sorry, but all of this is not science; it's art and general principles are at best a fuzzy outline, which must yield to the specifics of the given case.

The question of what "strategic risk" should be taken is up to the policy makers at that level. It sure as hell should not be up to some operational lawyer, no matter how brilliant or not.

Regards

Mike

[Mike Burgoyne]

One example is the US: We repealed prohibition.

Another is Sierra Leone: The RUF seize the diamond mines and threaten the capital. The government attempts appeasement (granting legal ownership of the mines to the RUF, and making its leader the national VP), which failed, resulting in a Brit intervention to simply crush the criminals.

I'm only wiki deep into this so please excuse my ignorance, but wasn't the RUF trying to overthrow the government?

[Mike Burgoyne]

When you think about the Mafia as ae example of a "resolved" criminal insurgency you'd better specify that it has abandoned in 1993 the terrorist line of operation. But at huge cost for the legitimacy of the State.
After a string of terrorist actions a secret deal has been struck. The Italian State has partially abandoned the use of harsh detention (art. 41/bis) that the mafia so feared. Tha Mafia has reached his political objective with the use of force.

Today "Cosa Nostra" is not the most dangerous, insurgency wise, of the criminal organizations directly threathening the state control of territory and population.

The N'drangheta (in Calabria not in Sicily) is far more strong and rich.

One aspect to consider when we talk about this organizations is the relevance they attach to local control of the original territory even whenthe organization is spread around the world. Even when Mafia or N'Drangheta control billion of dollars in half of the world by the most technological means the leadership is always located very near to the original small town of origin and they doesn't accept any kind of interference in their homebases.

Graycap:

Do you have any recommendations for reading on Cosa Nostra? This sounds a lot like discussions on Mexico regarding the 2012 election. Lots of folks are asking if the next government will make a deal with the DTOs. I tend to think the DTOs will drive a harder bargain now that they know they can challenge the state security forces.

Mike

[Bob's World]

I'm only wiki deep into this so please excuse my ignorance, but wasn't the RUF trying to overthrow the government?

"What" is interesting, but it is "Why" that determines what it is one is dealing with and how to resolve the problem.

RUF wanted control of the Diamonds. Money and Power. Not a political purpose, nor was it a movement the grew out of a base of popular support. So, in my book, not an insurgency. The government was an obstacle to deal with in that process.

So, going to the great conflation of Mexico and Columbia. In columbia, one had nationalist insurgent movements that got involved in the drug trade. In Mexico one has profit motivated drug cartels that are beginning to challenge government. Two completely different situations, that merely share similar factors. Columbia? Insurgency. Mexico? Criminal.

The nuance of causation and purpose is the most important thing. If all one can see is violence and conflict, then the result is applying the same old hammer to the same old nail. Not every problem is a nail.

[Graycap]

Graycap:

Do you have any recommendations for reading on Cosa Nostra?

Sorry Mike I'm italian and I haven't read anything written in english. For us it's something that you get to know by experience

BW wrote
...
The nuance of causation and purpose is the most important thing. If all one can see is violence and conflict, then the result is applying the same old hammer to the same old nail. Not every problem is a nail.

I agree that not every problem is a nail. But I thought that in this forum the question would be if the armed forces could get a role in countering criminal violence (even if we can't catalog them as insurgencies)

In Italy we have a long tradition of armed forces' (mis)use in combating organized crime. Organized crimethat has evolved his course of action when faced with the use of armed forces signalling that some kind of a role could exist.

We began in the years following unification (1861) when a full fledged insurgency was fought in southern Italy in a situation very similar to Iraq. From that suppressed insurrection the Mafia was born as Criminal organization used by land owners.

We had ten of thousands of soldiers flooding Sicily in the 90's after the terrorist actions of 1992-93.

Today we have to guard the building machinery used to construct an highway in the south (Calabria) that are constantly burned by N'drangheta who wants total control of building business.

It's obvious that military can't kill the way out of organized crime. But can they help? Or using military force could backfire (as in Mexico) rushing toward definitive collapse if force is used but demonstrates itself unsufficient?

In Italy my impression is that we used military force not for their coercive power but just like an information warfare tool. When criminal leadership receive the message they get in touch with political power and they reach some kind of agreement.

But this get the situation worse and worse.
Today even the doctors of some hospitals are nominated by criminal gangs.
When your son dies for a stupid disease because the doctor is incompetent that is a desperate situation. And the collapse of any meaningful "State".

[Bob's World]

No question that when there are those acting illegally and violently there is almost always room for a bit of "hammering" by state security forces. Where we get in trouble is if we don't fully appreciate the type of problem we are hammering on, and what role that hammering is going to play in moving toward an overall solution.

[slapout9]

Go to the link provided and scroll down to "International Crime Threat Assessment" for 12/2000. Long and detailed paper but it goes into a lot of the problems with gangs,globalization and there connection to extremist movements and insurgencies. It is a long paper and very detailed but worth the read IMO. Some of the stuff in the papaer I have been saying for years never the CIA paid any attention to me joke...just a joke guys.




http://www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp?p...cord=Top25.txt


I don't like the term but it sounds like 4GW!