He's a smart guy. Since I've been saying pretty much all of that since 1966 or thereabouts and he agrees with me, he must be smart...

With respect to his Reframing ideas:

Reframe 1 -- Agree. Note that he also rightly criticizes the rapid rotation of senior personnel as severely exacerbating the problem of poor design.

Reframe 2 -- Agree. However, while 'full spectrum operations' as a term does have the unfortunate connotation he describes, if we do away with it, we'll need to invent a new term to describe the capability to engage in all types of warfare and military operations which is a strategic, operational and tactical imperative and an achievable goal with improved training and education and a less risk averse attitude. Such capability is a likely necessity in the future. It was in the past, we just didn't bother after Viet Nam and we can see where that got us...

Reframe 3 -- Agree. He also notes the propensity to produce erudite, wordy and voluminous Field Manuals that say nothing and do even that poorly. While I believe that State and a reinvigorated USAid should have primacy in nation building efforts short of GPF commitment, there is no question that in conventional operations resulting in Occupation or anything that might resemble it and no matter how brief, the US Army has the responsibility to perform in lieu of the government it just displaced or defeated. That would include stopping local looters and precluding US Field Grades and senior NCOs from looting Free Port Stores along with Joe and the odd local denizen, a noted shortfall after the seizure of Baghdad and its International Airport...

Reframe 4 -- Agree. There are two critical points in this section:
"Strategically, we must determine the art of the possible regarding our relationship with Beijing and develop an achievable endstate for the emerging new world -- emphasis is mine:"
As well as this even more important item:
"The American citizenry needs to establish higher expectations for military competence—a new standard that the Pentagon must get the war right before it even begins, not blunder through years of painful and costly heuristic learning as the prospect of victory diminishes. Modern kinetic wars are measured in a handful of days. Golden hours in occupation are ephemeral. The opportunity for military success is often presented only once. Miss that precious moment, and we will ultimately fail, even though we may labor many more years before we come to that realization. We have simply got to wage the war right the first time.