Egypt's Spring Revolution (2011-2013)

[CrowBat]

The 1950s were a long time ago; things change.

Yes, they change, but then, the 1950s was just an observation for the point in time at which this friendship began. I'm sure you're going to agree that long-lasting friendships are of far higher quality than short ones (and that we're both beyond the age of enjoying one-night-stands ;-))?

The idea that Saddam was a "US ally" during the Iran/Iraq war is a fairly common misconception, but it is definitely wrong.

This "misconception" was actually disproved during the recent Reappraising the Iran-Iraq War Thirty Years Later Conference in London. Surely enough, evidence of Saddam advising the US (and receiving any sort of "blessing" from the DC) about his intention to launch an invasion on Iran, in September 1980, is still of rather circumstantial nature (well, he at least informed the Saudis and received their blessing, and there is little doubt the Saudis kept this info away from the DC). But the rest is meanwhile beyond doubt.

US policy then was effectively that neither side should be allowed to gain a decisive victory. There was never any illusion about Saddam being on our side or protecting anyone from Iranian imperialism...

We're again at discussing the official and unofficial stances. Yes, the official US stance was "it would be good if both of them could lose that war". Unofficial stance was: "Let's help Saddam keep the Iranian extremists busy" - with the repercussion of fastening exactly the same extremists in Iran in power.

The idea that Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks, based on wildly distorted out of context excerpts from a diplomatic meeting.

Ken answered this better than I ever could. Note that all the Iraqi generals that I interviewed meanwhile replied the same. Surely, everybody is free to call this "just another Iraqi conspiracy theory", but to me they seemed quite firmly convinced about this and certainly not thinking about this affair as any kind of "fantasy". (Indeed, I'll admit that "my" expression "Kuwait business" is actually exactly what I've heard from several retired Iraqi generals.)

You're right, Dayuhan (in your latest post), that Saddam was certainly no "diplomatic virgin". On the contrary. Alone from the studies of the Iran-Iraq War we can see that he knew very well how to (mis)use the diplomacy for his own purposes (a good example was when he used a member of the Qatari royal family to launch rumours that an Iranian F-14 pilot is about to defect to Iraq - in order to curb the IRIAF F-14 ops over the Khark and enable an IrAF offensive against that island, in summer 1985). But exactly that was the problem in this situation: because he was so good at this business, he understood Gilespy's statement as "no problem, go ahead".

Obviously Iran was not going to have any complaint about US action against Saddam Hussein, or against a regime in Afghanistan heavily influenced by Wahhabi and Deobandi theology and ISI support, none of which are terribly sympathetic to the Shi'a.

Agreed.

Ask yourself: what exactly does Iran as a nation, or the Iranian people, gain from Iranian support for Hezbollah, or from the Iranian nuclear program, or from the constant decades-old deluge of frantic anti-US and anti-Israeli rhetoric?

I went a step further and asked quite a number of Iranians. Their answers were as follows:
a) What does Iran gain from support for Hezbollah?
The same the US expected to gain from fighting Taliban in Afghanistan: keeping the opposition busy - and that away from its own turf.

b) What does Iran gain from its nuclear program?
B.1.) Sustainable and durable solution for providing energy for its oil/gas-export "triade", which is currently gulping immense amounts of power due to its dependence on entirely obsolete electric engines that are running its pumps (required to pump oil and gas over hundreds of kilometres of Iranian mountains and under the sea to such loading places like Khark, Sirri etc.);
B.2) Sustainable and durable solution for power supply required by its industrial and scientific development; and
B.3) Sustainable and durable solution for providing power required due to the population growth.

c) What does Iran gain from its frantic anti-US and anti-Israeli rhetoric?
Exactly the same US and Israel gain from their anti-Iranian rhetoric. Having enemies of that kind is good for the economy [well, at least the defence sector; my observation] and can be used for all possible practical purposes on the domestic as well as the international scene.

(And, please, don't blame the messenger.)

Iran gains nothing, but the regime gains the kind of permanent enemies that justify its existence. Without permanent enemies the regime might find its repression, corruption, and staggering economic mismanagement subject to more attention than they already get.

...I most sincerely hope you are aware of the fact, that from the standpoint of a great deal of the "US-enemies", this works exactly the other way too?

I.e. "Without permanent enemies, the US government might find its support for repressive and corrupt regimes in the Middle East a subject to more attention that they already get".

Obviously the Iranian regime will not complain if the US acts in their interests (as in Iraq), but they will always find reasons to keep the hate going. They need to.

And vice-versa. The problem is: we all know that the Iranians are ruled by a mercilessly brutal regime. A significant segment of the Iranian society knows this as well (and the part that doesn't, doesn't care about the regime's foreign policy the least). Correspondingly, they meanwhile need no foreign enemies to use for keeping themselves in power.

Why does the US need to demonize Iran, while at the same time are best friends and closest allies of such oppressive regimes like those in Saudi Arabia, UAE - or like Mubarak's was?