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Thread: Egypt's Spring Revolution (2011-2013)

  1. #261
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Default We should all try to be nice, really...

    But this:

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    a)
    GDP growth was way bigger than population growth.
    That's a real world fact and easily accessible.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy...ypt#Reform_era : Economic growth p.a. about 5%
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demogra...on_growth_rate : Population growth p.a. about 2%
    has little bearing on the matter under discussion. Higher GDP does not necessarily translate into higher disposable income for the average Egyptian or higher capacity to buy food. It also doesn't necessarily translate into higher government revenues and thus higher capacity to subsidize wheat imports.

    What we do see beyond doubt is that while Egypt's wheat imports fluctuate, the trend is steadily up, and while the world wheat prices fluctuate, the trend is also steadily up. That means the slice of Egypt's government revenue devoted to subsidized wheat imports has steadily increased (of course you realize that total trade deficit and government budget deficit are very different things). That means either pulling money from other parts of the budget or increasing government revenue or going deeper into debt, all of which pose difficulties of their own. Regardless of GDP and population, it's fairly clear that the cost of subsidized wheat imports to the Egyptian government had reached a level that made it impossible to avoid passing the increase on to consumers.

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    A thirty-year one-man dictatorship was overdue. We need no facebook, wheat imports or other fashionable (Malthus is apparently never out of fashion!) explanations for Mubarak's demise.
    Undoubtedly true, but these events do have triggers, and economic events can be triggers.

    Egypt's inflation rates have been very high, well outstripping average personal income: almost 12% in 2010, over 18% in 2009. That's 30% in 2 years, and that tends to piss people off. Unemployment remains high, and overall population growth is less an issue than a large demographic bulge of young people entering the job market at a time when jobs are scarce.

    Throw a steep sudden increase in staple food prices in on top of that and you turn incipient trouble into actual trouble.

    In any event my previous comment was less on the role of food prices in sparking the uprising than on the potential impact of food prices on transition frustration. The people will want the government to make prices drop. Of course government's capacity to do this is limited, but that's not widely understood. This needs to be considered by economic policymakers and the multilateral bodies that set conditions for the loans and other assistance that a transition government will need. Subsidy structures will need to be dismantled, but trying to eliminate them all at once is likely to have a devastating political impact on what will already be a shaky government.
    Last edited by Dayuhan; 02-15-2011 at 12:25 AM.

  2. #262
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Did anyone predict what happened in Egypt? Not that I'm aware of. Emergent phenomena cannot be predicted except through guesswork.

    And yes, intelligence comes with a lot of opportunity for failure and it is (or should be) a humbling profession.

    I personally have never much liked the CIA, but I won't deny them their successes. If you aren't aware of any, then I suggest you read any of Jeffrey Richelson's books on the agency and intelligence community.
    What? You can't even provide one success the CIA have had? That's sad.

    As I recall, Iraq and Afghanistan didn't exactly turn out as expected and, given the state of the USA, I doubt the American people will support similar invasions elsewhere - even if one believes such invasions are necessary and appropriate given the threat posed by AQ. Maybe it's different where you live, but here I think the idea that invading countries with large conventional forces to rout out terrorist organizations is pretty much bankrupt.
    Well whatever you think it happened before and may well be likely to happen again.

    And all this brings us back to the point that IMHO the US would be better served by cutting back on the incompetent CIA and the State department drastically than doing same to a military currently involved in two wars. The military cuts can come later.

  3. #263
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    Well, on one hand....if we go into the details of the US-Saddam relationship, the situation is even worse, since this relationship started with him on the "Company's" pay-list. So, if we discuss this relationship that precisely, and suppose that there are no lasting friendships in diplomacy, then we also ought to conclude that there are very much lasting friendships in "intelligence" (even if this is limited to paid assassinations).
    The "paid assassinations" stuff sounds very exciting in a Robert Ludlum sort of way, but I honestly don't know what you're trying to say here.

    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    On the other hand: would you use the same analogy about lasting friendships in the case US - KSA?
    Alliances last while both parties perceive them to be in their interests. There is no reason for them to last any longer or to be based on anything else.

    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    Would you like to say that all the US "special friendships", are lies?
    Certainly allies lie to each other. So do non-allies. It's part of diplomacy, and it's expected. The alliances still endure if they are in the perceived interests of both parties.

