While the Flying Tigers and Luftwaffe in May '40 accomplished great things, I don't think they were shining examples of airpower strategy - especially the Luftwaffe. But this is distracting us from the real point - your argument for better use of resources is exactly what Warden is arguing for - so you agree with his ends but not his means?
Warden's use of the Luftwaffe to illustrate his examples is one of the points (IMO) where he really goes off the rails. The Luftwaffe did exactly what it was designed to do, because the Germans had a different conception of airpower based on their experiences in World War I. Was it in line with Warden's vision? No. Does that automatically make it wrong? Certainly not.

Warden continues to chase the myth of warfare on the cheap (from our perspective, at least). He is also far too wedded to the idea that airpower can be decisive in any area, and if it can't we shouldn't get involved. If you read "The Air Campaign," you would think that the Air Force won the war in the Pacific all by itself and that the Battle of Britain was a failed defensive campaign. Warden is also (again IMO) far too linked to the idea that kinetic efforts should be divorced from political considerations, and far too often falls back on the "politicians tied our hands" argument when airpower doesn't work as advertised. Warden's theories work well in computer games, but I really think they fall short when put to the real world test.