Paper on Parallel Hierarchies

**Lookingforhelp** · 02-23-2011

I am writing a paper on parallel hierarchies in Insurgencies, and I need to find more information on what parallel hierarchies are, how they are formed and anything else that I can find. I am focusing on three case studies and any information that you can give me is much appreciated! My three case studies are the United Islamic Courts in Somalia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and I am searching for a third case, preferably a Maoist/communist insurgency government. I COULD REALLY USE ANY HELP.

Thanks

**J Wolfsberger** · 02-23-2011

Are you referring to situations in which an armed (and "illegal") insurgency has a parallel and legal political movement?

It would help if you provided more information. e.g. School, class, relevant readings, etc.

**Dayuhan** · 02-23-2011

If you're looking for a current Communist/Maoist insurgency the NPA in the Philippines might be a good example. No shortage of parallel hierarchies there, though as the previous poster states it's not entirely clear what you're looking for.

**Lookingforhelp** · 03-05-2011

Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger

Are you referring to situations in which an armed (and "illegal") insurgency has a parallel and legal political movement?

It would help if you provided more information. e.g. School, class, relevant readings, etc.

I am referring to the political hierarchies that insurgencies develop/create to counter the host government, and provide social services to the people. These are not necessarily legal or parallel to the insurgency, but rather an administrative part of the insurgency, and a parallel administration to the host government. For an overview of what parallel hierarchies/shadow governments are see O'Neill's Insurgency and Terrorism, chapter 6 pages 116 to 121.

thanks for responding!

**jmm99** · 03-05-2011

parallel hierarchy/shadow government structures (Dayuhan is an SME on that one), it sounds like a good third leg for your comparative analysis - NPA is current, finite (as opposed to Vietnam with its almost infinite bibliography) and anchors the eastern end of your spectrum.

All in the "Never Again, but ..." Region to this ancien dinosaur:

Shadow Goverrnance Project.jpg

but it sounds to me like an extremely interesting project.

Are you looking at it from the the viewpoint of the revolutionary or the counter-revolutionary ? Or both ? (As Bogart's Rick correctly pointed out to Maj. Strasser, one has to appreciate the viewpints of both the fox and the hound).

If you take on the hound's role, are you looking more to direct actions to neutralize (kill, detain or convert) the shadow government (as in part of the SVN Pacification Programs), or are you looking more at countering it by civil affairs programs ? Or both ?

Lots of interesting (to me) topics here.

Bonne chance

Mike

**Lookingforhelp** · 03-07-2011

Thanks for both the map and the support! As for your questions, I am looking more from the perspective of the owl in the tree overhead: I want to see how different shadow governments/parallel hierarchies are formed or shaped, what kinds of policies do they enact, what kind of reception do they recieve from the domestic community, and from the international community, who supports them and why, and who is against them and why, all culminating down into: what aspect of these shadow governments serve to help them win their insurgencies, and what are their weaknesses, how could we trip them up and win. Mostly I want to create a comprehensive look at what shadow governments are, because there isn't a whole lot of work on shadow governments themselves.

Thanks again!

**Marc** · 03-07-2011

Originally Posted by Lookingforhelp

I am referring to the political hierarchies that insurgencies develop/create to counter the host government, and provide social services to the people. These are not necessarily legal or parallel to the insurgency, but rather an administrative part of the insurgency, and a parallel administration to the host government. For an overview of what parallel hierarchies/shadow governments are see O'Neill's Insurgency and Terrorism, chapter 6 pages 116 to 121.

thanks for responding!

Lookingforhelp,

On social services provided by insurgent political hierarchies see:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...231_art015.pdf

Good luck.

**Bob's World** · 03-07-2011

The attached diagram may be helpful. This is my attempt to show in simple terms how the roles and dynamics of a "typical" insurgency play out. Obviously no insurgency is typical, but all have a common dynamic that separates them as "insurgencies" rather than some other form of conflict.

In the first scene we have a stable government-populace dynamic. There is a balance, and the government both draws its support and legitimacy from across the populace and also distributes its policies and programs equally across the populace as well.

Like all populaces, within even this healthy populace there are cancer cells of dissent. They radiate their message out, and draw some small support, but cannot take root in a healthy populace. The government has external friends and allies and a FID relationship exists. The government and those allied governments also have opponents and competitors who wish to seek inroads, but are blocked by the current government. These competitors will conduct UW and engage the cancerous cells within the populace. So long as the government stays in balance, the populace remains healthy, and such UW efforts have little effect beyond a bit a spying and rabble rousing.

In the second scene we see a government who's policies and engagement are getting out of balance. Sometimes it is the influence of an overly powerful FID government that pulls a government off of its center. This then allows cancer cells of dissent to grow into subversion and insurgency, and UW efforts to take hold. As this occurs the "shadow" structures you describe begin to emerge and to compete with those of the government to help build support among the people to the cause. An internal competition for this support is waged between the government and the insurgent leadership. Similarly, an external competition is often waged between the external parties with interests at stake.

In the third scene the balance has shifted, and the government is on the verge of collapse.

In the final scene succession is complete. The Insurgent has prevailed and is now the government and the counterinsurgent. So long as he can sustain this balance he will face little challenge. If he attempts to exclude those who supported the previous regime (think Afghanistan as a current example) he will go straight to the dynamic seen in scene two. Note also that the role of FID and UW has switched as well. Outside parties who waged UW before are now in the FID role. Those that conducted FID before are now in the UW role.

Repeat as necessary until at some point a government emerges that is committed to establishing and sustaining balance across the populace.

Hopefully this little cartoon helps.

Cheers!

Bob

**outletclock** · 03-07-2011

I don't have O'Neill in front of me, but I think the below might possibly be of some help...

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/con...ent=a794711535

This article offers a novel contribution to the terrorism literature by using mathematical modeling and case studies to demonstrate how terrorist and extremist groups can utilize social service provision activities and anti-corruption campaigns instead of violent activities to gain support.The basic argument of the model is that terrorist groups will try to gain support by promising that they will be better distributors of resources than the current regime once they gain power and by promising that they will be less corrupt. However, because all organizations can freely make these promises, their words are cheap talk, and the general population should ignore them. To overcome this problem, organizations must offer a costly signal. Provision of social goods and implementation of explicit anti-corruption campaigns before taking power serves as such a signal. As the United States government and its allies widen their “war on terrorism,” they must consider the ramifications of social service provision and anti-corruption activities, which are common, effective, and potentially useful for increasing the probability of group success.

Regards
OC