South Africa's COIN war in SWA/Namibia/Angola

[Jim Hooper]

In South West Africa (Namibia) the South Africans raised battalions from each of the ethnic groups and obviously the police recruited locals for their station areas for language, cultural awareness etc etc. Koevoet was about 25% white and together they fought against SWAPO / PLAN. That mix of black and white policemen achieved the best results of all forces in SWA/Namibia.

So if there is anything to take out of the Southern African wars that is worthy of study it is the Rhodesian Fire Force and the South West African Koetvoet operations.

And for either of these concepts to have any potential value for Afghanistan it needs some like a Hans Dreyer (who knows Afghanistan) to study both concepts in detail and come up some hybrid that would be useful in Afghanistan.

In the last few years I have been approached by a number of Ph.D. candidates whose theses centre on the use of private military companies (PMCs). I confess that they eventually come to me because their first choices succumbed to interviewee fatigue long ago and now decline such requests. My supposed expertise is limited to having written the first books on both Koevoet and Executive Outcomes, the former police unit comprising an important element of the latter company. The success of both has led some academics to believe they could be equally effective anywhere in the world. However, a critical analysis of what made them so successful suggests otherwise. The latest PH.D. student is convinced that EO-like PMCs are the answer to a First World country’s internal political divisions over involvement in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. In hope of generating debate, I’m sharing part of my latest email to him:

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Dear Mr ……, I believe your thesis on the role of PMCs is fatally flawed. First, Executive Outcomes was an anomaly, a phenomenon that is unlikely ever to be repeated. Its success was the result of black and white Africans - professional soldiers and airmen who had already worked together for 15 to 30 years - in Africa. They understood the culture and spoke the lingua franca - Portuguese in Angola, English in Sierra Leone. Were EO still in existence today and operating in Iraq or Afghanistan, they would not enjoy the same success; their military skills would be the same, but the local culture would be incomprehensible to them and they could not function without interpreters (who, due to tribal loyalties and various cultural imperatives, can never be relied on completely, especially in the chaos of combat); and without supporting arms such as artillery, fighter bombers and intelligence-gathering, their effectiveness in an offensive role would be close to zero in comparison to well-integrated state armies.

[Break-break for SWC readers: Michael F’s question in the COIN case: LRA thread, and Tom Odom’s eminently sensible answer lead to the perfect role for the now-retired EO.]

Second, your focus on jus in bello suggests to me that you see PMC employees as less ethical and less sensitive than state armies to their own losses and civilian deaths. From my experience, this perception is profoundly wrong. Remember that they learned their professions as members of Western military/police structures imbued with Judeo-Christian values and working in accordance with national and international law. To think that they will abandon those values when they exchange a state uniform for a PMC uniform is illogical. Equally illogical is to think that war can ever - or should - be risk free. War is defined by the possibility of death, and taking that risk is one of the greatest psychological motivations for young men who volunteer for military service.

No modern state is going to hire PMCs to conduct offensive operations in order to minimise own-force casualties. Doing so would call into question the state's investment in training, command and control, combat and logistics capabilities, and ethics. Nor will it dedicate artillery, close air support, precision guided munitions, aerial surveillance, sigint and a multitude of necessary specialists for the benefit of PMCs. The cost of providing those assets for both its own forces and PMCs (already better paid than its own personnel) would be astronomical. Do you really believe the US Congress, British Parliament, German Bundestag, French Assemblée Nationale, or Israeli Knesset - all legislatures representing countries that admire their nations' military prowess - would authorise such a radical departure from convention? It would be a damning self-indictment with huge political implications, both domestically and internationally. A comparison to 3rd and 4th Century Rome would be inescapable.

The only politically acceptable offensive role for PMCs is anti-piracy operations. Pirates are themselves mercenaries operating outside international law. They are universally seen as dangerous criminals who represent a clear and present danger to a law-abiding merchant fleet on which a large part of the world's economy is dependent. Compared to the manpower and materiel requirements for effective ground operations, the necessary assets to counter pirates are minimal and not financially burdensome: a few fastboats with radar, secure communications, automatic weapons no heavier than 20mm, a few relatively inexpensive UAVs data-linked to the boats and central command post, and a long-range helicopter capability for medical evacuation. And there are ample historical precedents for issuing letters of marque giving maritime PMCs a legal basis for their actions.

ENDS