Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
I didn't catch the symbolism...
The symbolism in the picture was sort of on track. It showed the then CNO, CJCS, CosA and a senior US Air person deliberately not looking at their civilian boss or each other -- jointness it was not. Far from it -- and that was my point.

Yet those guys won a global war...
It appears to me that we repeatedly throw together military plans in support of often poorly articulated policy...
That is the major flaw. Instead of insisting on a viable policy, we say 'Yessir, Yessir, three bags full...' Civilian control is vital but common sense should not be precluded.
I definitely think our strategy and planning process "would" work better if the Pentagon developed the strategy at their level with the National Security Staff (informed by the GCCs and Services), and THEN and only THEN would it be pushed down to the GCCs to develop and execute operational level plans. GCCs have a large strategy role down (some of it is appropriate)...Having participated in GCC level planning you may see this discussed, but rarely is it pursued because there isn't a mechanism compel others to act outside your theater.
Exactly, that and the theater specific parochialism are a large part of the problem.
If the Pentagon was empowered once again to perform this role (there would be painful growing pains) then they could compel the global force to act, and work more effectively with the interagency through the National Security Staff to get the various agencies to support the strategy (USG strategy, not just a military strategy).
True. G-N meant well but unintended consequences took over. Ever notice that most "unintended consequences" involve people not doing what the 'law' thought they would or should do...

I'm firmly convinced that most unintended consequences --and, militarily speaking, most failure to comply -- result from excessive specificity. We talk Mission Orders but we really cannot dredge up enough trust in our subordinates to let them loose. That is partly a result of inadequate training, partly normal human response and, in our case, partly a result of excessive civilian political micromanaging that gets adapted by our seniors.

The establishment of DoD and and G-N / Nunn-Cohen were the effective generators of the first and last of those three items; human nature has always been with us -- but its pernicious effects can be and were enhanced by excessively detailed military organizational decisions made by civilians on a civilian basis.
We have seen global plans, and we have seen various tasks given to various agencies to execute, but the ability to compel action (operationalize the plans) is clearly missing, and actual execution of these plans is spotty at best.
There are two distinct problems in this arena.

G-N was a band aid applied to existing US C2 systems and processes and accordingly, it does not give the CJCS command authority. Yet he is nominally senior to (or at least more equal than) the GCCs. The Chain of SecDef (who may or may not have the true respect of his direct subordinate GCCs) directed by a President (probably strongly influenced by his NSA / NSC, de facto competitors to both Defense and State) is convoluted and an invitation for non-compliance -- so that's what it gets. There's more to it than that like the Specified Command intrusions / exceptions, the proliferation of Flag Officers but suffice to say, the system is not clean and unity of command is violated (in the rape sense of the word... ).

That translates to a loss of unity of effort and not only an opportunity but an invitation to disobey or at least significantly modify plans from on high.

The plans themselves are a problem; the policies are unclear so the plans all too often provide excruciating detail in an effort to compensate and result in providing excess specificity (also an invitation for modification...) and inadequate flexibility for the Commanders (and / or Diplomats) on the ground.

My take on the issue is that:

- The establishment of DoD was a mistake and was unneccessary. Yes, that means I do not believe in the necessity or desirability of a separate Air Force. However, far more importantly, it allowed DoD to become a monopoly instead of the prior effect of two services competing for budget dollars and attention. Monopolies always stagnate due to lack of competition. IOW, If we wanted an AF, we could've created one and been a little better off. However, three way competition is not healthy as two will tend to gang up on one...

- G-N and Nunn-Cohen combined to force the services to be more 'joint.' What it effectively did was emasculate the Service headquarters -- but left them in being, to be a parochial thorn in the side of 'jointness;' empower the GCCs -- to the point of making them diplomatic pro consuls and thus a stake in the heart of State (causing them to often resist on principle even if they agreed with a position); remove the national planning capability (as you note) and 'decentralize' it -- while requiring all Plans to be approved by DoD and the NCA thus insuring that plans would be tailored to gain approval and not necessarily reflect reality or changing circumstances.

- The real issue is that the establishment of DoD created a centralized bureaucracy that would by the nature of our budgeting process seek to aggrandize itself so it was an invitation to problems. That was followed by two laws that had the intent of enhanced decentralized planning and execution -- but which failed to rein in the monster created by the 1947 Act. The Bureaucracy ate the homework. The two actions effectively worked at cross purposes, DoD wins in the budget battle, the GCCs win in the 'who's in charge here, now...' battle and the poor Troops / Squids / Airdales end up being tied in knots due to conflicts between the two...

Sadly, this could all be fixed fairly easily but that is unlikely to occur because we have, as a nation, lost our way, spent more than we took in and have a host of minor domestic problems that will consume the attention of the political classes for a while and national defense is, at this time, not a pressing issue..