    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    I implied they were informed in time about Saddam's intentions (I would like somebody to tell me that the Saudis are not informing their "business partners" in the US when somebody tells them he's going to invade one of their neighbours) - yet did nothing at all to stop him.
    Who knew, believed, or suspected what and when they knew, believed, or suspected it are generally matters of speculation, and allegations not supported by credible citations don't really mean very much.

    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    if the situation is as you present it, the US has no and is not attempting to influence whoever or whatsoever; its diplomacy is entirely concentrating on innocent commerce; there are no special "relationships" (neither of diplomatic nor of personal nature) and especially no connections to local despots based on any kind of common interests against the "subjects" of these same despots and even less so against other governments that refuse to have their foreign- and domestic affairs dictated by the DC (which is impossible any way, since DC is never dictating anybody how to behave)....
    The US has some influence. It varies according to where, when, and with whom dealings are taking place. Sometimes it is substantial. Often it is minimal. Sometimes it is nonexistent. Efforts to exert influence are often not successful. The US is influenced as often as it influences, and manipulated as often as in manipulates (probably more often). Influence is not control.

    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    Once again, Ken described this in a very nice fashion. I do not ask you to agree with that, but you'll at least have to accept the fact that the people in the Middle East - and in this case: people who used to have leading positions in Iraq - see the situation differently than you do.
    Some see it differently, some do not. In both cases memories may be colored by self-interest. I find it perfectly plausible that Saddam told people he had US approval, but the idea that someone of his experience could orchestrate a meeting in which a diplomat could say nothing of significance and then assign significance to anything she said is outside credibility. If Saddam believed the US would tolerate an invasion, it would not have been a consequence of anything April Glaspie said during that meeting.

    You might perhaps argue that Saddam misinterpreted American statements and believed he had "permission" to invade Kuwait. That can't be proven one way or another. Claiming that he actually was given permission is, as previously stated, a load of bollocks.

    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    there is no chance of anything of that kind - since all such proposals start with conditions. Is their standpoint that unless somebody starts to treat them as an equal partner, they are not ready to any kind of concessions,
    It's not just the USA, it's practically everybody, certainly everybody in the neighborhood. Nobody, anywhere, believes that the Iranian nuclear program is not weapons-oriented. Nobody in the region trusts the Iranian government with a bomb or wants to see them with one. That range and persistence of mistrust is not US-generated and cannot be separated from the choices, policies, and behaviour of the Iranian government. A rational government would accept the deals on offer, modify policy and official statements to build trust, and work from there. The existing government prefers to pursue a confrontational approach. That's their choice, for their own purposes, and the consequences of that choice are on them.

    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    You can't expect the Iranians to even think about not providing US$100 Million or so to Hezbollah every year, while the US is providing 400 Million to various Iranian oppositional groups (particularly those renown as "terrorists" in the IRI) and who knows how many Billions to various other of their enemies
    The figures require citation; $400 million seems unlikely to me. Still, when you choose confrontation, you make enemies. That has consequences. The consequences can be reversed, but only if you change your policies.

    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    Why do the oil-producing countries have to get on with the West, first of all?
    They don't have to get on with the west. It's a free choice. I just pointed out that those who have chosen to get on with the west (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE) have gotten on rather better than those that have chosen hysterical confrontation (Iran, Libya, Saddam's Iraq).

    "Getting on with the west" is really pretty easy. You don't have to change your form of government, embrace western ways, compromise your own interests. It's not all that easy to turn the US, the west, or the neighbors into outright enemies, but if you really try you can do it. It's generally not in the interests of a nation, though it is sometimes in the interests of a regime.

    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    Now, before I come to my next question, let me first observe that I am aware of the fact that a large part of "academic" West (I'll not even try to discuss the Western politicians) has immense problems of understanding alone how the IRI functions as a state, not to talk about how the government there functions. And, obviously, this is a topic that could easily "gulp" 10-15 threads each of which would be three times as large as this one, only in order to properly explain. So, let me try to (roughly) summarize the situation there as a "rule of consensus in a chaos of self-governing"...

    While I'll always be the first to observe that this reverse at the top of the IRI was primarily related to an internal power struggle going on already since the lat 1980s, I can't but add that this development was directly influenced by the behaviour of the Bush admin too - i.e. this "business only, nothing personal" policy - and this because not only a few voices emerged in Tehran concluding, "You see, we can't cooperate and even less so depend upon them" (the US). This is what I've heard with my own ears from several persons there that really can't be described as "not important".

