The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[Cole]

Let's clarify... we do not have a huge USAF. The USN (227) and Army (236) are both buying more aircraft in FY12 than the USAF is (114)... we have a small USAF that is getting smaller.

Because adjusted for inflation, a F-4 bought today would cost $13 million, not $140 million and counting with planned upgrades coming for F-22. Plus, AH-64Ds save lives daily in two conflicts. Have yet to hear of an F-22 providing CAS in Afghanistan or Iraq...or Libya. Perhaps the fact that they fly at 60,000 feet and have no EO/IR targeting capability is part of the explanation, not to mention maintenance expense in a desert environment.

With such capable and expensive aircraft, few threat nations can buy more than a few dozen less capable, and less stealthy Russian and Chinese attempts at stealth. In terms of annual defense budget, with the exception of China and Russia deterred by MAD, go all the way to Iran at 23rd to find the first potential foe, with a sub $10 billion annual defense budget and sanctions in place prohibiting them from buying modern aircraft. Ditto for North Korea with a similarly small defense budget. Libya's air force WAS a joke and doubt much remains. Twenty of the top 22 defense budgets are allies or ourselves to help deter Russia and China.

How long would it take Iran or North Korea to buy 180+ Russian or Chinese "stealth" aircraft at nearly $100 million each? 18 years if they could finance 10 per year at a billion a year...highly unlikely during which time we and allies also field thousands of stealthy F-35s, bombers, and unmanned aircraft.

Additionally, the B-2s could not have done what they did without the support of a lot of other aircraft- including fighters. B-2s are not invisible - meaning they are vulnerable to fighters.

Flying at night with F-22 and F-35 escorts, what are the odds of Chinese or Russian "stealth" aircraft even finding our aircraft let alone fighting air-to-air? Stealth cruise missiles and JASSM-ER fired from B-52H and B-1B don't need an escort.

Finally, Libya's IADS was not modern, nor was it robust... additionally, a lot of folks are trying to buy the same capabilities the US has, meaning they won't be asymmetric for much longer.

And again, you can argue all you want about not having a crystal ball but defense budgets don't lie. All realistic threats spend well under $10 billion a year which will never fund either a large air force, naval response, or IADS. We have ample air and seapower planned and programmed. You could easily argue that one or two less CVNs (6 of which typically sit vulnerable in just two U.S. ports) would finance the additional air and seapower without cannibalizing the Army.

Northern Watch and Southern Watch DID suppress ground operations... or do you have an example of Kurdistan or the Shiite south being attacked while they were actually in effect? Finally, the goal of ONW and OSW was never to replace Saddam.. it was to protect the Kurds and Shiites from Saddam... it did a pretty good job.

Folks may not have liked ONW and OSW based on the policy, but they accomplished their objectives.

I heard an analyst/General admit that Northern Watch was more effective than Southern Watch. Shiites were targeted with WMD and remained oppressed. The Oil for Food program robbed the world of an oil source, just as the Libya no fly zone may eventually. It may have satisfied a stated objective. It did not solve the primary problem.

[pvebber]

I will recast my parting olive branch post as I think it gets to the main issues that we seem to keep talking past each other on...

Warden's theory at its root is about improving the use of CoGs and a systems thinking framework to make military operations shorter, more efficient and more effective. It assumes that faster more parallel operations are better than a protracted series of battles.

Working back systematically from a singular desired endstate is the strategic method. It is assumed that the information necessary to accomplish this is available through observation of the system.


There are circumstances where this is the preferred approach. In these situations "airpower" is the supported arm.


An alternative theory suggests that some classes of military problems are not fully understood by observation from a distance. To fully understand the nature of some problems you must "grab the tarbaby" and engage in a serial "probing" of the system you are trying to understand/affect along a number of lines of operation that are iterative, heuristic, and unpredictable in their outcome.

There will never be sufficient information about a system to mechanically "work backwards" from a single desired end-state. Evolving solutions over time to favorably shape a wide potential set of endstates is the strategic method.


There are circumstances where this is the preferred problem approach. In these circumstances "landpower" is the supported arm.


Would Warden support that construct and a "why can't we all just get along" approach and accept that the two approaches have their preferred problem sets, both are necessary but insufficient to address the complete range of possible military operations and need to be integrated rather than in competition?

