1.Lockerbie bombingOriginally Posted by 91bravojoe
2.1986 Berlin discotheque bombing
3.1989 UTA Flight 772 bombing
Kill him and get out.
Ho Hum;Another Stupid War Of Choice
http://nationalinterest.org/commenta...ar-choice-5043
"There is neither a strategic nor an economic justification for a U.S.-led military crusade."
1.Lockerbie bombing
2.1986 Berlin discotheque bombing
3.1989 UTA Flight 772 bombing
Kill him and get out.
rinse/repeat
I'm sure you think you know the "truth" about those three incidents, just as the WMD stuff was so ravenously consumed.
If you know something the rest of us don't know please share. IMO the evidence is beyond a reasonable doubt. Take him and the Lockerbie bomber out - and then get OUT (not yelling, just emphasing). Let the Arab league fix their own.
There are some serious doubts about Lockerbie; I don’t think we will ever know the full truth. Bob Baer says Iranians were behind it; I have my doubts and am inclined to believe Baer.
I "know" that for any incident of the type that you mention, you can find a pianoroll like this:
http://100777.com/node/101
I am also aware that neither the official allegations nor the conspiratorial rebuttal are entitled to any weight at all without reading all the files possessed by all of the governments involved. Probably won't happen soon.
The US lies a lot. A foreign policy based on revenge is stupid. Pretty sure about those points.
A foreign policy based on revenge is stupid? Then we should never go to war for injuries against our State? We should never go to war for injuries against allies of our State?
Actually, no. That are sunk costs and thus to be ignored.
It may be necessary to deter such behaviour for the future by responding to provocations, though. That would not be the same as revenge, and it should show.
A corollary of Fuchs' point is that the past grievances, assuming they actually did occur in conformity with the various press releases, were a result of haphazard reactions, rather than a consistent known policy.
Why would you assume "haphazard reaction"? Certainly in the case of Al Qaeda the actions inspiring our grievances were totally consistent with that organization's consistent known policies.
Good title
91bravojoe,
The title of this thread "Another Stupid War of Choice" is well chosen. It draws the attention one of the main friction points between politicians and strategists in a democracy.
The friction point is that many strategists think that policy should follow strategy. In this line of thinking, strategists figure out our strategic interests and the strategies to further them, while politicians should limit themselves to developing policies within these strategic limitations.
Politicians often disagree. They think they are there to develop policy and strategists are there to figure out strategies within political limitations.
This friction leads to frustration, reflected in the wording of this thread's title.
Is there a better way to do this? IMO there is. Strategists should understand and accept the primacy of policy over strategy. It should have come as no surprise to strategists that western politicians would give in sooner or later to the "do something" pressure with regard to the current situation in the Arab world. In stead standing severely aloof from politics by saying that doing something" is a bad idea because it does not serve our strategic interests, strategists should accept that it is inevitable that "something will be done" and figure out a strategy that transforms that "something" into a strategy that makes the most strategic sense under the circumstances.
In the final analysis, all wars are "stupid" (and ugly, and brutal, and terrifying, and tragic); and all wars are a "choice," even if that choice is as fundamental as "live free or die."
So to argue the stupidity or choice of war is like arguing about the color of the sky. Opinions may vary, but it is what it is.
It is my opinion, that to see Libya clearly, one must step far back from recent events and the narrow geography surrounding that one country. One must step all the way back to the heady days following 9/11 and the mandate from the American people that was granted to President George Bush when he called for a "War on Terrorism."
The "End" for any conflict are best set at the very beginning. The Ends are found in the mandate that justifies the hard decision to choose what we all know is stupid; to choose war over peace. As I looked at this problem while writing my thesis for the War College, I came to two mandates, and thereby, two Ends for war:
1. Vengeance: To avenge the American people against the perpetrators of the attacks of 9/11.
2. Security: To allow the American people to once again feel as safe in their daily lives as they had felt on 9/10.
Interestingly, both of these are totally subjective, emotional conditions that are only accurately measured in the opinion of the American populace rather than in any set of conditions or facts that may contribute to shaping those subjective emotions.