    So please be so kind and patient and explain me: if it is so as you say, and the US is interested to work with governments that are willing to work with the US, and the IRI admin of Khatami proved willing not only to work with the US, but fully support its "business" (since this was all on purely commercial basis, right?) in the neighbourhood, if there were strong and undisputable common interests, and this has always been that way, and there was no change of US admins in between (and thus there should have been no change in US foreign policy either)... then what was the logic of the Bush admin turning its policy towards an actually friendly IRI admin for 180°, at the spot, in around 2003-2004?

    Was there some kind of disagreement over commercial deals?
    It's really not that difficult to engineer a situation that allows you to get all wounded and resentful and proclaim "see, we can't trust them". It's usually accomplished by giving a little with one hand while the other is up to something very different, and then discussing only what the hand that gave a little is doing. Cherrypicking events that support contentions is easy to do: torture history enough and it will tell you whatever you want to hear.

    Not saying that the US bears no responsibility for the state of its relations with Iran, but Iran doesn't just have problems with the US... and any time you're not getting along with anybody, looking at your own behaviour is a good place to start. At root, Iran's isolation and the general suspicion of the government's motives and plans trace back to their own choices, statements, and actions.

    Thank you for your offer to Explain Everything; omniscience must be terribly reassuring. When it comes to "what I've heard with my own ears from several persons there that really can't be described as "not important", I have to comment that name-dropping is rarely convincing or impressive, especially when it's nameless. I also get the feeling that my own statements are being deliberately misinterpreted.

    I'm done with this one, have the last word...
    Last edited by Dayuhan; 02-15-2011 at 04:27 AM.

  4. #264
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    @Dayuhan:

    I responded to this

    The problem was that economic growth in Egypt was insufficient to cover the cost of patronizing the fast-growing population.
    5 % > 2 % => economic growth was not insufficient.

    Export growth was probably insufficient, income distribution was probably insufficient - but neither of those is the same as economic growth.

    My reply had thus a bearing on the matter under discussion because I corrected a contribution to said discussion that I consider to be wrong.

  5. #265
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    @Dayuhan:

    I responded to this



    5 % > 2 % => economic growth was not insufficient.

    Export growth was probably insufficient, income distribution was probably insufficient - but neither of those is the same as economic growth.

    My reply had thus a bearing on the matter under discussion because I corrected a contribution to said discussion that I consider to be wrong.
    Ok granted... I didn't read the post responded to thoroughly enough, and it was inaccurate as phrased. I suspect the deficiency was more a lack of precision than a lack of substance.

    While economic growth per se may not have been a major factor, government's inability to sustain the massive wheat subsidy certainly was, and the widespread perception of an entitlement to cheap bread is going to be a significant issue that subsequent governments will have to address.

  6. #266
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Approval isn't really the point, nor is what he believed...

    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    Some see it differently, some do not. In both cases memories may be colored by self-interest. I find it perfectly plausible that Saddam told people he had US approval, but the idea that someone of his experience could orchestrate a meeting in which a diplomat could say nothing of significance and then assign significance to anything she said is outside credibility.
    It may be outside the credibility of you and I, even of most in the west. It is not outside the credibility of many in the ME.
    If Saddam believed the US would tolerate an invasion, it would not have been a consequence of anything April Glaspie said during that meeting.
    Nor is Glaspie the point other than the fact that an Arabist who doesn't understand Arab customs is somewhat of a waste and that's the factor which caused me to intrude on your conversation...
    ...Claiming that he actually was given permission is, as previously stated, a load of bollocks.
    While that may be true to you and to most in the west, it is not to most in the ME. However, you can of course ignore that and them. Unfortunately, I'm pretty sure most western governments should not do so else they'll likely make the same sorts mistakes in the area. And that is not a load of bollocks...

    Nothing the US did led Saddam to attack Kuwait, however, a lot of things the US did not do out of ignorance and arrogance aided and abetted the launching of that attack.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    5 % > 2 % => economic growth was not insufficient.

    Export growth was probably insufficient, income distribution was probably insufficient - but neither of those is the same as economic growth.

