Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Cole]

The reason I believe Wanat, and the Combat Studies Institute effort to document events is a valuable training scenario is that COP Kahler was a microcosm of the future Army concept of wide area security and combined arms warfare in irregular warfare. Likewise it exemplified war's inherent uncertainty. No plan survives enemy contact of this level.

To those who believe the C-o-C was deficient in planning/protecting/supplying COP Kahler, recognize that:

* The first of 50+ 155mm rounds began landing within 5 minutes of the first insurgent rounds. Two mortars were available to the platoon but were immediately destroyed.
* A B-1B arrived in about half an hour but the enemy was too close
* AH-64Ds and MEDEVAC arrived in about an hour from 50 miles away and provided decisive close combat attack and rapid evacuation
* Camp Blessing's ground QRF HMMWVs arrived within about an hour and a half from just 5 miles away, certainly a reasonable distance.
* The COP had over 70 troops guarding it, both US and ANA, This was more than typical for other similar COPs and the battalion was responsible for around 14 such COPs
* Waigal valley that Chosen Company was assigned had an average number of Troops in Contact far lower than other sister companies in the battalion, to include one in Korengal Valley
* The COP had a LRAS3 and Improved TOW sensor and initial UAS support
* It had 5 HMMWVs with crew served weapons thus limiting locations for positioning the vehicles on adjacent terraced and steep slopes
* COP Kahler had been in place only since about midnight 8/9 July and the attack occurred at 0420 on 13 July
* The Chairman of the JCS was visiting the battalion in this timeframe, thus occupying the battalion commander's attention. No reasonable leader would ignore such a visit.
* The company commander was tasked to perform a AR 15-6 investigation over an Apache engagement of trucks with insurgent mortarmen and possible hijacked civilians and thus he arrived the afternoon before the attack after experiencing a one day air transportation delay. He brought supplies and planned to patrol and address OP Topside problems the next day...but time ran out
* Wanat was being built because it was seen as a safer site than COP Bella that was farther from Camp Blessing and only resupplied/reinforced by air. The unit had 14 months and two weeks in country and thus was better suited to moving from COP Bella than the inbound unit that was just arriving.
* It had rained hard, the road to Wanat was incomplete and in poor condition the final leg, and the route clearance package had lost assets just before the planned move to Wanat. The contractor would not move large truck assets without such protection but smaller trucks did bring supplies. Both iodine and hand pump filters were available and a SSG was quoted as believing he had adequate supplies in the five HMMWVs when they departed Camp Blessing.

Given these circumstances, reasonable efforts appeared to be in place by the C-o-C to include 1LT Brostrum.

My point is that other larger Army efforts are justified to help lessen the fog of war by providing dismounted troops better "foglights" to help detect the enemy and IEDs. The need for greater precision fires with a smaller blast radius near friendly troops is another lesson.