Certainly to the US it would have mattered. We'd have been stuck out front where we don't want to be.
There's enough reason to participate, not enough reason to lead. Participation is an intermediate step between "dominate" and "do nothing". Considering the extent of our commitments elsewhere, I'm not sure the capacity we can actually deploy in the Mediterranean is "single most capable". We're positioned pretty much where we needed to be, seems to me.
We have no ability to dictate the end state with an acceptable level of involvement, but we saw sufficient reason to be engaged in the limited objective of preventing a total victory by Gadhafi. Subsequent objectives may or may not be adopted upon subsequent assessments. How is that unreasonable?
That's been made sufficiently clear by many, and I see no need to repeat. No need to make mountains out of mole-hills.
I articulated no such principle, though you may have interpreted it as such. There's no sense in imposing a long-term plan on a limited involvement that is specifically intended to be short term, it only restricts the flexibility that is the entire point of limited engagement.
Because at times we may see fit to assist in operations that are primarily someone else's responsibility, just as at times we seek the participation of others in missions that are primarily ours. Doesn't have to be all or nothing, control or avoid.
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