    My reply had thus a bearing on the matter under discussion because I corrected a contribution to said discussion that I consider to be wrong.
    @Fuchs, I guess my post was too short to be clear.

    In my post I stated: "The problem was that economic growth in Egypt was insufficient to cover the cost of patronizing the fast-growing population."

    As you said, economic growth in Egypt was about 5% and population growth about 2%. However, 2% growth in population does not mean that the cost of patronizing the population increases by 2%. Egypt uses subsidies to keep the bread price low. Roughly speaking, the cost of maintaining these subsidies depends on the amount of bread a person eats (unchanged), multiplied by the cost of wheat (rising) and multiplied by the number of people who depend on subsidized bread (rising at a higher rate than population growth). The reason why the percentage of people who depend on subsidized bread rises is that when the price of unsubsidized bread increases, more people will buy subsidized rather than unsubsidized bread.

    In summary, the rising costs of patronizing the population was CAUSED by population growth, but it increased at a much HIGHER RATE than population growth.

  8. #268
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Nor is Glaspie the point other than the fact that an Arabist who doesn't understand Arab customs is somewhat of a waste and that's the factor which caused me to intrude on your conversation...
    True enough... but Glaspie could have been Bernard Lewis and Lawrence of Arabia rolled into one and it wouldn't have mattered. She wasn't making policy, she was only communicating it. In the absence of any authorized communication she couldn't have said anything other than what she said. If she had been an Arabist she might have given other advice to DC, but since it would almost certainly have been ignored, it wouldn't matter much. At best she could have told DC that she believed the threat of invasion was serious and that it could be aborted by a threat of forceful response. How DC might have responded is not of course knowable.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    While that may be true to you and to most in the west, it is not to most in the ME. However, you can of course ignore that and them. Unfortunately, I'm pretty sure most western governments should not do so else they'll likely make the same sorts mistakes in the area. And that is not a load of bollocks...
    Known policies combined with the metronomic predictability of diplomatic templates make it very easy to engineer conditions in which statements will be made that can later be deliberately turned into something they are not. That's not misinterpretation, that's a con... in this case a very successful one. Saddam set up a situation in which statements would be made that could later be sold as something they were not... I see no reason to assume that was coincidence.

    It's true that the US walked into it, but the methods and conventions of diplomacy are inherently vulnerable to this kind of manipulation. I can't think of any easy or simple way to change that, certainly not without all kinds of potential for equally difficult problems.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Nothing the US did led Saddam to attack Kuwait, however, a lot of things the US did not do out of ignorance and arrogance aided and abetted the launching of that attack.
    Certainly true, but a good deal more evident with hindsight than at the time. It's also not certain that the road not taken would have led to another place: as always, that's speculative.

    The comment that I made at the start referred to the idea that the US "gave permission" knowingly and intentionally in pursuit of some devious purpose.

  9. #269
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    The "paid assassinations" stuff sounds very exciting in a Robert Ludlum sort of way, but I honestly don't know what you're trying to say here.
    - That there was a "special relationship" between Saddam and the CIA since the late 1950s, as can be read - for example - in Regime Change: How the CIA put Saddam's Party in Power, and then here, here, here etc.

    Alliances last while both parties perceive them to be in their interests. There is no reason for them to last any longer or to be based on anything else.
    No doubt, but no answer to my question, which was if you would use the same analogy about "no lasting friendships in diplomacy, only lasting interests" - for the relationship between the US and the KSA?

    Certainly allies lie to each other. So do non-allies. It's part of diplomacy, and it's expected. The alliances still endure if they are in the perceived interests of both parties.
    Again, I asked a very specific question: would you like to say that all the US "special friendships", are lies?

    Explanations like yours make me wonder about your standpoint regarding another, very similar, though more recent affair: how would you describe Emir of Kuwait's decision to introduce constitutional monarchy in his country, after this was liberated - by a US-led coalition (pure accident, of course) - in 1991? An absolute monarch woke up one Friday morning and said, "Ah, I feel like introducing a parliament today"? Or "could it be" the US played a role in that affair (too)? Perhaps you would also kindly explain what kind of influence is required in order to impose such a decision upon an absolute ruler of any country? A "little bit or influence", or perhaps some "dictate" after all?

