Getting Strategy Right

[Ken White]

...The current system with it current deficiencies could produce a national military strategy if the chairman wanted to step up to the plate or if the president told him to create it (of course that assumes the president understands what a national military strategy is).

I don't believe that's correct. G-N says the Chairman is the principal military adviser to the President but he specifically does not have command authority. He can direct the Joint Staff to do all sorts of things and make neat plans that the Prez approves but he cannot force the GCCs to accept said Joint Plans -- nor, really can the SecDef. That's why you're confronted with Schwarzkopf being visited by the SecDef and CJCS, Franks, Petreaus and McChrystal going to the WH (and Fallon getting his walking papers; that too is another thread). That is the issue with G-N -- it made the CJCS a fifth wheel.

With some of them, that's not all bad but with the wrong SecDef or President, its an invitation to stupidity at best or disaster at worst.

Yes, it is a failure at the general officer COCOM/CENTCOM level of strategic planning and execution. All of those deficiencies you mention are COCOM/CENTCOM responsibilities that were not fulfilled...I don’t see how moving those missed responsibilities to a national command authority would correct those issues. Four stars or five stars….general officers are general officers. We don't need to change the command structure we need to change general officers

For OIF, both the G3 of the Army and the Army War College produced detailed studies which specifically targeted the post attack actions. I have heard that J3 JCS did also. Franks ignored them.

CentCom has done more damage to the prosecution of the effort in both Afghanistan and Iraq than should have been allowed -- yet the system does not allow anyone to tell them they're wrong or force them to change their MO...

Changing the Command structure will not fix the problem of marginally competent FlagOs. That is a human frailty and personnel selection and management problem. Changing that structure will fix a chain of command that is awry and will delineate responsibilities and thus improve accountability. It will stop five and a half plus one geographically distantly located and focused Commands from doing it their way. As I said, the idea of decentralization was great. As you say, we do not have the FlagO quality to make it work.

To develop that FlagO quality will take years and major changes in the personnel, education and training systems. To improve C2 to lessen the adverse impact of less than stellar commanders who rotate through their jobs far too rapidly is a simple fix. Check their ability to do harm and balance them with a more powerful military adviser to the President...