I think it's interesting to see the emphasis Ambassador Bremer places on different events in his narrative. It seems intuitive to me that his particular focus was on domestic Iraqi politics - and thus he might be less informed concerning other matters. To the extent that he didn't see, and wasn't responsible for, the whole picture it's inappropriate to criticize the entire war effort based on his experiences.

However, I think this shows something revealing about the nature of counterinsurgency warfare as practiced by the United States - we do not mirror our enemies efforts. An insurgent force proceeds with social/political, economic and military agendas (to some extent or another). US counterinsurgency efforts divide those responsibilities among many agencies and individuals - with apparently little coordination. Hence, we can pour billions of dollars and thousands of men into destroying a city like Ramadi or Fallujah but suddenly falter when it comes to establishing a local government or turning the water back on - the right hand doesn't know what the left is doing.

Of course, by this theory the various insurgent groups in Iraq (particularly Al Qaeda in Iraq) fail as well. They perform none of the humanitarian or political indoctrination functions that say, Hamas, undertakes. Hence, their level of support is more limited than it might be.