    Who knew, believed, or suspected what and when they knew, believed, or suspected it are generally matters of speculation, and allegations not supported by credible citations don't really mean very much.
    Please, don't twist my words. I did not say "believed" or "suspected": Saddam's visit to the Saudi King in September 1980 and the topics discussed during that meeting have been widely reported, back then and several times ever since. Only somebody who never heard about this would come to the idea to explain this for "believed" or "suspected".

    The US has some influence. It varies according to where, when, and with whom dealings are taking place. <snip>... Influence is not control.
    The quantity might varry (in terms of manner in which the "influence" was exercised, particularly finances and people involved), but the quality not. Successive US administrations have exercised strong influence, and were often directly involved, upon/in almost every important development in the Middle East ever since the WWII. The US has not only "some" influence, and discussing "influence" in relation to "control" is actually pointless, at best a lame excuse: the US influence is usually crucial for the developments at hand, regardless if these are related to provision of support that saved the rule of al-Sauds or establishment of Israel in spite of Arab resistance in the 1940s; Op Ajax in Iran of 1953 and several coup attempts in Iraq and Syria of the 1960s; forcing the British, French and the Israelis to abandon their aggression on Egypt in 1956, etc., etc., etc.

    The US involvement in all these and plenty of other events was no "accident", not based on "some" influence and even less so "only" on some sort of "(innocent) commercial interest" but on a complex system of "special relationships" between the US establishment and various local "factors" (persons, groups, organisations etc.) - and it definitely shaped the Middle East as we know it today. Again; I'm not "blaming" the USA: any other power in the same position would do exactly the same. But, this does not mean the USA are "not doing it".

    For all these reasons, it's next to pointless in insisting the US have no influence upon Mubarak (or the Egyptian military) in recent developments in Egypt.

    They have and this is a matter of fact. I might have a problem in properly summarizing this process; I definitely left out plenty of other examples; and it would surely take me awfully long to provide "appropriate" citations (particularly those you might like and/or accept) for everything I said above. But this is not making my conclusion less truth.

    Some see it differently, some do not. In both cases memories may be colored by self-interest. I find it perfectly plausible that Saddam told people he had US approval, but the idea that someone of his experience could orchestrate a meeting in which a diplomat could say nothing of significance and then assign significance to anything she said is outside credibility. If Saddam believed the US would tolerate an invasion, it would not have been a consequence of anything April Glaspie said during that meeting.

    You might perhaps argue that Saddam misinterpreted American statements and believed he had "permission" to invade Kuwait. That can't be proven one way or another. Claiming that he actually was given permission is, as previously stated, a load of bollocks.
    I am not supposing (like you do), and I do not argue about misinterpretations: I am telling you what the Iraqis that played a role in this affair told me.

    BTW, don't you think it's at least "weird" you complain that I "know, believe or suspect" in one instance only to do exactly the same a moment later?

    It's not just the USA, it's practically everybody, certainly everybody in the neighborhood. Nobody, anywhere, believes that the Iranian nuclear program is not weapons-oriented....
    We can now also enter discussions about the Iranian nuclear program, and I'd then probably surprise you with my assessment that they not only have several (disassembled) nukes but also with evidence of their doctrine for such weapons. However, this is not the point.

    The point is that you do the same like successive US administrations and prefer to ignore the fact that the Iranians a) attempted to cooperate with the US in recent times, b) have offered negotiations on several opportunities, yet did not receive any kind of serious, dependable answers in return (only threats and conditions - all issued via the media), and c) that their standpoint is that unless somebody starts to treat them as an equal partner they are not ready to any kind of concessions.

    Obviously, you are - exactly like the US administration - free to continue ignoring the Iranian standpoints. But at least you could inform yourself about the recent history of US-Iranian relations in a better fashion - in order to obtain a complete picture: insisting on anti-Iranian paroles doesn't make you right, nor can you expect that such standpoints are likely to result in any kind of change of standpoints on the other side.

    The figures require citation; $400 million seems unlikely to me.
    I see now: there is a "deficit of information" after all... here you are:

    - George W Bush 'raised $400 million for action against Iran'
    - CIA has Distributed 400 Million Dollars Inside Iran to Evoke a Revolution

    BTW, related projects are not only going on since 2007, but at least since 2003, and they include even provision of support to organisations labelled as "terrorist" in the USA (i.e. listed as such by the FBI):
    - U.S. protects Iranian opposition group in Iraq
    - U.S. Funding Armed Groups to Overthrow Iranian Government: Author
    - Scandal over US-supported Sunni insurgents in Iran
    - U.S. Support for the Iranian Opposition...