America was indeed at war, but I would argue that if one were to go to the granter of that war mandate, to go to the American people, and truly ask how they feel, that one would find not only that the War on Terror is over, but that it has been for several years now.
The war is over, but the mission continues. Peace is often more difficult than war, as the rules are so much more constraining. Many of our current challenges are not that we fight stupid wars, but rather that we stupidly conduct peace as war due to our failure to recognize that the war is long over.
Iraq is not a war. Afghanistan is not a war. Libya is not a war. This is peace, and of all of those three locations there is a far stronger nexus to the issues that violated our sense of security on 9/11 in Libya than there is currently in Afghanistan, and ever in Iraq. Sometimes in peace one must employ war-like violence. That should be a hard decision and never done lightly, but also never off the table either. But by recognizing that one is at peace it moves that option to the back of the table.
If we conduct peace in Libya wisely, we can create effects across the Arab World that serve to lessen the risk of terrorist attacks on the U.S. That should be our goal. We are not there to ensure victory for any one side, but rather the broader victory of a stability that allows the Libyan people a chance at liberty and good governance on their terms. How we shape that is critical and difficult and new. At least new for us. After all, we still think we are at war.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
"The Libyan people" are hardly a unitary entity, and continued violence on their terms is as likely as liberty and good governance on their terms... probably more likely. Possibly I'm overly cynical, but in Libya or Yemen I'd count liberty and good governance among the least likely outcomes, in anything but a very long term.
Not really sure how we could "conduct peace" in Libya in a way that would, or even might, "create effects across the Arab World that serve to lessen the risk of terrorist attacks on the U.S." What effects do you propose to create, and how specifically do you propose to create them... especially given the very limited nature of our commitment in Libya and our even more limited ability to influence how events emerge there?
That no "populace" is some homogeneous entity is implied; that all effective COIN is difficult is a certainty. Both of these facts are incorporated in my comments, and neither detracts from their value.
As I have stated elsewhere, the challenging message that we must create with our efforts regarding Libya has many audiences. To "the populace" (yes, ever dynamic and with varying issues and concerns within and between nations) it must be one that the US is consistent with our principles and that we will not act overtly to deny for others what we demand for ourselves; but neither will we dash about the world to carry such causes on our back. To the governments of the region it is that the support of the U.S. does not come without condition. While history proves us to be far more respective of local legitimacy than those who have been similarly situated before us, our commitment to such largess has limits. We will not tolerate attacks on our own people by the people of others due to the bad acts those governments comment with impunity while emboldened and enabled by the nature of our intergovernmental relationships.
We have contributed to these conditions by disrupting natural shifts in the balance of power, both within and between nations in regions where we feel we have vital national interests to serve. For that we will not apologize, but we must none the less recognize that there are negative as well as positive effects from such engagement. We will not allow without consequence the government of any of these nations employ inappropriate violence to suppress their people. What those consequences should most appropriately be is what the Obama administration is attempting to sort out. It will vary by situation, but should be clearly consistent as well.
But this is our current problem:
In Libya we engage to protect the people against the government.
In Saudi Arabia we look away and publicly support the fiction that the Saudis are fighting "terrorists" when they subdue their populace through harsh ways and means.
In Afghanistan we vigorously act in support of the government in its efforts to violently suppress the insurgent elements of their populace.
We are conflicted. We really need to tighten our shot group on this.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Sort of in keeping with the topic of this thread, I thought this post was particularly hilarious in a dark comedy sort of way.
Act 1, Scene 1. The Western Desert outside Tripoli.
(Enter GADDAFI in Hawaiian shirt and baggies.)GADDAFI: “Behold, my people! I just don't want to live like I used to. And at some point, I'm going to put a gag order on myself in terms of talking about the past. I've got to slam the door and deal with the present and the future!”
(Enter right LIBYAN REBELS; a dozen or so midgets with banners and signs.)
REBELS: "Boo! Down With the despot! Power to the People!"
GADDAFI: “I'm dealing with fools and trolls and soft targets. It's just strafing runs in my underwear before my first cup of coffee. I don't have time for these clowns.”
(produces a comically immense scimitar and begins smiting the REBELS)
REBELS: "Aieee! You bastard! Take that, and that!" (etc)
(FIGHT ensues, with GADDAFI driven upstage.)