[pvebber]

The Libya Dilemma: The limits of Airpower

Is this a case where Warden would say we should not have gotten involved becasue airpower can't be used in a decisive fashion?

Or is this a case of not using airpower "as it should"? Is so how should it have been used?

What is the "desired endstate" to be worked back from in the case of a coalition with distinctly different national interests? Whose end-sate do we work back from?

In this scenario, the West will ultimately confront the same dilemmas that arose before Sept. 11. How long can Western leaders continue an apparently indecisive air campaign in the face of pleas for escalation from allies on the ground? In Kosovo, NATO was on the verge of a divisive debate over escalating to a ground invasion when Slobodan Milosevic delivered the alliance from its crisis by folding unexpectedly. Will Gaddafi stand fast longer? If so, what then? Nothing in the ostensibly new Obama doctrine offers an escape from this underlying issue. Multilateral burden-sharing might make a stalemate look cheaper, but it cannot transform a stalemate into painless victory.

How does Warden's "new model Airpower" solve the dilemma?

[slapout9]

What is the "desired endstate" to be worked back from in the case of a coalition with distinctly different national interests? Whose end-sate do we work back from?

Exactly, as the article points we should elevate the End to level we keep elevating the Means. Without a clearly defined Political Objective there is no way to properly organize your response, there is no way to properly choose which means(Air,Ground,Sea) to use.

[slapout9]

How to get Daffy and his thugs.
Also shows how Slobodan Milosevic did not just mysteriously collapse, it was done with Airpower.


http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

[pvebber]

Exactly, as the article points we should elevate the End to level we keep elevating the Means. Without a clearly defined Political Objective there is no way to properly organize your response, there is no way to properly choose which means(Air,Ground,Sea) to use.

That doesn't answer the question.

When you have multiple competing end states among coalition partners, who gets to pick the "right" one?

In this case it seemd the "means" to impose a no-fly zone is a no brainer. But what is the braoder "end"?

Is it simply protecting cvilians without choosing sides?

Is it regime change?

Is it avoidence of an iraq-like on-going pro Gaddafi insurgency after his government falls?

Is it a "reboot" of the political state so oil and gas contracts can be re-negotiated?

Is it ensuring a democratic government replaces Gaddafi (meaning the current rebels may not be who what to ultimately win?)

Its easy to say the "strategy should be what you start with, but how do you actually do that in a complex real-world situation like this?

[slapout9]

That doesn't answer the question.

When you have multiple competing end states among coalition partners, who gets to pick the "right" one?

In this case it seemd the "means" to impose a no-fly zone is a no brainer. But what is the braoder "end"?

Is it simply protecting cvilians without choosing sides?

Is it regime change?

Is it avoidence of an iraq-like on-going pro Gaddafi insurgency after his government falls?

Is it a "reboot" of the political state so oil and gas contracts can be re-negotiated?

Is it ensuring a democratic government replaces Gaddafi (meaning the current rebels may not be who what to ultimately win?)

Its easy to say the "strategy should be what you start with, but how do you actually do that in a complex real-world situation like this?

I agree it doesn't answer the question which is why the Libya situation is probably not going to end well. We just jumped in with Airpower and think this will make it OK, probably want. Which again is Warden's point Strategy has to come first before you decide on the means, whatever it may be. We have never defined what we (US) really want except for Daffy to be gone, whatever that means. Until that is clearly defined it dosen't matter how good your Airpower,Groundpower,or Seapower is, it is a mission with no end. Which from the most recent reports I have seen is exactly what it is turning into.

[Cliff]

Because adjusted for inflation, a F-4 bought today would cost $13 million, not $140 million and counting with planned upgrades coming for F-22. Plus, AH-64Ds save lives daily in two conflicts. Have yet to hear of an F-22 providing CAS in Afghanistan or Iraq...or Libya. Perhaps the fact that they fly at 60,000 feet and have no EO/IR targeting capability is part of the explanation, not to mention maintenance expense in a desert environment.

So we should only organize/train/equip for the current fight?

With such capable and expensive aircraft, few threat nations can buy more than a few dozen less capable, and less stealthy Russian and Chinese attempts at stealth. In terms of annual defense budget, with the exception of China and Russia deterred by MAD, go all the way to Iran at 23rd to find the first potential foe, with a sub $10 billion annual defense budget and sanctions in place prohibiting them from buying modern aircraft. Ditto for North Korea with a similarly small defense budget. Libya's air force WAS a joke and doubt much remains. Twenty of the top 22 defense budgets are allies or ourselves to help deter Russia and China.

