Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Cole]

You seemed to be focused on kit, and while kit will always play a role it is critical we train our forces on the principles behind infantry tactics, so they can most effectively operate with whatever kit they have (even if it is just small arms and a FM radio).

Bill, that sounds dangerously like former defense secretary Rumsfeld's comment: "As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

I hate to envision the ground casualties suffered without modern body armor and MRAP/M-ATVs. Without today's UAS, attack helicopters, lift and MEDEVAC aircraft flying a much broader area than Vietnam and suffering far fewer battlefield and accident losses, our ground forces could have been in a world of hurt. Those casualties easily could have cut the Iraq War short resulting in a different outcome due to homeland pressure ala Vietnam.

We may be so used to our technical superiority that we are forgetting/discarding the basics. I am not sure that is the case, but it is an observation validated more than once.

Sure, things like GPS make us lazy. But we tend to grossly exaggerate the number of nations truly capable of jamming GPS on a sustained basis. Those are the nations typically deterred by MAD. All the rest are the Irans, North Koreas, Libyas, etc.

While I disagreed with Fuchs implied comparison of actions in Libya to WWII Germany, I tended to agree that the Libyan aircraft and air defense threat was/is vastly overblown. I read an AviationWeek article that said the maximum altitude of the SA-6 is 7000 meters and the SA-8 was only 5,000 meters while a new SA-24 based on the SA-18 had a max altitude of only 3,500 meters...all unclassified figures they published. And as Fuchs pointed out, old MANPADS and radar-guided SA-6 don't work well and can be overflown at altitude. They also could have been jammed and taken out with HARMs from altitude. Only a handful of adversary nations have truly effective air defenses.

Meanwhile, ground forces continue to face far higher ground casualties from current adversaries and a host of potential ones. Yet the money and new developments keep feeding the already safer air and seapower. When was the last major ship-on-ship sea battle? Which potential threats have significant naval power. Only a few deterred by MAD and economics.

As for risk versus gain, that is an opinion, and one best formed by the tactical commander based on his understanding of the situation at the time. The value of protecting the populace is not reserved for large population centers only. That implies you are not taking the offensive, nor defending in depth, especiallly when the bulk of the insurgency is an outside in (taking the rural areas first, then when the time is right move into the urban areas).

If Nuristanis are xenophobes, their gem trade is threatened by the government, and Karzai likewise prevents Korengalis from selling lumber to Pakistan, how is there hope of winning those hearts and minds in areas adjacent to the Pech river? Why are they even relevant?

The rural areas are too large to cover. Do police set up precincts in the sticks? Even the AfPak border is too large and too hard to resupply. We can't even cover our border with Mexico and Canada. Only aerial technology can cover areas that broad and isolated...and not necessarily well.

However, my focus remains on not dragging our field leaders through the mud when they take casualties, it sends a terrible message to the force. You have seen the comments on the other posts where commanders are too cowardly to properly execute our COIN doctrine, and that behavoir is rewarded, while units that actually get outside the wire and push into contested areas put their careers at risk. Seems perverse to me, but in the end we may just have to agree to disagree on this on.

Agreed, particularly field commanders and Soldiers who have served honorably and effectively for 14 months and two weeks which no other service or SOF/SF element has been asked to endure.

However, in this instance from the safety of my couch it is easy to point out that perhaps 1LT Brostrum should have used his ANA to patrol since they were drinking local water and had effective ETT leadership. So in this instance, avoidance of patrol risk or lack of trust in the ANA, actually increased risk to the platoon as a whole.

Another largely unnoticed point in the study was that the platoon-plus at Wanat was newly arriving from Camp Blessing and had been there since, I believe, April, before moving to set up COP Kahler in July. That long rest at a far safer FOB would tend to dispute Ken's point about launching patrols from larger bases. After all, Wanat was just 5 miles north of Camp Blessing. An easy walk right? Well maybe with new body armor and carrying all your own supplies through mountains it is not so easy...

I saw many light loads in old Vietnam footage and some less than flattering equipment and uniform practices, perhaps caused by the long patrols Ken described. The far higher casualty figures also do not necessarily support the value of long random patrols anymore than boring holes in the sky hoping to find the enemy is an effective technique. One could argue patrols and UAS loiters should be cued and focused on CCIR and other IR related to commander's information needs.