Slap, you posted:

Well looks like I can't change your mind but maybe Walt can. Walt Disney Movie explaining the theory of Ring Warfare and how to win using Airpower.

Links to the Disney Classic from 1942 "Victory Through Airpower"
You bring it up in the context of trying to change my mind about the issues with ring theory, by seemingly extending it in hindsight to any application of airpower.

pvebber, kind of cheap shot don't you think? I plainly pointed out it was the History! of the rings from 1942.
I certainly did not intend a "cheap shot" I was simply venting my frustration that any criticism can be parried by seemingly extending the scope of the theory well beyond the scope of what it seems Warden intended (Removing the need for protracted "battle" and getting straight to strategic effects quickly and efficiently.

Warden himself in the article pointed out that the 8th Air Force effort was an incomplete attempt to include CoGs in the war effort and did not follow the 5 rings theory.

I hope we can agree that WWII airpower - regardless how effective we assess it in hindsight - was "a protracted battle" to achieve an effect over a long, long time, and not "highly compressed, highly parallel, inside the opponents reaction time". So bring it up as illuminating Warden's theory when Warden himself casts it off as a bad example? That is my frustration.

I have stated repeatedly that the notion of affecting CoGs to reduce the efficiency of the adversary war production is non-controversial. What is controversial is the notion that it can be not necessary - but SUFFICIENT to win a conflict. Airpower was not in WWII, nor any other conflict. Why should we think that increased precision alone now makes it so.

He doesn't miss it and has never said that ground forces would not be needed or don't have a vital role to play.
Are these not Wardens arguments?

Ground forces can conduct only serial operations, which are to be avoided.

Ground forces must overcome adversary ground forces through battle in order to achieve effects and "battle" is not just to be avoided, but removed from our vocabulary.

The implication from Warden's theory is that ground forces are implicitly defensive in nature - they prevent enemy ground forces from attacking your airbases. Their role in the offensive should be as limited as possible.

I am open to other interpretations of what "removing battle from our vocabulary" and:

To realize the future picture, we must change the opponent system, which we do by affecting one or more of its centers of gravity. The resulting impact on the system will be a function of how quickly the cen#ters are affected. If we do so too slowly (se#rially), the system will probably find ways to repair itself, protect itself against further attacks, and begin its own operations against its opponent’s systems. Conversely, if we affect enough centers of gravity quickly enough (in parallel), the system will go into a state of paralysis, preventing it from re#pairing itself, protecting itself against future attacks, or making competent attacks against its opponent’s systems.
What could the offensive contribution of ground forces be in such a construct other than a limited SOF role in intelligence gathering and DA in support of air operations?

Using Special Forces like we did in A's tan, Dropping Paratroopers to secure a COG or the Marines using a Helicopter Assault are all forms of Airpower.
How do paratroopers and marines take CoGs without battle? OR is it that we must redefine battle as we have redefined airpower (The joke in MC02 was that the Air Force wanted submarines to put torpedo shots on the ATO because they were launched with compressed air )

What if the bad guys have an actual Army that actually defends its CoGs requiring more force than you can transport by air? (like tanks).


Because he is pro Airpower people think he is anit-Navy or Army he isn't. He just dosen't believe in taking the risk if it can be done from the Air but when it can not be done he has no problem with another service doing it. He understands Airborne Warfare as it was originally conceived better than most people in the Army.
This ignores the reality that the Defense budget is a zero sum game. If the air Force is to get the kit required to make his vision a reality, we need a helluva lot more than a couple dozen B-2s and a host of new strike capabilities with a VAST increase in capacity.

Do you really think he would be OK with giving up the Future bomber to build a new class of SSGNs as the deployer of choice of strike capability in future areas where land power outranges land based airpower?

If he thinks that "Airborne" operations are a means in and of themselves to achieve significant ends, then he did not learn the lessons of Viet Nam in terms of the roles and limitations of Air mobile operations.

Gotta sign out for a while now (and there was much rejoicing...yeaaaaa!)

I look forward to seeing some more discussion of the scenarios brought up so far. So far it seems that they gravitate to either "no holds barred" major theater war where the goal is coercion using a theory akin to "nuclear warfare by conventional means" , or "decapitation strikes".

If Wardens warning not to use airpower when it can't win preculed what's in between, then it is arguing itself into irrelevance in the main of future warfare.