    Perhaps you can help me a little bit further: I am yet to find a report that any of related operations were closed, or funding ceased.

    Still, when you choose confrontation, you make enemies.
    But how did the Iranians "chose confrontation" when they cooperated with the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq, in 2001-2004 period?

    It's really not that difficult to engineer a situation that allows you to get all wounded and resentful and proclaim "see, we can't trust them".
    I'm sorry, but this is no answer to my question. I asked what was the logic of the Bush admin turning its policy towards an actually "friendly" IRI admin for 180°, at the spot, in around 2003-2004? How comes that the Iranians should have "engineered a situation" in that case: do their decision makers sit in the White House, Capitol or Pentagon?

    Thank you for your offer to Explain Everything; omniscience must be terribly reassuring... <snip>... I also get the feeling that my own statements are being deliberately misinterpreted.
    This comes from the same person that declared me for a "conspiracy theorist", that can't answer even 50% of my questions but says I offered to "explain everything" - and then just a sentence or two before explaining it's your statements that are "deliberately misinterpreted"?

    Interesting, no doubt.

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    Default The Case That Egypt Diminishes AQ

    http://blogs.reuters.com/bernddebusm...w-to-al-qaeda/

    If you like backhanded swipes at Ma Clinton, it's there.

    Conclusion:

    So, it is reassuring to know that America’s top spy, James Clapper, sees the link between the Muslim Brotherhood gaining political space and the adverse effect that would have on al Qaeda. “With respect to what’s going on in Egypt,” he told a House Intelligence Committee hearing, “there is potentially a great opportunity here to come up with a counter-narrative to al Qaeda.
    Yes, I know that Clapper's head is being called for by the usual suspects.

    ------------------

    As to phrasing the Iranian argument in terms of their "nuclear threat", geez, isn't this The Second Time As Farce? What, no Niger purchases?
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-15-2011 at 08:32 AM. Reason: Citation in quotes

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Marc View Post
    The reason why the percentage of people who depend on subsidized bread rises is that when the price of unsubsidized bread increases, more people will buy subsidized rather than unsubsidized bread.

    In summary, the rising costs of patronizing the population was CAUSED by population growth, but it increased at a much HIGHER RATE than population growth.

    I also showed that even at the peak of the wheat price, wheat imports were still a tiny fraction of overall imports, even a small fraction of the trade balance deficit.

    The whole focus on wheat / bread is wrong.

  12. #272
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I also showed that even at the peak of the wheat price, wheat imports were still a tiny fraction of overall imports, even a small fraction of the trade balance deficit.

    The whole focus on wheat / bread is wrong.
    The percentage of overall imports is not relevant: most imports are not paid for by the government. The relevant statistic would be the percentage of government funds spent on wheat imports, and (more important) the rate at which that spending was increasing. The issue is the government's capacity to import - at government expense - wheat for subsidized distribution. This expense was unquestionably increasing, and the volatility of wheat prices must have made budgeting a nightmare: how do you budget for the purchase of 6 million tons of wheat every year when you don't know what it will cost from week to week?

    30% inflation in two years, driven largely by steep increases in the price of staple foods, unquestionably played a part in pushing public anger to the breaking point. The next government will unquestionably be judged largely on its ability to reverse that trend, which it will not be able to do without a period of subsidy.

    The comment I started this with was that while eliminating subsidies is good economics, doing it too quickly can generate huge disaffection at a time when a political transition is very fragile. I think it's a valid point. Prices of staples do make a difference.

  13. #273
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    You budget for purchasing wheat just like any trader in a volatile market does. That should be outright simple for a dictator.


    There's furthermore no great difference between private imports and state imports. The greatest difference is that the state can use the foreign cash reserves of the central bank.

    30% inflation is still something different than to lack economic growth.

  14. #274
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Not really.