Not arguing with the budget comparison. Nevertheless, China's budget goes a lot farther... because their weapons are being made by Chinese, who get payed a lot less than the average American defense worker.

Your argument that MAD is sufficient for deterring China and Russia is a slippery slope... As we found out with the New Look, this severely constrains your options, and probably isn't a good idea. If China decides to start cutting off Japanese oil over a dispute, are we willing to threaten them with nukes? If the answer is no, then MAD is probably sufficient to insure US national survival, but not protect our national interests.

How long would it take Iran or North Korea to buy 180+ Russian or Chinese "stealth" aircraft at nearly $100 million each? 18 years if they could finance 10 per year at a billion a year...highly unlikely during which time we and allies also field thousands of stealthy F-35s, bombers, and unmanned aircraft.

A long time. Like I said above, they won't have to pay $100 million... because the folks making Chinese or Russian airplanes don't get payed as much as US workers. Again, China and Russia are more the issues, with Iran and NK being more manageable.

Flying at night with F-22 and F-35 escorts, what are the odds of Chinese or Russian "stealth" aircraft even finding our aircraft let alone fighting air-to-air? Stealth cruise missiles and JASSM-ER fired from B-52H and B-1B don't need an escort.

The odds are not 0. B-2s need to be protected if fighters are present. I'll leave it at that.

And again, you can argue all you want about not having a crystal ball but defense budgets don't lie. All realistic threats spend well under $10 billion a year which will never fund either a large air force, naval response, or IADS. We have ample air and seapower planned and programmed. You could easily argue that one or two less CVNs (6 of which typically sit vulnerable in just two U.S. ports) would finance the additional air and seapower without cannibalizing the Army.

According to the unclass 2010 report to Congress on China, the Chinese Air Force has over 327 fourth generation fighters... all of which are very capable. They have 252 advanced SAM systems... neither of these numbers include naval systems. I would submit that we currently have the minimum force required- in fact, it was classified as "moderate risk" in congressional testimony.

That said, you seem to miss my point. I'm not arguing for gutting the Army to buy more F-22s. I would have liked to have seen us buy the 40 more that were in the budget originally to give us a viable/sustainable force - but we didn't, and we're not going to get more. We need new tankers, new CSAR helos and the new bomber more, frankly. The big problem will be our F-16s and F-15s wearing out before we can actually buy F-35s (if and when we get to buy some).

As Secretary Gates said, another large land conflict is unlikely for multiple reasons. Based on the extreme distaste for "boots on the ground", I think the Libya model is much more likely to be the model. I would expect that SOF and adviser forces will be heavily used as well.

Given all of that, we do not have too large an Air Force - we have one that is just large enough to give us a moderate-high level of risk based on our stated national strategy. It is going to get smaller due to attrition and airframes aging out- and that is not a good thing.

As I have said before on this blog, the job of the USAF and USN is to make sure our wars stay small by being so good that they can't be beat. If we can't deter folks conventionally, we're left with nukes, as you mentioned...

I heard an analyst/General admit that Northern Watch was more effective than Southern Watch. Shiites were targeted with WMD and remained oppressed. The Oil for Food program robbed the world of an oil source, just as the Libya no fly zone may eventually. It may have satisfied a stated objective. It did not solve the primary problem.

Saddam used chems on Halabja in Kurdistan in 1988, as well as on the Iranians. There is evidence of his using Mi-8s to drop Sarin on Karbala in March of 1991. Again, all of this was PRIOR to the no-fly zones being enforced- they were established AFTER Saddam attacked the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South.

You are now changing the argument... ONW and OSW fulfilled their objectives at a relatively low cost relative to what troops on the ground would have cost. If the objective was regime change, that's a different story.

As I said above, I think we have more NFZs/No drive zones in our future - it is a (relatively) cheap way of stopping dictators from using their high-end military to slaughter their people, and doesn't have the stigma of boots on the ground. Sudan is a good example of a place where we might use this same strategy.

If you disagree with the political objectives, as others have pointed out that's a different story.

V/R,

Cliff