The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[Marc]

If you want to Colonize a country and Warden has said this himself you will need a large Army, but he also cations about doing this because it will be very difficult,and expensive and in the end you may not get you to final political objective because you will create such hatred in the indigenous population that.......well it is just better not to do it.

Still the same circular argument. Circular reasoning seems to be inherent in the defence of airpower. Warden's new article also contains a good example:

Very simply, whether in war or business, our normal approach to the time element is exactly backward: we ask ourselves how long something will take rather than decide how long it should take in order to create parallel effects and succeed at an acceptable cost. So important is this concept that we can use it to help determine whether or not we want to go to war. If we cannot or will not operate in the parallel domain, then we should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

The circular reasoning is the following: If we can win the war by applying Warden's strategy (creating parallel effects to put the enemy in a state of system paralysis), we should do so by using airpower and airpower only. Conversely, if we cannot win the war by applying Warden's strategy, we should avoid war altogether.

Let me give some examples:

There is a security and drugs problem in Colombia. The FARC destabilizes the country. Colombian cocaine is sold all over the country and even in front of the White House. What should we do? Well, let's ask John A. Warden. John A. Warden will probably say that the five-ring model does not apply to the FARC and that precision bombardements won't work. His answer will be:

We should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

Another example: There is a terrorist threat in the Philippines. The Abu Sayyaf Group, related to Al Qaeda threathens security in the entire region. What should we do? Well, let's ask John A. Warden. John A. Warden will probably say that the five-ring model does not apply to the Abu Sayyaf Group and that precision bombardements won't work. His answer will be:

We should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

One more example: Thanks to Warden's strategy, we were able to overthrow Saddam Hussain. Unfortunately, several emerging terrorist movements in Iraq do not embrace the concept of democracy. What should we do? Well, let's ask John A. Warden. John A. Warden will probably say that the five-ring model does not apply to the Al Zarqawi and Muqtada Al Sadr and that precision bombardements won't work. His answer will be:

We should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

Unfortunately, we are already at war. Then John A. Warden will probably shut up and wait until an army general like Petraeus comes up with an army-centric strategy that works. After that, he will wait even more until the Americans withdraw from Iraq. Once that is achieved, he will wait still a little bit longer until people forget about Petraeus' successful strategy. Then, finally, he will write an article saying that:

Very simply, whether in war or business, our normal approach to the time element is exactly backward: we ask ourselves how long something will take rather than decide how long it should take in order to create parallel effects and succeed at an acceptable cost. So important is this concept that we can use it to help determine whether or not we want to go to war. If we cannot or will not operate in the parallel domain, then we should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

I don't buy it. Do you?... Really?