    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    ...How DC might have responded is not of course knowable.
    Umm, with ignorance and arrogance???
    ... I see no reason to assume that was coincidence.
    Nor do I. Nor do most in the ME -- it's just that their version differs radically from ours. That fact is my point in this sub thread and I wouldn't beat on it if it weren't terribly important.
    It's true that the US walked into it, but the methods and conventions of diplomacy are inherently vulnerable to this kind of manipulation. I can't think of any easy or simple way to change that, certainly not without all kinds of potential for equally difficult problems.
    Agree to an extent but do believe a bit less arrogance -- not terribly difficult -- and erasure of much ignorance by simply listening to people who've been there and know the culture -- also not all that difficult. It can be easily changed, all that's needed is an attitude adjustment and a realization that the sun does not rise and set in the US alone...
    Certainly true, but a good deal more evident with hindsight than at the time. It's also not certain that the road not taken would have led to another place: as always, that's speculative.
    In reverse order. True and not so (that's my "Not really"). A number of folks with some mid eastern experience were warning of the foolishness at the time (the entire Iraqi - Saddam - Khomeini - Iran series of fiascos over 20+ years from the mid-60s forward) but they were blithely ignored as were their predecessors with respect to SE Asia in the early 60s and their successors in the post 2000 period...

    There are always unknown unknowns, etc. but a lot of our problem is not such unknowns, it is willful, blind discarding of sound advice due to domestic political considerations being accorded greater precedence in decision making. It's also partly due to such appointments as Holbrook (I was not a fan of the guy who deliberately set up the almost criminal farce that was Dayton...) and Grossman as "Special Envoys" for 'Af-Pak.' No good came of the first guy and I'll be amazed if the second does better.

    All of which is tied to an extent to the fact that the ME operates on a different schedule and program to the west. Failure to accommodate or account for those differences has killed a tremendous number of people. Unnecessarily...

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    Default Tiny fractions

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I also showed that even at the peak of the wheat price, wheat imports were still a tiny fraction of overall imports, even a small fraction of the trade balance deficit.

    The whole focus on wheat / bread is wrong.
    Fuchs, ok, I understand what you are saying.

    I think this is the right time for a compairison. Egypt's overall trade deficit is about $23 bn. The 8 million tons of wheat that Egypt imports each year represents a trade volume $3.5 bn or 7% of overall imports. According to you, this is but a tiny fraction. Therefore, it cannot be an important factor in the current Egyptian situation.

    Let us take a look at these figures from another perspective. In 2010, crude oil represented 8% of US overall imports, a percentage that is comparable to the volume of wheat imports in Egypt. Is it a fair assessment to say that oil dependency is a negligible factor in US internal and external politics?

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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    What? You can't even provide one success the CIA have had? That's sad.
    Of course I can, I was simply pointing you to references where you could find out for yourself. There's always google too. Here are some terms for you: U2 (not the band, that plane), Oxcart, Corona. You can search the for the CIA's role in burying the missile and bomber gaps with the Soviets. More recently, and contrary to the claims of one Daniel Patrick Moynihan, you can read this. That should at least get you started. There are actually a lot of successes. Of course there are a lot of failures too.


    Well whatever you think it happened before and may well be likely to happen again.

    And all this brings us back to the point that IMHO the US would be better served by cutting back on the incompetent CIA and the State department drastically than doing same to a military currently involved in two wars. The military cuts can come later.
    The CIA is only one part of the intelligence community. As a result of the 2004 intelligence reforms, it's a smaller part as several functions were taken away from it. What specifically do you think should be cut?

    As for the military, we waste hundreds of billions each year. I think we could use some cuts and regardless cuts are inevitable given our government's fiscal situation.
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Marc View Post
    Is it a fair assessment to say that oil dependency is a negligible factor in US internal and external politics?
    U.S politics are - well, how could I phrase that without being too offensive?

    The oil imports are still just a tiny share of U.S. imports and typically smaller than the U.S. trade balance deficit, of course.


    You may argue that Egyptian politics were not rational and thus the wheat stuff was still important - but the same could be said for the much bigger bills that stood behind the huge rest of the trade balance deficit.


    It's fashionable and simple to single out well-known themes and suspect that they played a decisive role in Egypt and/or Tunisia; Malthusian trap, facebook, twitter - convenient and simple explanations.


    Convenient and simple explanations are suspicious by definition in a complex world like ours. The typical ones applied to the Egyptian revolution don't pass simple tests and thus I reject them.


    @Entropy:
    You can search the for the CIA's role in burying the missile and bomber gaps with the Soviets.
    Would you please elaborate on this?
    Those "missile gaps" were in part hoax (the one around '60), in part nonsense based on lack of logic thinking (the SS-20 scare). There was also no real bomber gap, ever - just a flimsy CONUS/Canada air defence and an almost worthless SM-1 naval air defence system.
    Last edited by Fuchs; 02-15-2011 at 06:45 PM.