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
It seems to me that references to "the populace" or "a populace" explicitly deny and overlook the enormous rifts within these countries and the inclination of the involved populaces to fight each other.
Very well, but others may not be seeking what we demand for ourselves. Others may be - and in many cases are - seeking the ability to seize power for themselves and stomp the stuffing out of the people who used to have it and anyone else they dislike. We can't assume that anyone fighting against a bad government is fighting for liberty and good governance, or that liberty and good governance naturally follow the fall of bad governance.
Our ability to impose conditions is proportional to the degree to which these governments seek and require our support. That degree is in many cases quite limited. The suggested degree to which many of these governments are "emboldened and enabled" by us remains undemonstrated and very debatable.
We should never talk about what we will allow or tolerate unless we have the will and ability to back those remarks up with specific actions. If we have no such actions available, or if their likely consequences of those actions are worse for us than the consequences of not undertaking them, we're generally well advised to keep our mouths shut.
We engage to protect some of the people against the government. The people supporting the government are people too. If rebels gain the upper hand and start killing loyalists, no we intervene on the other side? If the fight devolves into a protracted civil war with neither side able to gain the upper hand, do we take sides? Major can of worms there, an excellent reason to hand the intervention to the Europeans and back out.
Are we supposed to say we won't allow or tolerate that? Backed up by what specific actions if what we say we won't allow or tolerate continues? What carrots or sticks have we to support any such position? What, specifically, would you have us do about it?
In Afghanistan we made the mistake of trying to install a government and dictate the form of another nation's government. Shock and horror, they governed like Afghans. Any government we replace them with will govern like Afghans. The lesson there is not that we need to install better governments, but that we need to stop trying to install governments.
True, but that starts with realistically assessing ends and means and making sure the two are proportional. Certainly bringing liberty and good governance to Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan and all the rest is a lovely and desirable end, but if we haven't the means to achieve that end we'd better not try.
The artificiality of Libya is covered in the first link(bottom of page 1). 3 disparate cultures jammed together by Italy into a Colonial Ugly Baby. Probably would have gotten unrested much earlier if not for the Colonel's muscle.
The haphazard treatment of AQ by this country is a damn old operational definition. The US funded and armed AQ in the 1980s. Once we pronounced ourselves satisfied in Afghanistan, the project got characteristically abandoned. 1990s attacks, especially the Cole, produced vague threats to do something. In 2001, we openly negotiated with AQ's congenial host, the Taliban, to build an oil pipeline. 9/11 changed all that. We attacked Iraq, and became AQs faithful recruiter.
Everything but coherence.
The pipeline was held out as a carrot to try to get the Taliban to dump AQ on several occasions, notably in 97-99, before the project was sidelined by US-imposed sanctions. Bit of bribery... it's been known to work on occasion, but it didn't work this time. AQ of course would have known it was going on and tried to stop it.
Despite the voluminous amounts of blather on various conspiracy-theory websites, the project was never of any economic significance to the US. It was seen purely as leverage to try to pry the Taliban into a more moderate and engaged stance by promising some revenue from transit fees. Nothing terribly unusual or inconsistent there.
I don't think your quite listening to the music, Dayuhan. More or less adjacent to
barracks bombing and Cole bombing, it was OIL that suddenly had the US and the arch-fundamentalist Taliban feeling each other up. Supporting the perception in all the wrong corners that the US was driven by oil availability, not by any coherent point of view on Wahabiism, or the kind of pseudo-government that we would tolerate.
Actually not. The pipeline would have carried natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan; wasn't oil and the US wouldn't have received it. The US was alternately trying to bribe and threaten the Taliban to drop OBL and deal with the West. Carrots and sticks, the tools of diplomacy ever since.
People will perceive what they will; there's no effective way to preempt perception and any action, or none, will fuel some perception that we don't like. At that point in time it wasn't about what we would or wouldn't tolerate, it was about trying to maneuver that government into becoming a bit more tolerable.
I see no reason why we should need a "coherent point of view on Waahhabism"; our problem, whether with governments or individuals, is what people do, not what they believe.
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