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    Default Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose

    Has anyone else noticed that the Egyptian armed forces seem to have been following along with much of the advice given by Frank Kitson in Chap. 5 "The Non-Violent Phase" of his Low Intensity Operations, Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping (reprint from Hailer Publishing; and original in pdf) ?

    See also this piece by Eric Margolis, Egypt's Faux Revolution: Bait and Switch on the Nile, which doesn't cite Kitson; but which suggests that the counter-insurgency strategy has been a "bait and switch" (which is what Kitson's Chap. 5 boils down to).

    The "new" government seems to have gained something of a grace period, from Google Inc. executive Wael Ghonim:

    “If you get paid 70 dollars, this is not the time to ask for 100 dollars,” Ghonim said in an interview with Bloomberg Television yesterday. “If you really care about this country, it is not about you anymore. This is about restoring you know, that stability. This is about sending signals to everyone that Egypt is becoming stable and we are working on that.”

    Ghonim, 30, who was released on Feb. 8 after being held by the government in secret detention for more than a week, said he met military leaders over the weekend and he believes they are “really sincere” about bringing about the change demanded by the Egyptian people.

    “They realize the value of business and creating jobs,” the activist said. “We had a half an hour discussion about the challenges of how to get people back to work and how to create jobs. They are aware of the problems.”
    And, although unrest still exists, the focus has shifted to the economy generally and to specific sectors:

    Egypt's Transitional Government Struggles to Retain StabilityBy Leland Vittert, Published February 14, 2011, FoxNews.com

    CAIRO, Egypt – As Egypt struggles to return to normal just three days after former president Hosni Mubarak resigned, hundreds of government workers went on strike Monday over wages and corruption.

    The Egyptian transition government, led by the army, tried to contain a wave of protesters who defied orders not to strike. Bus drivers and ambulance workers walked off the job and a group of police protesters marched through the streets.

    The instability comes as the Egyptian people are demanding to know what the next government will look like and how it will begin an economic recovery. .....
    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 02-15-2011 at 07:56 PM. Reason: add links

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    Default What is the cause?

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    U.S politics are - well, how could I phrase that without being too offensive?

    The oil imports are still just a tiny share of U.S. imports and typically smaller than the U.S. trade balance deficit, of course.

    You may argue that Egyptian politics were not rational and thus the wheat stuff was still important - but the same could be said for the much bigger bills that stood behind the huge rest of the trade balance deficit.

    It's fashionable and simple to single out well-known themes and suspect that they played a decisive role in Egypt and/or Tunisia; Malthusian trap, facebook, twitter - convenient and simple explanations.

    Convenient and simple explanations are suspicious by definition in a complex world like ours. The typical ones applied to the Egyptian revolution don't pass simple tests and thus I reject them.
    OK, so much for Occam's Razor I guess, right?

    Fuchs, since you think that economic, demographic, and technology issues were not the cause, what do you think it was? If these were not catalysts, what was?

    V/R,

    Cliff

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    Default What simple tests?

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    You may argue that Egyptian politics were not rational and thus the wheat stuff was still important - but the same could be said for the much bigger bills that stood behind the huge rest of the trade balance deficit.


    It's fashionable and simple to single out well-known themes and suspect that they played a decisive role in Egypt and/or Tunisia; Malthusian trap, facebook, twitter - convenient and simple explanations.


    Convenient and simple explanations are suspicious by definition in a complex world like ours. The typical ones applied to the Egyptian revolution don't pass simple tests and thus I reject them.
    Fuchs, on the subject of convenient and simple explanations, I could not agree with you more. However, I never mentioned twitter, facebook or Malthus. On the contrary, I think that to find Malthus at work, you have to travel to Darfur, Rwanda or East Congo, not to Egypt.

    However, when studying a revolution, it is obvious to analyze the issues that have to potential to mobilize large crowds. In Egypt, rising bread prices have been an incentive for social unrest on more than one occasion. This has been the case in 1977 and 2008. Actually, I do not understand why you are so adamant to reject the argument that someone's daily bread (literally) is a prime motivator for militant action. What simple tests allow you to do that?

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